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Syndromic surveillance  
Our globalised world faces new, unprecedented and diverse challenges for public health. 
These challenges are resulting from new emerging diseases, extreme environmental 
events, natural disasters, or man-made threats. They call for quick decisions and actions, 
also across borders. Such decisions can only be taken based on rapid information about 
the public health effects of events. Until now, traditional public health surveillance was 
focusing on specific pre-defined diseases or agents causing certain diseases. This 
approach cannot cope with diverse, unknown, or unexpected public health threats. In 
response, the World Health Organization (WHO) revised their International Health 
Regulations in 2005 (IHR (2005)) from focusing on specific diseases to an all-hazard 
approach (1). The revised regulations also request the WHO member states to adjust 
their surveillance capacities. Member states now need to monitor different health threats 
and to immediately report the results. The approach of syndromic surveillance can help 
countries to meet the new public health challenges and the new surveillance 
requirements. 
Syndromic surveillance aims at augmenting traditional public health surveillance systems 
with (near) real-time information on the public health impact of events (2). In order to 
gain a head start, syndromic surveillance analyses existing, possibly electronic data that 
usually were not collected for surveillance purposes. These data come from non-clinical 
sources such as calls to telephone helplines or web searches (3). Or they come from 
clinical sources such as patient records from primary and emergency care or veterinary 
records. 
Syndromic surveillance was primarily developed in the United States of America (USA) as 
one answer to the threat of bioterrorism after the 2001 terrorist attacks (4). Several 
syndromic surveillance systems were developed for the rapid detection and follow up of 
the impact of bioterrorist attacks on public health. Fortunately, they had not to be used 
for that purpose often (5). Instead, syndromic surveillance evolved to be applied for other 
purposes, as Paterson and colleagues showed (6). First, the focus changed to rapid 
information about the onset and development of seasonal infectious diseases, mainly 
influenza. Later, syndromic surveillance was used for situational awareness during 
different events associated with public health risks. Such events are as diverse as the 
2012 Olympic Games in London, hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005, the 2010 volcanic 
ash plume in Europe, the influx of refugees to Italy since 2011 or the recent financial 
crisis in Greece (7-11). In Europe, the first systems were established in England in 2001 
for augmenting seasonal influenza surveillance and in France in the aftermath of the 2003 
heatwave (12, 13). In 2012, there were about 60 active, pilot, planned or terminated 
syndromic surveillance systems in more than 15 European countries (3, 14).  
Syndromic surveillance is still a relatively new approach and there is still much doubt 
about its added value (15-17). Timeliness in terms of earlier case detection and/or 
reporting results is considered the main strength of the approach (18, 19). The provision 
of information at times when no information is available from other (traditional) 
surveillance systems can be considered another advantage (8, 20, 21). Also the flexible 
application for different health threats is a strength of syndromic surveillance (6, 22). The 
major weakness is seen in the lack of specificity of the output of syndromic surveillance 
systems. They analyse existing data sources and signs, symptoms and proxy measures 
that are not indicating one specific health effect or disease. This non-specificity can lead 
to false alerts or not detecting events (15). By assessing the performance of the various 
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syndromic surveillance applications, we can now compile more conclusive evidence on 
the usefulness of the approach. 
 
Made in Europe 
A unique context… 
Europe, in this thesis usually referring to the European Union (EU), is a unique structure. 
It is not like a state although it has many state characteristics such as legislative, 
executive and judicative bodies. It is a sphere of common history and values, close 
relations but also great diversity. EU interventions are following certain principles to 
balance European integration and European diversity (23). These principles were 
originally established to define the competences of the EU. The basic principle of European 
integration or harmonisation refers to creating European standards which replace 
differing national standards. The principle of subsidiarity is the opposite of European 
harmonisation efforts. It entails that tasks which are better performed by member states 
should also be performed by member states instead of by the EU. The principle of mutual 
recognition refers to member states respecting regulations, goods, services or people of 
other member states. This has the advantage that the EU does not have to regulate every 
detail. Although these principles are usually applied to legal questions, they might also 
be applicable to assess the European fit of any strategy or action that has to perform well 
in the European context.  
 
…for fighting health threats 
Greer and colleagues have summarised the role of the European Union regarding health 
issues as “somewhat paradoxical” (23, p.xi). While having agreed on health being a 
common core value (24), member states keep a strong own position regarding health 
issues (23). The EU has a limited direct mandate for health through Article 168 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. But, the impact of the Union is largely 
indirect via the coordination of social security, environmental protection and occupational 
safety but also via regulations on the internal market or free movement, for example. 
Often, crises had an impact on health policy change at the European level. One examples 
is the 2003 SARS outbreak which led to the establishment of the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (23). As health threats do not stop at borders, the EU 
focuses more on harmonisation in the area of health security. A recent example is the 
decision on cross-border health threats (25). The decision aims at implementing the IHR 
(2005) in Europe and aims at improving coordination and exchange between member 
states and with the European Commission. It especially also focuses on monitoring and 
early warning of health threats.  
Member states frequently join forces to conquer similar health problems or they learn 
from states who have already experiences in tackling them. The European Commission 
supports such activities by co-funding actions in the framework of the Health Programme 
with the aim: “[…]to complement national policies of the Member States with a European 
added-value […], [produce] results [that] should be able to be applied in other countries 
and regions across Europe […], [and to] support developments at European level in the 
field of health.” (26, p. 3, 17). The EU principles of harmonisation, mutual recognition 
and subsidiarity are also reflected in Health Programme actions. In this context, Brand 
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discussed a dichotomy of actions characterised as ‘public health in Europe’ and those 
characterised as ‘European public health’ (27). ‘Public health in Europe’ refers to more 
reactive or retrospective actions regarding health issues in several European countries. 
The more proactive ‘European’ approach covers actions such as defining generic European 
frameworks, adopting common policies across Europe, or centralising actions at European 
level. Health Programme actions are often characterised by the setup of a network and 
knowledge exchange between member states, going more in the direction of ‘public 
health in Europe’. Further, actions also focus on harmonisation efforts, defining common 
standards or strategies, which rather fall under ‘European public health’. 
There are various Health Programme actions on health security and surveillance (28, 29). 
Between 2007 and 2013, there were two actions focussing on syndromic surveillance. 
The first action “European Emergency Data-based System for Information on, Detection 
and Analysis of Risks and Threats to Health” (SIDARTHa, Grant Agreement No. 2007208) 
intended to develop a European concept for syndromic surveillance based on emergency 
care data at the subnational level (30). The second action “Syndromic Surveillance 
Survey, Assessment towards Guidelines for Europe” (Triple S-AGE, Grant Agreement No. 
20091112) aimed at harmonising syndromic surveillance across Europe and providing 
European guidelines to foster implementation of syndromic surveillance (31). These two 
Health Programme actions provided a unique framework for studying the interactions 
between the European context and the new concept of syndromic surveillance. They 
offered the chance to assess if and how the results of the two actions went with the 
European principles of harmonisation, mutual recognition and subsidiarity. 
 
…for generating new knowledge 
Europe has repeatedly been coined a “natural laboratory” for learning about health (32-
34). The diversity in Europe somewhat limits the integration efforts, but on the other 
hand it provides a unique context to gain new knowledge by analysing the differences 
between countries (33). But, how does this cross-country learning process in Europe 
actually look like? In general, two different rationales for cross-country learning can be 
differentiated. 
Marmor and colleagues have described the process of cross-country learning from the 
perspective of countries learning from others (35). Here, new knowledge is mainly 
generated in and for the individual countries. According to Marmor et al., the learning 
process takes three different forms: learning about, learning why and learning from. 
‘Learning about’ refers to an often descriptive understanding of similarities and 
differences. ‘Learning why’ aims at explaining the way a certain aspect has taken the 
form it did. ‘Learning from’ refers to the transfer of a certain aspect from one country or 
a group of countries to another.  
Cross-country learning can also be described from a broader perspective of gaining new 
knowledge from comparing differences between several countries. A good example for 
this form of cross-country learning in the European context is the work of the WHO 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (36, 37). Here, new knowledge is 
generated for one or several other countries, based on benchmarking and the 
identification of good practices. Such cross-country comparisons have helped reforming 
health policies, regarding cancer services in England, for example (38). However, there 
are obstacles for good quality country comparisons. They lie in the limited comparability 
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of the complex contexts in the different countries, limited data availability and diverse 
multidisciplinary comparative approaches and methods (38, 39). Despite various 
initiatives, the field of international comparisons between countries in the area of health 
is still in the development phase (38).  
Based on the rationales of cross-country learning and the characteristics of the European 
context described above, a generic framework for European cross-country learning can 
be derived (figure 1). The framework is intended to explain how the European context 
adds value for generating new knowledge on a certain topic. Three dimensions of learning 
can be differentiated with the European context playing an increasing role from the first 
to the third dimension. In the first dimension, Europe provides a context in which 
countries can learn from each other to gain new knowledge for their own situation, 
referred to as ‘Learning in Europe’. In the second dimension, knowledge for Europe is 
compiled by harmonisation, standardisation, generalisation or identification of a common 
denominator of a topic. This can be referred to as ‘Learning for Europe’. Here, the EU 
principles as described above should to be taken into account in order for the knowledge 
to fit into the European context. The third dimension is focusing on ‘learning from Europe’. 
New knowledge on a topic is generated for common use in Europe (and beyond), based 
on a structured analysis of the differences in Europe. This could be based on cross-country 
comparisons, for example. The dimensions of ‘Learning in Europe’ and ‘Learning for 
Europe’ can also be linked to Brand’s argumentation of ‘Public Health in Europe’ and 
‘European Public Health’ respectively. In this thesis, the framework was applied to analyse 
the added value of the European context to learn about syndromic surveillance. 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for cross-country learning in Europe (own concept)  
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Aims and outline of the thesis 
The thesis aimed at analysing 
1) the added value of syndromic surveillance for improving Europe’s surveillance 
capacity, and  
2) the added value of the European context to gain new knowledge about syndromic 
surveillance.  
For the first aim, the thesis explored how a specific European syndromic surveillance 
system should look like by respecting the European principles of harmonisation, mutual 
recognition and subsidiarity. Secondly, the usefulness of syndromic surveillance for 
Europe was explored by assessing the major strengths and weakness of syndromic 
surveillance: timeliness, flexibility, additional information provision, and non-specificity. 
Finally, it was assessed how the application of syndromic surveillance can foster Europe’s 
capacity to meet the new IHR (2005) surveillance core capacity requirements (figure 2). 
For the second aim, the thesis analysed how the European context adds value to learning 
about syndromic surveillance according to the framework presented in figure 1. The focus 
of this analysis was on a cross-country comparison for identifying success factors of 
syndromic surveillance systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Framework for analysing the added value of syndromic surveillance for Europe (own concept) 
IHR (2005) = International Health Regulations (2005) s = strength, w = weakness  
                                                                                                                                                                              Chapter 1: Introduction     13 
Research questions 
Specifically, the thesis aimed at answering the following research questions (with 
reference to chapters in this thesis): 
1. How can a specific European syndromic surveillance concept be defined? 
1.1. How can syndromic surveillance in Europe be defined (chapter 2)? 
1.2. How can a European syndromic surveillance system be defined (chapter 3, 5)? 
 
2. How useful is syndromic surveillance for Europe, in terms of monitoring 
2.1. gastrointestinal outbreaks (chapter 3), 
2.2. seasonal influenza (chapters 4, 6), 
2.3. other potentially public health threatening events (chapters 5, 6)? 
 
3. How can syndromic surveillance support the implementation of the IHR (2005) core 
surveillance capacity requirements in Europe (chapter 5)? 
 
4. What is the added value of a European cross-country comparison for identifying 
success factors of syndromic surveillance systems (chapter 6)? 
 
Research design 
The research questions were answered in several studies which can best be described as 
following a pragmatic mixed methods research design. Question 1 was answered applying 
consensus methods. Both questions 1.1 and 1.2 were answered using an expert-panel. 
The expert panel for question 1.2 was informed by the results of a semi-structured survey 
and a literature review. Questions 2.1 and 2.2 were answered by applying quantitative 
analysis methods in a case study design using secondary data from emergency care. For 
questions 2.3 and 3, a narrative review was applied based on mixed data collected from 
the literature. Question 4 was answered applying the mixed methods approach 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The study analysed mixed data collected from the 
literature and from country visits. 
The two Health Programme actions SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE provided a unique 
framework for studying the research questions. The author had a leading role in both 
actions and the research presented in this thesis was embedded in the actions. Her 
research was only possible through the access to data, cases and the network of the 
partners of these two actions. 
 
Thesis outline 
The thesis has seven chapters. This chapter 1 introduces the basic concepts of syndromic 
surveillance, the unique European context and cross-country learning. It presents the 
aims and conceptual frameworks of the thesis, the research questions and the research 
design. Chapter 2 introduces a new European definition for syndromic surveillance. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of a concept for a European syndromic surveillance 
system, including a feasibility study for gastrointestinal outbreak detection. Chapter 4 
assesses the application of the European syndromic surveillance concept for supporting 
local influenza surveillance in one European country. Chapter 5 analyses the potential of 
syndromic surveillance for situational awareness during different events in order to 
support the implementation of the IHR (2005) in Europe. It also presents a proposal for 
the European setup of the syndromic surveillance concept presented in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 6 identifies success factors of syndromic surveillance systems by comparing 
syndromic surveillance systems from different countries in Europe using Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis. It also provides further evidence on the usefulness of syndromic 
surveillance for seasonal influenza surveillance and situational awareness. Chapter 7 
synthesises the results in a general discussion regarding the aims of this thesis, discusses 
limitations and draws conclusions on the practical relevance of the findings and for future 
research.  
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Assessment of syndromic surveillance in Europe 
Potential public health threats are generally detected through specific surveillance 
systems based on predetermined diseases and rapid biological confirmation. However, 
such systems are not rapid and they do not detect all health hazards, especially 
unexpected threats. Syndromic surveillance can support public health professionals in 
this endeavour.  
The idea was first put into practice in the late 1990s with the aim of providing early 
warning of disease outbreaks and potential bioterrorist actions (1). Progressively, such 
surveillance systems have taken a wider public health approach, focused not only on 
provision of early alerts but also on the reassurance of stakeholders and the public about 
health effects, ranging from infectious diseases to environmental hazards (2).  
Syndromic surveillance systems rely on near real-time automated data collection and 
analysis from various information sources including general practitioners (3), emergency 
departments (4), pharmacy sales, telephone help lines (5), web queries (6), and 
veterinary data (7). These systems monitor the spread and impact, or absence of impact, 
of known or unknown events in the population on the basis of the presentation of signs 
and symptoms. 
Syndromic surveillance is being increasingly used. Several European countries, including 
France and the UK (6, 7), have already integrated such surveillance into national 
surveillance programmes on a routine basis. The organisation of public health systems 
across the European Union (EU) drives diverse approaches to syndromic surveillance. 
This diversity makes comparison of results difficult but offers the opportunity to learn 
from the variety of experiences and to identify good practice and factors leading to 
success. 
With the aim of increasing the European capacity for real-time or near real-time 
surveillance and monitoring of the health burden of expected and unexpected health-
related events, a European project, co-financed by the Public Health Programme through 
the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, was launched in 2010. The Triple-S 
(Syndromic Surveillance Survey, assessment towards guidelines for Europe, grant 
agreement GA 2009.11.12) project (8), coordinated by the French Institute for Public 
Health Surveillance, includes 24 organisations from 13 countries. This project addresses 
both human and animal health, and offers a unique opportunity to initiate knowledge 
exchange between experts from both disciplines. The project complements previous EU 
work: the EuroMOMO project, based on public health mortality monitoring systems (9); 
and SIDARTHa, focused on the development of a European emergency data-based 
syndromic surveillance system (10). 
The project recognises the vast quantity of potential data sources for syndromic 
surveillance across Europe, and the different public health surveillance approaches; its 
objective is not to create a single European system but to review and analyse syndromic 
surveillance activities across member states. 
The project consists of an inventory of syndromic surveillance systems to identify 
reference people in the member states and survey the characteristics of established, pilot, 
expired, and planned systems. The project relies on a proactive approach, with the 
organisation of eight country visits to gain an in-depth understanding of selected systems 
and to stimulate knowledge transfer. The inventory and the country visits aim to develop 
a network of expert organisations that can support one another or organisations that are 
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planning to start or re-establish syndromic surveillance systems in their own countries. 
The project will thus contribute to the international discussion of the usefulness of the 
concept, taking into account not only integral factors of such systems but also contextual 
determinants, such as treatment-seeking behaviour or political environment.  
Before this review was undertaken, the consortium decided that an update of the 
definition of syndromic surveillance generally used (based on the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention guidelines) was necessary in view of the evolution of syndromic 
surveillance during the past decade (1). The development of a common definition by 
experts in the discipline constitutes the first output of the project (panel).  
The Health and Consumer Directorate General of the European Commission, the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, WHO Regional Office for Europe, and the 
International Society for Disease Surveillance are members of the advisory board, to 
encourage exchange of practices and skills at both the European and the global level. 
All relevant findings from the different systems identified by the project will be integrated 
into a proposal for a European syndromic surveillance strategy that will aim to improve 
public health surveillance in the member states to reinforce public health action across 
Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Panel: Definition of syndromic surveillance 
A real-time (or near real-time) collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health-related 
data to enable the early identification of the impact (or absence of impact) of potential human or 
veterinary public health threats that require effective public health action. 
Syndromic surveillance is based not on the laboratory-confirmed diagnosis of a disease but on non-
specific health indicators including clinical signs, symptoms as well as proxy measures (e.g., 
absenteeism, drug sales, animal production collapse) that constitute a provisional diagnosis (or 
“syndrome”). 
The data are usually collected for purposes other than surveillance and, where possible, are 
automatically generated so as not to impose an additional burden on the data providers. 
This surveillance tends to be non-specific yet sensitive and rapid, and can augment and complement 
the information provided by traditional test-based surveillance systems. 
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Abstract 
We developed a syndromic surveillance (SyS) concept using emergency dispatch, 
ambulance and emergency-department data from different European countries. Based on 
an inventory of sub-national emergency data availability in 12 countries, we propose 
framework deﬁnitions for speciﬁc syndromes and a SyS system design. We tested the 
concept by retrospectively applying cumulative sum and spatio-temporal cluster analyses 
for the detection of local gastrointestinal outbreaks in four countries and comparing the 
results with notiﬁable disease reporting.  Routine emergency data was available daily and 
electronically in 11 regions, following a common structure. We identiﬁed two 
gastrointestinal outbreaks in two countries; one was conﬁrmed as a norovirus outbreak. 
We detected 1/147 notiﬁed outbreaks. Emergency-care data-based SyS can supplement 
local surveillance with near real-time information on gastrointestinal patients, especially 
in special circumstances, e.g. foreign tourists. It most likely cannot detect the majority 
of local gastrointestinal outbreaks with few, mild or dispersed cases. 
 
Key words: Gastrointestinal infections, public health, surveillance system. 
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Introduction 
Syndromic surveillance (SyS) of pre-diagnostic cases based on signs and symptoms or 
health-related behaviour is a supplementary approach for timely detection of public 
health threats and for monitoring events with potential public health impact if 
information from other surveillance systems are not yet or not at all available (1). 
SyS can provide a ﬂexible and cost- effective way to gain timely information about 
the health impact of known and unknown, communicable and non-communicable, 
natural and man-made health threats (2, 3). 
The European landscape of public health surveillance mainly consists of three parallel 
schemes. The ﬁrst scheme comprises the speciﬁc communicable disease surveillance 
systems of European Union member states (MS) that provide information on conﬁrmed 
cases following a common case deﬁnition to the European Surveillance System (TESSy) 
(4). The second scheme is different reporting systems through which MS give account of 
communicable or non-communicable events to inform other MS and European 
institutions, e.g. the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) (5). The third scheme 
comprises unspeciﬁc information collated by European networks of different countries, 
e.g. Inﬂuenzanet for self-reported inﬂuenza symptoms (6), or EuroMOMO for mortality 
monitoring (7), and by the Medical Information System (MedISys) that automatically 
screens online news wires concerning health events (8). SyS is accomplished in MS at 
the local, regional, and national levels (9). A systematic approach towards European SyS 
could support timely, comparable, cross-border surveillance. 
Routinely collected emergency-care data from (i) emergency medical dispatch (EMD) 
centres, (ii) ambulance or emergency medical services (EMS), and (iii) emergency 
departments (ED) can be a valuable source for SyS. Across Europe, emergency-care data 
is available following a common structure (10). The biggest advantage is the opportunity 
of real-time reporting of electronic emergency data that can offer timelier and more 
frequent information compared to established traditional surveillance systems, e.g. based 
on sentinel doctors (2). It provides data based on a form of clinical assessment, e.g. 
working diagnoses from emergency physicians (EP), which have a higher speciﬁcity for 
SyS compared to non-clinical data from, e.g. over-the-counter drug sales (11). 
We aimed at developing the ﬁrst concept for SyS based on three routine emergency data 
sources that is applicable across Europe. We describe the development of the SyS concept 
and present results of a case study testing the SyS concept using the example of local 
gastrointestinal outbreak detection. 
 
Methods 
SyS system concept 
Inventory of emergency data availability in Europe 
We asked regional (sub-national) emergency service representatives in 12 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Turkey) to assess availability and content of routine datasets collected in 
EMD, EMS, and ED. Using a semi-standardized survey we asked for the method of data 
collection, i.e. manual or electronic, the frequency of data availability, e.g. daily, and the 
available data ﬁelds in the routine datasets. 
26    Syndromic Surveillance – Made in Europe                                                                                              
Syndrome deﬁnition 
Based on the inventory, we deﬁned syndromes of potential public health relevance that 
could be generated using routine emergency data. Based on a focus group discussion 
with emergency-care and public-health experts from across Europe and examples from 
the literature, we developed recommendations for generating syndromes based on the 
most common diagnostic coding systems used in EMD, EMS, and ED, i.e. Advanced 
Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS), versions 11.3 and 12.0 (Priority Dispatch Inc., 
USA), International Classiﬁcation of Disease (ICD) 9th and 10th revisions, chief 
complaints based on Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale (CTAS), and the Minimum Dataset 
for Emergency Physicians (MIND). 
 
SyS system design 
Based on a review of the literature and material published on existing SyS systems and 
a consultation with European emergency-care, public-health and information technology 
experts, we developed a design concept for an emergency data-based SyS system. We 
deﬁned a minimum standard dataset as input for the SyS system that is applicable for 
EMD, EMS and ED, deﬁned the data ﬂow, selected statistical analytical methods for 
detecting unusual aberrations, and described ways of reporting the output. 
 
Case study on local gastrointestinal outbreak detection 
We tested our SyS concept for EMD, EMS and ED, and for different syndromes and 
purposes, based on retrospective analyses of historical data from regional emergency 
systems in four countries (12). In this paper we present the results of a case study on 
local gastro-intestinal outbreak detection. 
 
Datasets 
We analysed data from the EMD centre in the state of Tyrol, Austria (EMD-AT 
dataset), data from EMS staffed by EP in the state of Tyrol, Austria (EP-AT dataset), 
the county of Goeppingen, Germany (EP-DE dataset) and the country of Belgium (EP-
BE dataset), and data from an ED in a university hospital in the city of Santander, 
Spain (ED-ES dataset). Table 1 describes the main characteristics of the datasets. 
 
Gastrointestinal syndrome case deﬁnition 
Table 2 details the deﬁnition of gastrointestinal syndrome cases for ﬁve common 
emergency-care coding systems as an example for a syndrome that can be generated 
based on routine emergency-care data. An emergency case which received any code 
included in Table 2 was included in the case study.  
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Temporal aberration detection algorithms 
As a ﬁrst step, three detection algorithms based on cumulative sums were applied 
for the analysis of aberrations in the time series of gastrointestinal syndrome cases: 
C1, C2, and C3 based on short-term baselines (13), and two cumulative sum 
algorithms based on longer baselines, one for normal (CUSUM-N) and one for 
Poisson-distributed data (CUSUM-P) (14). If the distribution of the datasets for a 
speciﬁc syndrome was neither normal nor Poisson distributed, as was the case for 
gastrointestinal syndrome cases, we applied all algorithms in parallel. The CUSUM 
algorithms were enhanced with the fast initial response (FIR) technique which 
ensures that large chart values do not inﬂate following values preventing the 
production of excessive signals (15). In the case study the algorithms were applied 
retrospectively. We analysed periods of six (EP-BE dataset) or 12 (EMD-AT, ED-ES 
datasets) months produced a daily CUSUM value. For each analysis period, we 
calculated baseline means to which the actual values were compared, based on the 
6 or 12 months preceding the analysis period (Table 1). For the CUSUM-P analysis, 
the accepted mean was deﬁned close to the actual mean and the threshold value h 
was deﬁned by look-up procedure in the table of Lucas (16). The temporal aberration 
detection algorithms have been applied using Microsoft Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corp., 
USA). 
 
Spatio-temporal cluster detection algorithm 
In a second step, outbreak periods that were identiﬁed based on temporal aberration 
detection analysis (see deﬁnition of outbreaks in the next section) were analysed by 
a prospective spatio-temporal scan statistic (17). The scan statistic process can be 
explained as a cylindrical scanning window that moves ﬂexibly over the study area. 
The width of the cylinder base represents the geographical area and the height 
represents the time period which is scanned. The scan statistic evaluates for all 
possible cylinder locations and sizes if an observed cluster of cases is caused by 
chance. The scan statistic can be applied to different levels of spatial aggregation of 
cases. In the case of spatially aggregated datasets, the cases are concentrated on 
the centroids of an area. In our case study, a prospective spatio-temporal Bernoulli 
model-based scan statistic was applied to the exact addresses of the emergency sites 
in the EMD-AT dataset. A prospective spatio-temporal Poisson model was applied to 
the EP-AT, EP-BE, EP-DE, and ED-ES datasets, based on the centroids of each 
administrative area (Table 1) (17). During the scanning process the rates of 
gastrointestinal cases divided by the total number of emergency cases within the 
scanning window were compared to the rates outside of the window. The baseline 
populations were generated using the total number of emergencies in the previous 
12 months (EP-AT, EP-DE) and the previous 6 months (EP-BE, ED-ES). The likelihood 
that a cluster exists by chance was characterized by a P value based on 999 Monte-
Carlo simulations (17). 
For each syndrome, different parameters have to be deﬁned for detecting relevant 
clusters. For local gastrointestinal outbreak detection, only clusters with the 
parameters of 1 day temporal length, enclosing a circular area of up to 1 km radius, 
and with a signiﬁcance level of P < 0.001 that the cluster exists by chance were 
deﬁned as relevant. Pre-tests with different parameters showed that for longer and 
larger cluster sizes the number of cases that formed a cluster was too low and/or the 
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cases were scattered over too large an area to reﬂect a true positive outbreak. The 
analyses were performed using SaTScan™ (v. 9.1.1., M. Kulldorff and Information 
Management Services Inc., USA). The identiﬁed spatio-temporal clusters were 
visualized using ESRI ArcGIS® v. 10.1. (Environmental Systems Research Institute 
Inc., USA). 
 
Table 2: Gastrointestinal syndrome deﬁnition for ﬁve common emergency care coding systems (21) 
Coding System Codes included for gastrointestinal syndrome (Boolean operator: OR) 
AMPDS 11.3, 12.0 A1 Abdominal Pain 
ICD 9 001 Cholera 
 002 Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers 
 003 Other salmonella infections 
 004 Shigellosis 
 008.5 Bacterial enteritis unspecified 
 005 Other food poisoning (bacterial) 
 005.9 Food poisoning unspecified 
 008.6 Enteritis due to specified virus 
 008.69 Enteritis due to other viral enteritis 
 009.2 Infectious diarrhoea 
 009.3 Diarrhoea of presumed infectious origin 
 787.0 Nausea and vomiting 
 787.01 Nausea with vomiting 
 787.02 Nausea alone 
 787.03 Vomiting alone 
 787.81 Diarrhoea 
 558.9 Other and unspecified non-infectious gastroenteritis and colitis 
 535.5 Unspecified gastritis and gastroduodenitis 
ICD 10 A00 Cholera 
  A01 Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers 
  A02 other salmonella infections 
  A03 Shigellosis 
  A04 other bacterial intestinal infections 
  A05 Other bacterial foodborne intoxications, not elsewhere classified 
  A08 Viral and other specified intestinal infections 
  A09 Diarrhoea and gastroenteritis of presumed infectious origin 
  R11 Nausea and vomiting 
  K52 Other non-infective gastroenteritis and colitis 
  K52.9 Non-infective gastroenteritis and colitis, unspecified 
  T62.9 Noxious substance eaten as food, unspecified 
MIND II 4.1 Abdominal disorders, acute abdomen 
  4.2 Abdominal disorders, gastrointestinal bleeding  
  4.3 Abdominal disorders, colic 
  4.4 Abdominal disorders, other disease abdomen 
  6.2 Metabolic disease, dehydrated 
CTAS Abdominal pain adults 
  Abdominal pain children 
  Diarrhoea 
  Vomiting 
 
AMPDS, Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System; ICD, International Classiﬁcation of Diseases; MIND, Minimum Dataset 
for Emergency Physicians; CTAS, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale. 
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Deﬁnition of an outbreak 
We developed a decision tree as suggested by Meyer et al. (18) and Ansaldi et al. 
(19) to deﬁne inclusion criteria for outbreaks based on the signals given by, ﬁrst, the 
temporal and, second, the spatio-temporal detection algorithm. For the case of local 
gastrointestinal outbreak detection, these were (i) at least 2 days of consecutive 
temporal aberration detection signals, or (ii) days with an exceptionally high 
aberration in case numbers from the mean (>3 standard deviations (S.D.) from the 
baseline mean of the previous 6 or 12 months), and (iii) outbreaks identiﬁed by the 
temporal aberration analyses with corresponding spatio-temporal clusters. 
 
Validation of outbreaks 
The comparison with reference data from other (traditional) surveillance systems can 
give additional assurance that a signal could represent a real event. For the case 
study on local gastrointestinal outbreaks, we compared the detected outbreaks with 
notiﬁable surveillance reports of foodborne diseases. This reference data was 
available for Tyrol (Austria), Belgium, and Goeppingen (Germany) (20) (Table 1). 
 
 
Results 
SyS system concept 
Availability of emergency data 
Routine electronic data was available daily in 11 of 12 regions from EMD, EMS and/or 
ED (Table 3). Information on the patients’ chief complaints was available daily and 
electronically in ten systems, information on age and sex in nine systems (Table 3). 
Although the datasets comprised common data ﬁelds across Europe such as date, 
age, sex, and diagnostic information, the items were deﬁned differently. In particular, 
diagnostic information varied. Sometimes international coding systems were used, 
and sometimes data was collected following regional or national coding systems 
(Table 1). 
 
SyS system design 
We deﬁned a standard dataset for SyS that can be generated based on routine data 
collected in the majority of EMD, EMS, or ED across Europe: (1) date, (2) syndrome, 
(3) geographical reference, (4) modiﬁer I: age, (5) modiﬁer II: sex, (6) modiﬁer III: 
severity. 
Figure 1 shows the generic functions and data ﬂow of the automated SyS system. 
The system can be implemented by emergency institutions using the institution’s 
already established health information technology infrastructure. The emergency 
institution is supposed to programme a permanent, daily translation between the 
emergency database and the surveillance system following the standard SyS dataset, 
e.g. an extract transform load (ETL) process. Afterwards, the syndromic data should 
automatically be analysed by applying temporal and spatio-temporal aberration 
detection algorithms in parallel. The proposed algorithms can be operationalized 
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using open source software such as R (21) and SaTScan, or can be programmed 
directly in other, already applied data analysis software. The parameters of the 
algorithms have to be calculated once for each monitored syndrome and each 
emergency dataset, based on historical emergency data. During regular operation of 
the SyS system, these parameters should be updated regularly and after changes in 
the data collection procedure. The outputs of the SyS analyses are statistical signals 
that can be displayed in tables, charts and maps, which can be disseminated within 
the emergency-care institution and to the local/regional public health authority. 
Reporting can be accomplished by establishing a regular automatic email message, 
by incorporating the results in already established reports, or by allowing 
stakeholders to access a virtual dashboard online that is automatically updated on a 
regular basis. The public health authority and/or emergency institution decide if the 
signals could represent a real event following a pre-deﬁned decision tree for each 
syndrome. The public health authority can incorporate SyS alerts into existing 
surveillance systems and response procedures. The emergency institution can use 
the information for resource planning. At the time of writing this paper, two 
institutions have implemented an automatic SyS system following this concept, the 
EMD centre of the State of Tyrol, Austria, and the ED of the University Hospital in 
Santander, Spain. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Concept of an automated emergency data-based SyS system. 
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Case study on local gastrointestinal outbreak detection  
The case study showed that the case numbers in the datasets based on data from 
EMS staffed with EP in the Austrian (EP-AT dataset) and the German (EP-DE dataset) 
regions, with an average of 0.14 and 0.31 cases per day, respectively, were too low 
for providing valid results based on the temporal aberration detection analysis. 
Figure 2 shows the time series of the number of gastrointestinal syndrome cases and 
the signals of the temporal aberration detection analyses for the EMD-AT, EP-BE and ED-
ES datasets. 
 
Table 3: Availability of selected electronic emergency care information from three sources (EMD, EMS, ED) in 
regional emergency institutions in 12 countries (status: June 2009) 
   Data availability 
Country Region 
Data 
source 
date 
chief 
complaint/ 
working 
diagnosis  
age  sex  
Austria State of Tyrol (City of Innsbruck, 
District of Innsbruck, District of 
Kufstein) 
EMD daily daily daily daily 
  District of Kufstein  EMS (EP) daily daily daily daily 
  District of Kufstein  ED daily n.a. daily daily 
Belgium Province of Flemish-Brabant EMD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  City of Leuven EMS (EP) daily weekly daily daily 
  City of Leuven ED daily daily daily daily 
Czech  City of Prague EMD daily daily weekly weekly 
Republic  City of Prague EMS daily weekly - - 
  City of Prague ED n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Denmark Capital Region of Denmark EMD daily daily - - 
  Capital Region of Denmark EMS (EP) daily daily daily daily 
  Capital Region of Denmark ED daily - daily daily 
Finland City of Kuopio EMD daily daily - daily 
  City of Kuopio EMS (EP) daily - weekly weekly 
  City of Kuopio ED daily daily daily daily 
France District of Hauts-de-Seine EMD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  District of Hauts-de-Seine EMS (EP) weekly - weekly weekly 
  n.a. ED n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany County of Goeppingen EMD daily - - - 
  County of Goeppingen EMS (EP) daily daily daily daily 
  County of Goeppingen ED daily - daily daily 
Hungary national level EMD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  national level EMS (EP) monthly - monthly month
ly 
  City of Budapest ED daily - daily daily 
Italy Province of Genoa EMD daily daily - - 
  Province of Genoa EMS (EP) monthly - monthly month
ly 
  Province of Genoa ED n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Norway City of Bergen EMD daily daily daily daily 
  City of Bergen EMS daily - - - 
  City of Bergen ED n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Spain Autonomous Region of Cantabria EMD daily daily daily daily 
  Autonomous Region of Cantabria EMS (EP) weekly weekly weekly weekly 
  Autonomous Region of Cantabria ED daily daily daily daily 
Turkey City of Antalya EMD monthly n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  n.a. EMS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  n.a. ED n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
EMD, Emergency medical dispatch, EMS, emergency medical services, ED, emergency department; EP, emergency physician; 
n.a., information not available; –, data not available. 
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The temporal aberration detection analyses resulted in many signals. When applying 
the decision tree to identify outbreaks, there were many events with high aberration 
from the mean and with signals on at least 2 consecutive days. When applying the 
spatio-temporal analysis during these outbreak periods, we were able to further 
narrow down the number of relevant outbreaks. Figure 3 provides an overview on 
the number of signals and the application of the decision tree for each dataset. One 
outbreak was located in Tyrol, Austria (EP-AT) (14 February 2007, 12 cases within a 
circle of 0 km radius, P < 0.0001), and one in Santander, Spain (3 August 2010, 
seven cases within a circle of 0.68 km radius or distribution across postal code areas 
of 2.2 km2, P < 0.0001). Figure 4 exempliﬁes the cluster in Santander, Spain. 
The comparison with notiﬁable disease reporting data conﬁrmed the alert on 
14 February 2007 as a norovirus outbreak in a group of foreign students who stayed 
in one hotel in the city of Kufstein (n = 26 cases). The alert was not conﬁrmed by 
the EMD-AT dataset which refers to the same region. Two subsequent norovirus 
outbreaks in the following days in two foreign tourist groups in the same hotel (n = 
10 and n = 53 cases) were not identiﬁed in the syndromic datasets. No other notiﬁed 
foodborne outbreak in Tyrol, Austria (n = 42), and Belgium (n = 105) could ultimately 
be linked to signals in the syndromic data-sets. The reference data from Goeppingen, 
Germany did not provide the number of outbreaks. 
 
Discussion 
SyS system concept 
We developed the ﬁrst concept for a SyS system based on routinely collected 
emergency medical care data from EMD, EMS and ED for different countries in 
Europe. 
Routine emergency data was available in many regions in Europe in electronic form 
and on a daily basis. It provided relevant information for SyS, such as date and 
geographical information and the patients’ chief complaints. We deﬁned 
recommendations for syndrome coding, based on the most common coding systems 
in emergency care, and designed a concept for an emergency data-based SyS system 
able to be implemented at the local/regional level in Europe. Two regional emergency 
institutions in Austria and Spain have initially implemented an automatic SyS system 
following our concept. 
As the emergency data inventory revealed differences in data coding and availability 
across Europe, we conceptualized the system to be implemented at single emergency 
institutions or in one jurisdiction. This allows for raw data to be analysed in the 
emergency institution, respecting data privacy. This ﬂexibility of the concept supports 
a relatively rapid set-up of a SyS system as no agreements or technical connections 
outside of the emergency institution have to be established. The syndrome deﬁnitions 
based on the most common emergency-care coding systems ease the 
implementation and support the portability of the SyS concept across Europe. Next 
to the gastrointestinal syndrome, the expert consortium deﬁned syndromes for 
respiratory and inﬂuenza-like illness, for heat-related illness and unspeciﬁc syndrome 
(= volume of medical cases without speciﬁcation) (12, 22). The results of case studies 
analysing these syndromes are discussed elsewhere (23, 24). 
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Figure 2 Time series and temporal aberration detection algorithm signals for local gastrointestinal cases in three 
regions: (a) state of Tyrol, Austria, based on emergency medical dispatch data (EMD-AT); (b) Belgium (national  
coverage) based on data from emergency medical services (EMS) staffed with emergency physicians (EP-BE); 
(c) city of Santander, Spain, based on emergency department data (ED-ES) 
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Figure 4: Exemplary spatio-temporal cluster of gastrointestinal syndrome cases in Santander, Spain, on 3 
August 2010 and rate of gastrointestinal syndrome cases on 3 August 2010 per total number of ED cases 
between 1 January and 30 June 2010 per postal code. 
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Case study on local gastrointestinal outbreak detection 
Our SyS concept was tested for the detection of local outbreaks of gastrointestinal 
illness in four regions in Europe. In this case study, we identiﬁed two potentially 
relevant outbreaks. The outbreak identiﬁed in Spain could not be conﬁrmed due to 
missing reference data. The alert in Austria was conﬁrmed as a norovirus outbreak 
in a group of foreign students. No other notiﬁed outbreak was identiﬁed by the SyS 
analyses. This low validity shows that our SyS concept cannot replace traditional 
surveillance of gastrointestinal diseases. 
Gastrointestinal diseases are often the focus of SyS applications (25), pursuing three 
major purposes: (i) early information on the onset of expected seasonal outbreaks 
such as winter vomiting disease (26), (ii) situational awareness during potentially 
health-threatening events such as disasters or mass gatherings (18), and (iii) 
detection of local gastrointestinal illness clusters (27). Earlier studies suggested that 
comparatively large outbreaks at the local or regional levels were successfully 
detected by SyS systems (28). Rather small outbreaks, however, appear to be 
difﬁcult to detect as Xing et al. (29), Balter et al. (30) and Heffernan et al. (31) found 
based on ED data. Moreover, in our study most notiﬁed outbreaks in the study 
regions, which mainly consisted of few cases, were not detected by our SyS analyses. 
Emergency-care data, similar to other health services based data sources for 
surveillance, are unlikely to reﬂect outbreaks with few or dispersed cases such as 
foodborne outbreaks comprised of visitors to a restaurant who later develop 
symptoms when they are in different areas (30). 
Another explanation for the low validity is the fact that emergency-care data sources 
are not anticipated to catch all gastrointestinal outbreaks as most gastrointestinal 
illness patients with mild symptoms would self-treat their symptoms or utilize primary- 
care services. This assumption would suggest additional analysis of other data sources 
for SyS with a bigger coverage of mild gastrointestinal illness cases. Andersson and 
colleagues (32) compared three syndromic data sources able to cover people affected by 
gastrointestinal illness who were not seeking care in Sweden: telephone helplines, web 
queries and over-the-counter drug sales. This study also conﬁrmed the ﬁnding that only 
larger outbreaks were detected by SyS. From nine point-source outbreaks only the four 
largest were detected with case numbers between 369 and 27 000. Five smaller 
outbreaks with case numbers between 100 and 185 were not detected. We could not test 
our concept on large outbreaks as no outbreaks with more than 53 cases occurred during 
the study period. The reference data in Belgium and Germany did not provide the 
number of cases per outbreak. 
Emergency care especially comes into contact with gastrointestinal illness in case of 
severe illness, e.g. during the Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli outbreak in 
Germany in 2011 during which ED reported on bloody diarrhoea cases (33). Further, 
emergency services are approached by gastrointestinal patients during crisis 
situations such as the 2003 blackout in the USA (34). In ED in the USA, seasonal 
increases of gastrointestinal cases are seen during winter suggesting that 
gastrointestinal patients visit emergency services not only for severe illness but most 
likely because other health facilities are not accessible, e.g. during Christmas holidays 
(30). In addition, emergency services cover patients with special characteristics, e.g. 
as in our case of Austria foreign tourists that might have decided to use emergency 
care as the easiest point of access to care. Hence, compared to other SyS data 
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sources, emergency-care data-based SyS can have an added value for 
gastrointestinal surveillance if patients with severe symptoms or in special 
circumstances are using emergency care instead of other health services. 
In the case study, we received many temporal signals for aberrations consisting of 
small case numbers which could not be conﬁrmed by data from notiﬁable disease 
surveillance, which was also the case in other studies (35, 36). This could be due to the 
choice or calibration of the statistical methods applied for temporal aberration detection 
analysis (37). The application of other detection algorithms such as regression analysis 
or moving averages could yield more valid results. However, we saw the greatest 
potential to increase validity by additionally applying spatio-temporal detection 
algorithms which are expected to add information to solely temporal analyses of local 
gastrointestinal outbreaks as many cases tend to cluster in relatively small areas (38). 
Other studies applying spatio-temporal scan statistics detected rather large or severe 
outbreaks (36, 39). In order to enhance the validity of detecting small clusters, 
adjustment of the analysis parameters was suggested (38). Our case study showed 
promising results for identifying smaller outbreaks and reducing the number of 
potential false alerts when applying relatively restrictive parameters to the analysis. 
This limited our analysis to only detect point-source outbreaks although it increased 
the probability of receiving alerts for true positive outbreaks. We also tested less 
restrictive parameters to scan for clusters up to 1 week and up to 5 km radius but 
found only insigniﬁcant results. 
The aggregation of cases to a larger geographical area yields the problem of lower 
validity of the identiﬁed clusters (40). In our case study, the Spanish study area 
contained both urban and rural areas with very large zip-code areas. If a cluster had 
been detected comprised of such a large postal code, the risk of it being a false alert is 
much higher compared to a cluster comprised of only small urban postal code areas. 
Another limitation in the applied scan statistic is the ﬁxed circular form of the scanning 
window which cannot identify clusters of another shape. Flexible shapes have been tested 
but are not commonly used (17). Due to high computing time we applied the prospective 
spatio-temporal analysis to shorter, previously deﬁned outbreak periods based on the 
temporal analysis for the whole study area, which might have led to missing 
outbreaks that cluster in space and time, but are not visible in the purely temporal 
analysis. This problem would be diminished if the analyses ran automatically. 
We are the ﬁrst to have used run-sheet data from EMS staffed with EP for SyS. 
Although in two areas the case numbers were too low to perform a valid temporal 
aberration detection analysis, the data source appears to be promising for SyS. The 
true positive norovirus outbreak in Tyrol, Austria, was only captured by the data from 
the EP run sheets and not by the EMD data covering the same area. This indicates a 
higher speciﬁcity of EP-staffed EMS compared to EMD data. It also indicates that SyS 
based on data sources with such low case numbers tend to detect point-source 
outbreaks with a high number of cases rather than continuous or propagated source 
outbreaks with low case numbers or cases dispersed over space and time. We 
encourage further research using ambulance data for SyS to conﬁrm our ﬁndings. 
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The case study was performed retrospectively and was not based on results from 
active automated SyS systems. The performance of the two currently implemented 
automated systems needs to be evaluated prospectively in the future to further conﬁrm 
the usefulness of our concept. 
 
Conclusions 
We have provided a practical concept for implementing SyS in Europe based on 
routine emergency-care data from EMD, EMS and ED that can be used as 
supplementary and timely surveillance information source at the local/regional level. 
Emergency-care data-based SyS can supplement local surveillance with near real-
time information on gastrointestinal patients, especially in special circumstances or 
with special treatment-seeking behaviour, e.g. foreign tourists. It should be able to 
detect large outbreaks and outbreaks comprised of patients with severe symptoms. 
It is not very likely to detect the majority of local gastrointestinal outbreaks with few, 
mild or dispersed cases. We recommend using a combination of temporal and spatial 
outbreak detection algorithms in parallel and to apply a decision tree for initiating 
public health action based on statistical signals, in order to increase the validity of 
SyS. 
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Abstract 
Background: We assessed the local implementation of syndromic surveillance (SyS) as 
part of the European project ‘System for Information on, Detection and Analysis of Risks 
and Threats to Health’ in Santander, Spain.  
Methods: We applied a cumulative sum algorithm on emergency department (ED) chief 
complaints for influenza-like illness in the seasons 2010–11 and 2011–12. We fine-tuned 
the algorithm using a receiver operating characteristic analysis to identify the optimal 
trade-off of sensitivity and specificity and defined alert criteria. We assessed the 
timeliness of the SyS system to detect the onset of the influenza season. 
Results: The ED data correlated with the sentinel data. With the best algorithm settings 
we achieved 70/63% sensitivity and 89/95% specificity for 2010–11/2011–12. At least 2 
consecutive days of signals defined an alert. In 2010–11 the SyS system alerted 1 week 
before the sentinel system and in 2011–12 in the same week. The data from the ED is 
available on a daily basis providing an advantage in timeliness compared with the weekly 
sentinel data. 
Conclusions: ED-based SyS in Santander complements sentinel influenza surveillance by 
providing timely information. Local fine tuning and definition of alert criteria are 
recommended to enhance validity. 
 
Keywords: communicable diseases, emergency care, epidemiology 
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Background 
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) estimates that ~40 000 
premature deaths occur per year in the European Union due to seasonal influenza (1). A 
comprehensive and effective seasonal influenza surveillance approach can support timely 
and adequate reactions of professionals and decision-makers during pandemic periods 
(2). Influenza surveillance should integrate timely surveillance and detection of outbreaks 
based on different data sources of different specificity as the ECDC suggests in their 
epidemic intelligence framework. Part of this concept is the real-time data collection from 
unspecific information sources known as syndromic surveillance (SyS) (3). SyS uses data 
collected prior to laboratory confirmation with the advantage of providing timelier 
information on public health threats or sole information on potentially health-threatening 
events for which no other surveillance information exists (4). SyS understood in such a 
broad sense can be indicator based (using structured data such as health-care 
information indicating a certain health condition or disease) and event based (using 
unstructured information such as media reports to detect or monitor an event) (5). 
While there are many initiatives at local, regional and national levels, no European 
approach to indicator-based SyS exists. The European co-funded project ‘System for 
Information on Detection and Analysis of Risks and Threats to Health’ (SIDARTHa) aimed 
at creating the basis for an emergency medical care data-based SyS approach, which is 
applicable across Europe. SIDARTHa focuses on emergency data from three sources, pre-
hospital emergency medical dispatch centre call logs, ambulance service run sheets 
(patient records) and emergency department (ED) patient records. The project followed 
a local approach to alert and inform local/regional authorities about communicable and 
non-communicable health threats that are not at all or not timely monitored by existing 
surveillance systems (6). 
This paper presents the results of a case-based assessment of the local implementation 
of the SIDARTHa SyS approach at the ED of the University Hospital Marque´s de Valdecilla 
(HUMV) in Santander, Spain. We evaluated the system performance in terms of 
timeliness, sensitivity and specificity for seasonal influenza surveillance. 
 
Methods 
We conducted a retrospective quantitative analysis of two influenza seasons in 2010–11 
and 2011–12 with ED data on influenza-like illness (ILI) from the HUMV in Santander, 
Spain.  
 
Data sets 
With an assigned population catchment of around 300 000 inhabitants, the HUMV is the 
largest hospital serving the Autonomous Region of Cantabria, Spain (7). The SyS system 
at the HUMV analyses syndromes based on patient’s chief complaint codes which are 
similar to the Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale (8). The chief complaints are assigned 
only by an emergency physician after a first examination of the patient in the ED. The ILI 
chief complaint code was defined in accordance with the definition of sentinel general 
practitioners (GP) in the region who apply the Spanish ILI definition that follows the 
recommendation of the ECDC (9): ‘Sudden onset of symptoms AND at least one of the 
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following four systemic symptoms: fever or feverishness, malaise, headache, myalgia 
AND at least one of the following three respiratory symptoms: cough, sore throat, 
shortness of breath’. The Spanish authorities added to this definition the point that these 
symptoms occur without suspicion of any other illness (10). The data set also includes 
information on age, sex, severity and postal code referring to the patient’s residence. The 
ED data are aggregated daily and automatically uploaded in the SyS system data base 
during the early hours of the following day. We analysed the ED data on ILI that was 
available for the period 1 July 2010–30 April 2012. 
We compared the syndromic data from the ED with the data from the official influenza 
surveillance system. The reference data set contained information on the weekly number 
of ILI cases as reported by sentinel general practices for the Autonomous Region of 
Cantabria. In Cantabria there are 17 sentinel practices who are voluntarily taking part in 
the national influenza surveillance system, covering 5.26% or 30 198 inhabitants of the 
Cantabrian population (10). The sentinel practices were chosen to represent the whole 
population. No information was available on the population structure of the sentinel ILI 
patients. ILI cases are defined only by the GP in the sentinel practices. Data were 
available for Weeks 44/2010–9/2011 and Weeks 44/2011–12/2012. We selected the ED 
data from the same periods for the comparative analysis. The sentinel system in 
Cantabria defines a weekly case number of >74 per 100 000 inhabitants as threshold for 
high influenza activity (10). 
 
Data analysis 
In a first step, we plotted the time series of the daily and weekly number of ED ILI cases 
against the reported weekly case numbers of the sentinel system.  
As influenza is a rare disease in the ED setting, normal distribution cannot be assumed. 
We therefore chose a one-sided cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm for Poisson 
distribution as the most suitable aberration detection algorithm for this study (11). We 
added the fast initial response technique to assure that large chart values do not inflate 
subsequent ones and control for over-production of out-of-control signals. With this 
technique a head start of the algorithm is obtained, which tends to give quicker signals 
(12). The threshold value h for the CUSUM algorithm was retrieved by a look-up 
procedure in the table of Lucas (11). All CUSUM calculations were done with Microsoft 
Excel 2003. 
We performed a fine tuning of the CUSUM algorithm by testing different baselines and 
accepted mean values to obtain optimal surveillance results. Four different scenarios (A, 
B, C and D) have been tested with a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to 
investigate which scenario would have the best trade-off of sensitivity and specificity and 
to reduce the number of false-positive signals. We tested if it is suitable to take a baseline 
mean close to the average of influenza cases outside the influenza season, which is 
anticipated to be 0 (scenarios A and B) or rather close to the number of cases occurring 
outside of the period of high influenza activity (scenarios C and D). Further, we tested 
two different accepted means, one close to the baseline mean (scenarios A and C) and 
one reflecting the average daily case occurrence during the influenza season (scenarios 
B and D). Table 1 lists the variables used for the four scenarios in relation to the different 
periods analysed in our study and the respective means. The ROC calculations were done 
using IBM SPSS 15.0. 
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The specificity and sensitivity of the CUSUM algorithm were calculated using a daily 
approach. We compared the signals of the algorithm to the weeks of high influenza 
activity as reported by the sentinel system. When the threshold rate of the sentinels was 
exceeded, these weeks were counted as 7 days of expected signals by the CUSUM 
algorithm. Based on the signal pattern of the CUSUM algorithm we explored criteria for 
alerts of the SyS system that indicate the onset and end of the high activity influenza 
period. 
 
Results 
In the two monitored influenza seasons, around 350 ILI cases were counted at the ED 
per year. During the periods of high influenza activity four to five cases occurred on 
average per day (around 2% of all ED cases), while the daily mean during the entire year 
was 1.1. The majority of ILI patients were middle-aged patients with rather light 
symptoms. Therefore, no stratification for age or severity was carried out in the 
syndromic aberration detection analysis. 
In both influenza seasons 8 weeks of high influenza activity were identified by the sentinel 
GPs (Weeks 1–8/2011 and 3–10/2012). On average, 54 cases per week occurred during 
the periods of high influenza activity in the sentinel system, which is equivalent to 223 
cases per 100 000 inhabitants. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the ED 
and sentinel data sets for the different periods used in our study. 
The ED data corresponded to the epidemiological curve of reported sentinel cases in both 
seasons. While the pattern of the epidemiological curve in the season 2011–12 is 
comparable for the ED and sentinel system data sets, in the season 2010–11 the influenza 
wave was recognized earlier in the ED than in the sentinel practices (figure 1). In the 
season 2011–12 the ED case numbers were generally lower than the sentinel case 
numbers. In the 2010–11 season the weekly numbers of ED ILI cases were higher than 
the sentinel case numbers in Week 52-2. More ILI patients were visiting the ED in the 
season 2010–11 (Week 44–9: n=360) than in the season 2011–12 (Week 44-12: 
n=283). 
 
Fine tuning, specificity and sensitivity 
The fine-tuning analysis showed the trade-off between the sensitivity and specificity of 
the different parameters of the CUSUM algorithm indicated by the area under the ROC 
curve (table 2). In season 2010–11, the most suitable scenario is C with a sensitivity of 
70% and a specificity of 89%. In the season 2011–12 the optimal trade-off was achieved 
also by scenario C with a 63% sensitivity and 95% specificity (table 2). The variables of 
scenario C were applied in the case study with a threshold value h set to 4. 
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Table 1: Properties of data sets and corresponding variables of fine-tuning scenarios  
 
 
Table 2: Results of fine-tuning scenarios 
Scenario Period 
Sensitivity 
(%) Specificity (%) 
Positive predictive 
value (%) 
Negative predictive 
value (%) 
Area under 
ROC curve 
              
A 2010-11 75 80 75 80 0.775 
2011-12 64 86 73 80 0.750 
              
B 2010-11 75 81 76 80 0.782 
2011-12 64 89 78 80 0.766 
              
C 2010-11 70 89 83 79 0.791 
2011-12 63 95 88 80 0.785 
              
D 2010-11 66 91 86 77 0.778 
2011-12 50 96 88 76 0.728 
 
Period Total Mean 
95% confidence 
interval 
Median 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Standard 
deviation 
CUSUM scenario variables 
                  
Daily analysis 
Analysis perioda                                                                751 1.12 0.95-1.30 0 0 19 2.31 Accepted mean = 1                       
(scenarios A and C) 
Influenza seasonb                                                                      698 1.91 1.62-2.21 1 0 19 2.87 Accepted mean = 2                       
(scenarios B and D) 
High influenza 
activity periodc                                                                        
492 4.39 3.70-5.08 4 0 19 3.67   
Period outside 
influenza seasond                                              
53 0.17 0.12-0.23 0 0 3 0.46 Baseline mean = 0.0005 
(scenarios A and B) 
Period outside high 
influenza activity 
periode                                    
259 0.46 0.38-0.55 0 0 7 1.06 
 
Baseline mean = 0.5                   
(scenarios C and D) 
                  
Weekly analysisf 
ED 633 16.23 10.52-21.94 11 0 74 17.61   
Sentinel GPs 1003 25.72 16.19-35.24 12 0 105 29.38   
 
a 1 July 2010-30 April 2012 
b 1 October - 31 March 2010-11 + 1 October - 31 March 2011-12 
c 3 January -27 February 2011 + 16 January - 11 March 2012 
d 1 July - 30 September 2010 + 1 April - 30 September 2011 + 1 April - 30 April 2012 
e 1 July 2010 - 2 January 2011 + 28 February 2011 - 15 January 2012 + 12 March - 30 April 2012 
f weeks 44/2010 - 9/2011 + 44/2011 - 12/2012 
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Figure 1: Time series of daily and weekly ED ILI cases from Santander, Spain compared with weekly sentinel 
GP ILI cases for the region of Cantabria, Spain for the influenza seasons 2010–11 and 2011–12 and respective 
CUSUM algorithm signals 
 
Alert criteria 
On average there have been five signals of the CUSUM algorithm per week during the 
periods of high influenza activity. Before and after these periods only sporadic signals 
occurred, none with consecutive days of signals (figure 1). Based on this pattern we 
defined the criterion for alert of the SyS system for ILI as at least 2 consecutive days of 
CUSUM signals. 
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Timeliness 
Applying the alert criterion the SyS system produced the first alert in the season 2010–
11 1 week before the sentinel system reached the threshold for high influenza activity 
(four signals on 4 consecutive days in Week 52). In 2011–12 the first alert is produced 
in the same week in which the sentinels reached the threshold (two signals on 2 
consecutive days in Week 3) (figure 1). Compared with the weekly reported sentinel data 
timelier information is reported by the ED data-based system which reports daily. 
 
Discussion 
Main findings of this study 
Daily SyS of ILI based on the ED data in Santander, Spain correlated with the outbreak 
pattern reported by the regional sentinel system. 
A one-sided CUSUM algorithm for Poisson distributed data with the parameters of 0.5 for 
the baseline and 1 as the accepted mean was identified as best setting for the local 
analysis. We defined a local alert criterion of at least 2 consecutive days of CUSUM signals 
for detecting the onset and the end of the influenza season. 
The SyS system indicated the onset of the period of high influenza activity in one season 
1 week before and in the other season at the same time as the sentinel system. The daily 
reported ED data provide an earlier warning compared with the weekly sentinel reporting. 
 
What is already known on this topic? 
SyS is often used to detect influenza especially based on the ED data (13). Buehler et al. 
describe ED data-based surveillance as ‘common extension’ to the surveillance of 
seasonal influenza based on sentinel GPs (14). Review results suggest general usefulness 
of SyS for timely and sensitive information of outbreaks affecting large parts of the 
population such as influenza. But the performance of the systems varies depending on, 
for example, the aberration detection algorithm applied (15). As Griffin et al. suggest, 
fine-tuning of algorithms can be useful to enhance the performance of a SyS system (16).  
 
What this study adds 
The Poisson CUSUM algorithm was useful to detect seasonal influenza in Santander, 
Spain, in combination with fine tuning of parameters and definition of an alert criterion. 
The alert criterion reduced the number of false alerts based on single CUSUM signals and 
supported the timely detection of the onset and end of the high influenza activity period. 
Some other SyS systems apply the same alert criterion of consecutive days of signals. 
Further criteria explored by these SyS systems are the magnitude of the aberration, the 
age and severity of cases, and the activity of other syndromes and other SyS system 
sites (17-19). The magnitude of the aberration would not have added precision in terms 
of defining alerts in our case study. No significant differences in age and severity were 
found in our ED ILI data set, which might be due to the relatively small sample size. The 
criterion of signals in other syndrome groups could be a future option. Especially, the 
comparison to the syndrome group of respiratory illness that is established in the SyS 
system in Santander could be of value. Also the criterion of signal activity in neighbouring 
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SyS sites could be explored in the future if further SyS systems would be implemented 
in Northern Spain. Our alert criterion needs to be assessed in the everyday work of the 
SyS system in future influenza seasons. 
Our daily approach of calculating sensitivity and specificity provides a more precise 
picture of the performance of the SyS system. Other studies aggregate daily syndromic 
data to weeks for comparison to weekly reference data (20, 21). Ansaldi et al. compared 
the ED data with the sentinel GP data following a daily approach and reached a similar 
specificity and sensitivity using a 5-day moving average algorithm (17). In general, it is 
difficult to compare validity between different SyS systems as factors, such as the chosen 
statistics/algorithms, represented population and outbreak characteristics, are 
influencing the performance (15). 
In one of the seasons the ED data-based SyS system indicated the beginning of the 
influenza season 1 week earlier than the sentinel system. In the other season both data 
sources showed elevated influenza activity in the same week. This is in line with the 
results of other SyS systems based on the ED data that indicated a similar or earlier onset 
of 1–3 weeks for influenza compared with traditional surveillance data sources depending 
on the reference data sources used and statistical measures applied (13). The application 
of the same case definition in the two systems in Cantabria makes it possible to more 
precisely determine the early detection effect of the ED data compared with the sentinel 
GP data. This could be a reflection of the treatment-seeking behaviour in Spain that is 
characterized by a high number of patients utilizing EDs with conditions that would more 
appropriately be treated in a primary care setting (22). 
For the season 2010–11, the health system organization and treatment-seeking 
behaviour of the population is also the likely explanation for the earlier wave seen in the 
ED. The period of high influenza activity began during the Spanish Christmas holidays 
(26 December–10 January) when most GP practices were closed and patients visited the 
ED instead (23). This highlights the usefulness of an ED-based surveillance system that 
is continuously operating during the entire year while the sentinel system based on GP 
practices is not. The beginning of the influenza season in season 2010–11 could only be 
detected in near real time by the ED SyS system. This suggests that ED data-based SyS 
can constitute an important supplement to the surveillance system to get a more 
complete picture of the influenza disease burden on the population. However, for general 
seasonal influenza surveillance, it needs to be taken into account that the populations 
visiting GPs and the ED are usually reflecting different populations, i.e. the general 
population, and more severe and acute, out-of-hours cases, respectively. 
The influenza season 2010–11 in Santander also highlights the pressure of a high number 
of influenza patients on the resources of the ED, especially during holiday seasons when 
other health-care providers are closed (24, 25). The implementation of a daily automated 
SyS system with locally adjusted algorithms and alert thresholds supports the decision-
makers in the hospital to timely adjust their resources to the actual demand. 
Once implemented, an automated SyS system can be a stable and flexible tool for timely 
monitoring of various public health events. Such a generic surveillance system can rapidly 
be applied during unexpected crisis situations or out-of-season epidemics such as the 
influenza pandemic in 2009 (26, 27). The Department of Health of the Autonomous 
Region of Cantabria officially endorsed the integration of ED data-based SyS as 
implemented in Santander as a supplementary surveillance information source in the 
region. 
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Limitations of this study 
The time period of two seasons of influenza is quite short for a representative assessment. 
Furthermore, the analysis has been conducted retrospectively. A prospective analysis also 
of the experience of the regional public health authority during influenza seasons can 
bring further insight in the future.  
The objectivity of physicians in diagnosing ILI could be influenced by the higher 
expectation of influenza case occurrence during the influenza season as suggested by 
Moore et al. (28). We anticipate the multiple aspect case definition used in Santander to 
reduce false diagnoses to a minimum. 
We applied one aberration detection algorithm that is used in other syndromic influenza 
surveillance systems and that is easy to implement but there are others that are equally 
often used such as regression analysis or moving averages (15). A statistical modelling 
of time series data with seasonal autoregressive moving average (SARIMA) algorithms 
could be suitable to our context as seasonal patterns and trends can be accounted for in 
a more precise manner (29). 
The spatial distribution and spread of influenza can yield additional information for 
decision-making during an epidemic. Other studies have shown that syndromic data can 
be scanned for space-time clusters. These studies focused on large areas such as New 
York City, England or the Netherlands consisting of a large number of small-area postal 
code regions as basis for the analysis (30-32). Santander covers a comparatively small 
area with 12 postal codes for which we considered a spatial analysis not to provide an 
added value. This assumption could change in the future if the SyS system is enlarged to 
cover neighbouring areas in addition. 
 
Conclusions 
This case study shows the added value of SyS based on routine ED data to effectively 
complement sentinel surveillance for seasonal influenza at the local level in Spain. We 
recommend the local adjustment of the aberration detection algorithms and the definition 
of alert criteria per syndrome and data source to improve the performance of a SyS 
system. 
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Abstract 
Background:  
The revised World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) request 
a timely and all-hazard approach towards surveillance, especially at the subnational level. 
We discuss three questions of syndromic surveillance application in the European context 
for assessing public health emergencies of international concern: (i) can syndromic 
surveillance support countries, especially the subnational level, to meet the International 
Health Regulations (2005) core surveillance capacity requirements, (ii) are European 
syndromic surveillance systems comparable to enable cross-border surveillance, and (iii) 
at which administrative level should syndromic surveillance best be applied? 
 
Discussion:  
Despite the ongoing criticism on the usefulness of syndromic surveillance which is related 
to its clinically nonspecific output, we demonstrate that it was a suitable supplement for 
timely assessment of the impact of three different public health emergencies affecting 
Europe. Subnational syndromic surveillance analysis in some cases proved to be of 
advantage for detecting an event earlier compared to national level analysis. However, 
in many cases, syndromic surveillance did not detect local events with only a small 
number of cases.  
The European Commission envisions comparability of surveillance output to enable cross-
border surveillance. Evaluated against European infectious disease case definitions, 
syndromic surveillance can contribute to identify cases that might fulfil the clinical case 
definition but the approach is too unspecific to comply to complete clinical definitions. 
Syndromic surveillance results still seem feasible for comparable cross-border 
surveillance as similarly defined syndromes are analysed. 
We suggest a new model of implementing syndromic surveillance at the subnational level. 
In this model, syndromic surveillance systems are fine-tuned to their local context and 
integrated into the existing subnational surveillance and reporting structure. By 
enhancing population coverage, events covering several jurisdictions can be identified at 
higher levels. However, the setup of decentralised and locally adjusted syndromic 
surveillance systems is more complex compared to the setup of one national or local 
system. 
 
Summary:  
We conclude that syndromic surveillance if implemented with large population coverage 
at the subnational level can help detect and assess the local and regional effect of different 
types of public health emergencies in a timely manner as required by the International 
Health Regulations (2005).  
 
Keywords: Public health surveillance, Europe, World Health Organization 
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Background 
Diverse health threats and implementation of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) in Europe  
Europe faces different health threats which are arising from infectious disease outbreaks, 
natural disasters or man-made events. The variety of potential health threats led the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to adjust their International Health Regulations (IHR 
(2005)). The IHR (2005) now follow an all-hazard approach, focusing on an “illness or 
medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present 
significant harm to humans” (1). Detection, assessment and immediate reporting play an 
important role in the IHR (2005) and Article 5 requests every member state, within five 
years after the regulations came into force, to have established appropriate surveillance 
and response capacities (1). Until now, surveillance in Europe primarily follows the 
approach of specific notifiable communicable disease reporting, which does not foresee 
detection or assessment of other health threats which are not defined as notifiable 
diseases (2). Generally, notifiable communicable disease reporting provides data on a 
weekly basis. Timelier information and information on different kinds of health threats 
are difficult to retrieve because separate public health surveillance systems cannot be 
established for every kind of threat. As a result, about one third of WHO Europe member 
states asked for an extension of the compliance date for implementing the core capacities 
for public health surveillance and response with the new all-hazard requirement being 
seen as an obstacle (3). 
 
Public health surveillance in Europe – a matter of comparability 
For the European Union (EU), comparability of surveillance results in the form of 
comparable case definitions, data formats and diagnostic codes is of high value to enable 
cross-border monitoring of events. EU member states, however, are very diverse and 
adopting comparative case definitions based on similar data sources is difficult to achieve 
(4). The new directive on serious cross-border health threats 1082/2013/EU 
acknowledges the IHR (2005) requirements and strengthens the Union’s mandate to 
coordinate in times of public health crises which are potentially concerning more than one 
member state (5). For communicable disease surveillance, the directive requires member 
states to provide information to the EU on the progression of an outbreak and about any 
unusual phenomena and outbreaks of unknown origin. The EU provides case definitions 
for comparable reporting of cases in implementing decision 2012/506/EU which member 
states have to use (6). These are based on a classification of cases based on clinical signs 
and symptoms, laboratory, and epidemiological characteristics enabling the identification 
of possible, probable and confirmed cases. For threats of biological origin consisting of 
bio toxins or other harmful biological agents not related to communicable diseases and 
threats of chemical, environmental or unknown origin, member states shall inform each 
other based on the information from their own surveillance systems. However, the EU 
may adopt case definitions to which member states shall adhere (5). The question is how 
member states’ surveillance capacity in terms of the IHR (2005) can be strengthened 
against the backdrop of both, European comparability requirements and European 
diversity. 
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Role of the subnational level for surveillance in Europe 
We understand the subnational level in this paper as primary level, e.g., county, and 
intermediate level, e.g., province, of the public health response in a country according to 
the IHR (2005) (1). The subnational level is often the first to identify a health threat and 
has the responsibility to inform higher levels about an event. Also the response to an 
event is starting at the subnational level (7). The IHR (2005) explicitly request the 
responsibility of the primary and intermediate public health response level to detect 
events in the whole state territory and for immediately assessing and reporting 
information on such events to higher levels (1). 
But how can the subnational level be equipped with the means to detect different types 
of events or related health effects in a timely fashion? Local intelligence in the form of 
professionals reporting on events, e.g., in schools, or health care institutions, are the 
cornerstone of detecting the onset of events at the local level, as shown for example, 
during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic (8, 9). Still, there is a risk to overlook patterns that 
might be detected only when taking a wider perspective beyond the patients treated by 
one clinician or in one institution (10, 11). Surveillance systems that pool information 
from multiple institutions or jurisdictions can potentially detect events that are not 
represented in the data of any single region or institution. Using routine data, for instance 
from health care services, for timely detection and assessment of public health threats is 
in principle the idea behind the approach of syndromic surveillance. 
 
Syndromic surveillance – a means to meet the IHR (2005) surveillance 
requirements? 
According to a recent definition by the European project Triple S-AGE, syndromic 
surveillance augments traditional surveillance systems by providing clinically nonspecific 
but (near) real-time information on the public health impact of events, gained from 
existing and if possible automatically generated data that were originally not collected for 
surveillance purposes (12). The Triple S-AGE project inventoried syndromic surveillance 
systems in Europe and provided a detailed overview on their characteristics (13). The 
project identified 124 syndromic surveillance systems worldwide and 60 in Europe (13, 
14). Syndromic data sources are ranging from nonclinical sources such as web search 
logs, medications sales registries, and telephone helpline call logs to clinical sources such 
as chief complaints from primary care or emergency departments, and veterinary records 
(14). 
Timeliness, flexibility and cost-effectiveness are considered to be the major strengths of 
syndromic surveillance which could make it a suitable solution for gaining timely 
information on different kinds of health threats as required by the IHR (2005) (15). Its 
major weakness is the lack of specificity which can lead to false alerts and undetected 
events (16). Therefore, the usefulness of syndromic surveillance is not undisputed, 
although the approach has been applied for over a decade, using different kinds of data 
sources and targeting various health threats (16-18). The WHO evaluated syndromic 
surveillance as not applicable to become part of a global regulation to support countries 
to meet the IHR (2005) requirements but it was rated as potentially useful to support 
surveillance within countries (19). This assessment was done back in 2001. We think it 
is time for a reassessment based on the evidence collated since then, and to consider a 
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reinforced endorsement of syndromic surveillance for the support of countries’ 
surveillance capacity as required by the IHR (2005). 
Below, we discuss the following questions around the usefulness of syndromic 
surveillance in the light of the IHR (2005) implementation in Europe: 
1.  How can syndromic surveillance be used to support European countries to meet the 
IHR (2005) requirements for the core capacity of immediate detection, assessment 
and reporting of different kinds of (potential) Public Health Emergencies of 
International Concern (PHEIC), especially at the subnational level? 
2.  How comparable are syndromic surveillance systems to enable cross-border 
surveillance in Europe referring to case definitions, data formats and diagnostic coding 
systems? 
3.  What are strengths and weaknesses of different implementation models for 
subnational syndromic surveillance in Europe? 
 
Discussion 
Contribution of syndromic surveillance to support European countries to meet 
the IHR (2005) requirements  
In the following, we explore three European public health emergencies during which 
syndromic surveillance was applied, the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic, the volcanic 
ash plume which covered Europe in 2010, and the O104:H4 gastrointestinal outbreak in 
2011. The pandemic was declared a PHEIC in the framework of the IHR (2005) while the 
other two events were reported to WHO by member states as potential PHEIC. We analyse 
the contribution of syndromic surveillance in the three cases in terms of timeliness, added 
value of subnational level application and flexibility in terms of an all-hazard approach. 
 
Purpose of syndromic surveillance during three public health emergencies 
During the A/H1N1 pandemic, the purpose of the application of syndromic surveillance 
was to detect the onset of the pandemic in a country and to gain timely information on 
the spatial and temporal development. Next to the syndromic surveillance systems listed 
in table 1 and table 2a, we identified seven additional systems, for which no details were 
retrievable and they were not included in further analysis (13, 20). 
During the time in which the volcanic ash plume covered Europe in April 2010, syndromic 
surveillance was used to timely assess if there was a public health impact of the plume 
or rather to provide reassurance that the plume had no health effect. Next to the 
syndromic surveillance systems listed in table 3, further syndromic surveillance systems 
were reported in Iceland and France for which we could not find any further details (39). 
None of the systems produced a syndromic signal which could be connected to the ash 
plume. This was in line with the conclusions by WHO and the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) (39, 40). During this public health emergency, syndromic 
surveillance systems were the only source of information to measure any direct health 
impact. 
The O104:H4 outbreak in 2011 originated in Northern Germany and later affected 13 
countries in Europe, Canada and the United States of America. The outbreak first 
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developed unnoticed for around two weeks mainly because of time lost in the information 
flow from local to regional and national level in the decentralised epidemiological reporting 
system in Germany (43). Upon becoming aware of the outbreak, the German national 
centre for disease control enhanced the frequency of reporting from subnational to 
national level to daily reporting and implemented a syndromic surveillance system for 
bloody diarrhoea in emergency departments (44). We did not identify reports of 
syndromic surveillance use in any of the other affected countries during this public health 
emergency. 
 
Timeliness of syndromic surveillance during three public health emergencies 
During the influenza pandemic, the syndromic surveillance systems provided information 
on the onset or peak of the pandemic on average half a week before traditional 
surveillance systems, at the earliest (table 2). These timeliness assessments did not take 
into account the common reporting delay of traditional sentinel influenza surveillance 
systems. They refer to an earlier detection of cases analysing data sources in which 
(potential) influenza patients are registered earlier in the course of illness or treatment, 
as compared to traditional data collected later in the process by sentinel general 
practitioners or laboratories. Additional time is gained because syndromic surveillance 
information usually is available daily while sentinel and laboratory information often is 
reported up to a week after the case was registered (21, 23, 35). Many syndromic 
systems were already established and were ready to be used when the pandemic occurred 
which saved time in comparison to ad-hoc set up systems. 
During the volcanic ash plume event, information was made available to the English public 
one day after the first day of eruption and two days afterwards in Scotland. Information 
was updated in the following days and weeks (42). The first information from the systems 
in Austria, Germany, and Spain was available to the public two weeks after the first day 
of eruption and was updated again 10 days later (41) (table 1). There is no information 
on the timeliness for the syndromic surveillance system in Sweden. As there were no 
other health surveillance systems used during the ash plume, there is no gold standard 
to compare the timeliness of syndromic surveillance systems to. 
During the O104:H4 outbreak, the syndromic surveillance system was implemented on 
27 May, 8 days after Robert Koch-Institute was notified of a first cluster of cases and 5 
days after the EU and WHO were informed. The system was terminated on 30 September 
2011. Syndromic reporting was daily. The syndromic surveillance system was set up ad-
hoc, relied on manual data collection and reporting (via fax or email) and was voluntary. 
Thus, syndromic reporting varied in completeness and continuity (43). 
In synthesis, syndromic surveillance provided timely information during the three events 
supporting the IHR (2005) requirement of immediate assessment and reporting. Also 
during other subnational and national emergencies, syndromic surveillance provided 
timelier information, as for example found in a review by Dailey et al. (45). For rare or 
non-communicable health threats such as the volcanic ash plume, there are often no 
established health surveillance systems. As clinically specific systems cannot be 
implemented for every conceivable health threat like the volcanic ash plume, syndromic 
surveillance is often the only source of timely information (46). 
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Table 3: Key aspects of syndromic surveillance systems assessing the volcanic ash plume in Europe* 
 
* Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries 
† First report after first day of volcanic eruption 
 
 
Added value of syndromic surveillance at the subnational level during three 
public health emergencies 
During the influenza pandemic, 13 out of 15 systems provided syndromic information at 
the subnational level, while nine systems and the European study provided data at the 
national level (table 1). Smith et al. (32), Kavanagh et al. (37), and Todd et al. (36) 
highlighted the use of local analyses for earlier identification of the onset of the pandemic 
in certain regions compared to the national level analysis. Rosenkötter et al. compared 
among others ambulance patient records at the local level in one country with national 
level data in another and found better validity for national level data (21). The low validity 
at the local level was explained by the difficulty to differentiate signal from noise when 
very small case numbers were analysed. The authors also compared single emergency 
departments located at the subnational level in two different countries and found that 
both provided syndromic data of sufficient validity and timeliness compared to sentinel 
data in the regions. Case numbers at these emergency departments were large enough 
for a sound syndromic surveillance analysis. These examples show that a valid application 
at the subnational level is achievable if the analysed data source can potentially reflect a 
critical mass of cases. 
Country 
System   name / 
short description 
Data source Syndromes 
Time-
liness 
[days]† 
Sub-national 
level appli-
cation 
(Yes=Y; 
No=N) 
Pros-
pective (P) 
or retro-
spective 
(R) data 
analysis 
Refe-
rence 
Austria SIDARTHa-Tirol 
Emergency 
medical 
dispatch 
Respiratory 
syndrome, 
cardiovascular 
syndrome, traffic-
related injuries 
14 Y R (41) 
Germany 
SIDARTHa-
Göppingen 
Ambulance 
service 
Respiratory 
syndrome, 
cardiovascular 
syndrome 
14 Y R (41) 
Spain 
SIDARTHa-
Cantabria 
Emergency 
department 
No syndrome 
specific analysis 
(only total number 
of cases) 
14 Y R (41) 
Sweden GET WELL Web queries Not known 
Not 
known 
N Not known (29, 31) 
United 
Kingdom 
(England) 
Q-Surveillance 
(scheduled care 
surveillance 
England) 
Primary care 
Asthma, 
conjunctivitis, 
allergic rhinitis, 
wheeze, 
lower respiratory 
tract infection, 
upper respiratory 
tract infection 
1 N P (42) 
United 
Kingdom 
(Scotland) 
NHSDirect 
surveillance 
England/Wales 
Telephone 
helpline 
Difficulty 
breathing, 
eye problems, 
cough, rash 
2 Y P (42) 
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During the volcanic ash plume event, information in Sweden (29) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) was only published for the national level, i.e., England and Scotland, however, in 
Scotland also the subnational level was analysed but no results were presented (42). The 
systems in Austria, Germany and Spain were providing information at the subnational 
level (41). As during the influenza pandemic, the systems in Austria and Germany were 
analysing low case numbers which was affecting the validity of the results. 
During the O104:H4 outbreak, 193 German emergency departments participated in total, 
of which 28 were located in the more effected areas. The subnational syndromic data 
were aggregated to county level and were assessed as suitable for the timely analysis of 
the development of the outbreak (44). 
In conclusion, syndromic surveillance can support public health authorities at the 
subnational level to detect events earlier or rapidly gain information about the health 
impact of an event. Although many syndromic surveillance systems are applied at the 
subnational level, the added value compared to a national application is often not 
analysed. The problem of distinguishing signals from noise, especially of events with low 
case numbers, also became apparent during other syndromic surveillance applications at 
subnational or national level (47, 48).  
 
All-hazard applicability of syndromic surveillance 
The examples showed that syndromic surveillance was used to assess the health impact 
of different (potential) communicable and non-communicable PHEIC which is in line with 
the all-hazard requirement of the IHR (2005). Although these are only three examples, 
the flexibility of syndromic surveillance to analyse different kinds of health threats was 
shown during many subnational or national level applications in Europe, such as mass-
gatherings, e.g., the Olympic Games in the UK, environmental events, e.g., heat and cold 
waves or floods, and diverse communicable disease outbreaks (13, 20). Also Paterson 
and colleagues highlighted the ‘remarkable adaptability of syndromic surveillance’ in their 
recent review (15). 
 
Comparability of syndromic surveillance output for cross-border surveillance in 
Europe 
We explore the European comparability of syndromic surveillance systems, especially in 
terms of compliance to European case definitions used during the A/H1N1 influenza 
pandemic and the O104:H4 outbreak (6).  
During the influenza pandemic, the 15 systems and the European study analysed 
influenza-like illness (ILI) or respiratory symptoms based on different case definitions 
(table 1). Some systems applied the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
definition for ILI (26, 49) or the European ILI definition established by ECDC (28) which 
are based on symptoms. Others use aggregated diagnostic information and not 
symptoms, self-defined queries of standardised coding categories or free-text. Also for 
syndromic surveillance systems based on the same group of data sources, for instance 
emergency departments, the diagnostic coding systems differ. It might not be achievable 
to use the European definition in a syndromic surveillance system because the underlying 
source does not provide all necessary information. For example, the use of the European 
definition was attempted for the syndromic surveillance system in Sweden but the 
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analysed data source of web queries did not provide all necessary information (29). For 
the system in Ireland, different definition for free-text searches were compared, one 
being based on the national definition, another one on the CDC definition, but the best 
outcome for identifying influenza cases was achieved using a definition which was tailored 
to the available information in the data source (25). Other syndromic surveillance 
systems do not use a definition but analyse the total volume which is reducing specificity, 
for example systems using school absenteeism data (35, 50, 51). These examples show 
that not one and the same case definition can and should be applied when using 
syndromic surveillance in order to achieve valid results. Although this means that these 
case definitions are not comparable, most systems analysed similar syndromes indicating 
ILI.  
None of the examples provided evidence that syndromic surveillance is capable of 
identifying an A/H1N1 case according to the full European clinical case definition. The 
syndromic surveillance systems could help identify cases meeting a part of the clinical 
case definition, always depending on the information provided by the analysed data 
source.  
The EU did not provide any case definition during the volcanic ash plume event. The 
cross-border comparability of the definitions used by the different syndromic surveillance 
systems is to be considered weak due to differences in the analysed data sources as seen 
also during the A/H1N1 pandemic. During the O104:H4 outbreak, the syndromic 
surveillance output could not meet the European clinical case definition of Shiga Toxin-
Producing Escherichia coli (STEC)-associated Haemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS), only 
for STEC/Verotoxin producing Escherichia coli related diarrhoea. Therefore, syndromic 
surveillance could not contribute to clinical STEC-associated HUS case classification. 
However, the European comparability of the syndrome “bloody diarrhoea” can be 
considered high as it is based on a relatively simply defined symptom which is clearly 
distinguishable from other symptoms. 
To conclude, syndromic surveillance can contribute to identifying clinical cases according 
to the European case definitions but it is unlikely that syndromic information provides 
more detailed information to identify cases according to full clinical case definitions as 
required by the IHR (2005). Syndromic surveillance is rather suited to augment existing 
surveillance systems in order to provide a timely indication of clinical cases to be verified 
by traditional surveillance and assessment measures.  
The low level of comparability of syndromic information in Europe in terms of case 
definitions, data formats and diagnostic coding does not speak for implementing 
standardised syndromic surveillance systems at European level or for aiming at a 
harmonisation of existing systems in order to support cross-border surveillance. From a 
pragmatic point of view one could argue that the systems are analysing similarly defined 
syndromes, such as ILI, and are in this way enabling cross-border surveillance. Also the 
European influenza surveillance system is based on different data sources and different 
case definitions of ILI or acute respiratory illness (52-54). 
Following this line of argument, the Triple S-AGE project suggested three models of 
syndromic surveillance harmonization in Europe: (A) a European syndromic surveillance 
system model with standardised data sources and case definitions as implemented for 
mortality monitoring in the European Mortality Monitoring system (55), (B) a completely 
disharmonised European model as it is existing at the moment for all morbidity syndromic 
surveillance systems, and (C) an intermediate model with diverse data sources and case 
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definitions but standardised reporting at the European level (56). Depending on the 
characteristics of the syndrome/event and the opportunity to generate comparable 
syndromes from the available data, these models can exist in parallel. From a European 
point of view, the goal might be to find the optimal combination of these models with the 
largest possible harmonisation to allow for cross-border comparison. In the following 
section, we will look at the strengths and weaknesses of different implementation models 
of syndromic surveillance at the subnational level in Europe (following the Triple S-AGE 
models B and C). 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of implementation models for subnational syndromic 
surveillance in Europe 
Current subnational syndromic surveillance implementation: national vs. local model 
The implementation of syndromic surveillance systems for subnational surveillance in 
European countries currently follows either a national or a local model (table 1). 
Syndromic surveillance systems following the national model are hosted at the national 
level, collecting subnational data, collating and analysing it at the national level, and 
reporting surveillance results at the national and subnational level. Examples for national 
syndromic surveillance systems in Europe are especially found in the UK (32, 34, 37, 50, 
57) and France (58, 59), which are the longest established syndromic surveillance 
systems in Europe. This might be explained by the fact that both countries have centrally 
organised health systems (20). Implementation of national systems is likely to be limited 
in federal countries with a long tradition of predominantly decentralised health systems 
(10). 
Syndromic surveillance systems following the local model are hosted at the local level, 
collating and analysing data covering a single jurisdiction and reporting surveillance 
results for that jurisdiction only. Examples for local syndromic surveillance systems are 
found in many countries (table 1), also in countries having national syndromic 
surveillance systems, e.g., in Italy (26, 60), and the UK (35, 61). 
Table 4 compares the strengths and weaknesses of the two models for some syndromic 
surveillance system characteristics for which we could identify an impact by the model of 
implementation. The characteristics are defined following the framework for assessing 
syndromic surveillance systems proposed by the CDC (62) and detailed by the Triple S-
AGE project (63). 
National systems have the biggest advantage in simplicity and cost-effectiveness. To set 
up a syndromic surveillance system at the national level without involving too many 
stakeholders, based on national registries or a national point of access to a network of 
data providers is relatively easy. Examples for such systems are found in Belgium (21), 
France (64) or the UK (36). If data collection is organised regionally or different data 
collection software is used as it is often the case for health care services, access to data 
sources can be difficult, impeding representativeness of the whole country and delaying 
setup of a system, as reported for example for syndromic surveillance systems in England 
(20). 
Comparability of surveillance system results in national systems is high as data source, 
case definitions, analysis methodology, and reporting are the same for the whole country. 
The chance of detecting events covering multiple subnational jurisdictions is high in a 
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national system and impossible in a local system. The signal-to-noise problem of 
syndromic surveillance which limits detection of events with small case numbers is the 
same for both models. 
A single national or local syndromic surveillance system may be prone to become a ‘single 
point of failure’ in times of crises, because of a power failure, for example (7). A 
decentralised surveillance system can provide information during an event even if parts 
of the system are not working. 
The biggest advantage of the local syndromic surveillance model is that it can be adjusted 
to the local circumstances of data availability and accessibility, data collection procedures, 
treatment seeking behaviour of the population and priorities for targeted health threats. 
Syndromic surveillance performs best if fine-tuned to the characteristics of the analysed 
data source as shown for the influenza syndromic surveillance system in Spain, for 
example (28). 
A local system which is operated by the professionals responsible for local surveillance is 
more easily “owned” by these professionals and will foster motivation and quality of work, 
compared to a system which is imposed by the national level (20, 65).  
A close collaboration between local public health authorities and local health care 
institutions which often function as data providers can simplify the setup and maintenance 
of syndromic surveillance systems. Data providers know their data and the context of 
data collection best. They can identify the most suitable data fields for analysis which 
improves data quality, and they can support interpretation of syndromic surveillance 
results by giving explanations for signals. Collaboration between health care institutions 
and public health authorities for a syndromic surveillance system can enhance 
collaboration of these two often divided parts of the health system for crisis preparedness 
(10). Finally, syndromic surveillance output based on health care data can also be useful 
to support clinical resource management in health care institutions during times of crisis 
(8). 
Another advantage of local systems is that raw data are analysed in the same local 
jurisdiction compared to a national system where data are leaving the jurisdiction to be 
analysed at the national level. This can reduce problems of data privacy that are arising 
from analysing patient information (66). 
In summary, there are distinct advantages and disadvantages of the national and the 
local syndromic surveillance system models which are hampering to make the best use 
of syndromic surveillance. Systems should at best be set up locally adjusted but also 
covering a large part of the population. In the following we propose a system model that 
combines these advantages of the national and local system model. 
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A new model: Subnational syndromic surveillance implementation 
We suggest a new implementation model in which syndromic surveillance is integrated in 
existing surveillance structures at the subnational level. Data collation and analysis are 
done at the local level, while higher levels can analyse aggregated syndromic data or only 
receive reports. This is to be decided in each country and will depend on the organisation 
of the public health and surveillance system. Transferring aggregated instead of raw data 
or reports to higher levels has the advantage that data privacy rules are respected. 
Reporting of surveillance results for the local, regional and national level is following a 
standardised format. The approach can only live up to its potential by covering a large 
part of the population and several jurisdictions. 
In the EU project “European Emergency Data Based System for Information on, Detection 
and Analysis of Risks and Threats to Health” (SIDARTHa), we developed a subnational 
syndromic surveillance implementation model based on three different emergency care 
data sources (67). Figure 1 depicts the setup, data flow and reporting directions in a 
SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance system. A decision tree was developed for the 
SIDARTHa approach for validation of signals so that not every syndromic signal results in 
a public health response (68). Currently, the SIDARTHa system is implemented in one 
region in the countries of Austria (active), Belgium (pilot), Germany (pilot) and Spain 
(active) (21, 68). 
Table 4 compares the strengths and weaknesses of the subnational model compared to 
the local and national model. The model combines the advantages of the local and the 
national model for most characteristics. An additional improvement of this model is the 
stability in times of crisis by the decentralised setup of systems. Further, 
representativeness is anticipated to be increased through easier access to subnational 
data sources by subnational surveillance system operators. However, comparability of 
surveillance results in terms of case definitions, data formats and diagnostic coding 
systems can be anticipated lower as in a national system setup. Systems following the 
subnational model are likely to differ in their setup because they are adjusted to the local 
accessibility and characteristics of data sources in each region. The comparability can be 
increased if a common framework is used for setting up a system, as for example 
developed by the European projects SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE. 
The major disadvantage in comparison to the local and national model is the higher effort 
and complexity in the setup of a decentralised and locally adjusted system. Because of 
the high effort, the two active SIDARTHa systems in Austria and Spain could only be 
implemented as local systems providing information for one region in the respective 
country. For a roll-out to other regions we consider political endorsement and support 
from higher levels as vital. 
 
  
 72   Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe 
Table 4: Strengths and weaknesses of syndromic surveillance system implementation models in Europe* 
Syndromic surveillance system characteristics 
National 
model† 
Local 
model‡ 
Integrated 
subnational 
model§ 
Simplicity and costs of setup ++ + -- 
Simplicity of access to subnational data sources - + + 
Stability: Potential of single system failure in times of crisis -- -- ++ 
Acceptance and utilization of syndromic surveillance results at subnational level - ++ ++ 
Flexibility of adjustment to local events/priorities - ++ ++ 
Data protection problems - ++ ++ 
Data quality - ++ ++ 
Validity: Interpretation of signals including false alerts (signal-to-noise problem) - + + 
Validity: Small-number problem in detecting local events -- -- -- 
Validity: Detection of events covering multiple local jurisdictions + -- + 
Representativeness of whole country + -- ++ 
Comparability of surveillance results across multiple subnational jurisdictions ++ -- + 
Transferability between subnational jurisdictions + -- + 
Clinical resource and quality management in health care institutions -- + + 
Crisis preparedness of health care institutions -- + + 
 
*  Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries 
†  Data collation and analysis at national level, representing several subnational jurisdictions, top-down reporting to national, 
regional and local level 
‡  Data collation and analysis at local level, representing a single subnational jurisdiction, local reporting to local level 
§  Data collation and analysis at local level, analysis of aggregated data at regional or national level representing several 
subnational jurisdictions, standardised bottom-up reporting to local, regional and national level 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The SIDARTHa model for integrated syndromic surveillance at the subnational level  
SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance systems are implemented at subnational level and can be based on one or different kinds of 
data sources. In this way, the data analysis algorithms can be chosen and adjusted according to the immediate context. The 
syndromic surveillance results feed into the established surveillance and reporting system of the responsible subnational health 
authority augmenting existing (traditional) surveillance information. Syndromic information would only be reported to higher 
levels in aggregated form limiting problems arising from data privacy. Investigation of signals is done at subnational level but 
could also be done at national levels to allow for detection of events covering several jurisdictions. The data providing institutions 
should also receive access to syndromic surveillance results for their institution and/or jurisdiction which could be used by them 
for resource planning purposes. 
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Summary 
We conclude that syndromic surveillance can support countries to detect and assess the 
public health impact of different types of PHEIC at the subnational level as stipulated in 
the IHR (2005) core surveillance capacity requirements. The approach provided timely 
information during three different public health emergencies in Europe. For some events 
syndromic surveillance systems were the only available source of near real-time 
information. Many syndromic surveillance systems are applied at the subnational level, 
which in some cases proved to be of advantage for detecting an event earlier compared 
to the national level. Syndromic surveillance is not suited to detect local events consisting 
of small case numbers. 
In terms of case definitions, data formats or diagnostic coding systems, syndromic 
surveillance systems are not identical across Europe because of the diversity of the 
analysed data sources. Nevertheless, we consider comparable cross-border surveillance 
possible based on similarly defined syndromes. 
Implementation of syndromic surveillance in Europe currently follows either a local or 
national model. In order to gain the most of syndromic surveillance we suggest a new 
subnational approach of implementing syndromic surveillance. The model foresees locally 
adjusted data collation and analysis at the subnational level, and integrated and 
standardised reporting to higher levels. By covering a large part of the population, events 
covering several jurisdictions can be identified at higher levels. However, the setup of 
decentralised and locally adjusted systems is more complex compared to setup of one 
national or local system. 
Using guidelines and tools produced by European syndromic surveillance projects and 
with national or European policy support, a wider roll-out of syndromic surveillance across 
Europe can be achieved. Only by expanding the application of syndromic surveillance, 
European countries will be positioned to timely assess the public health impact of potential 
PHEIC, especially rare and non-communicable events. 
 
Endnotes 
a The literature search was accomplished in June 2013 and updated in July 2014. The 
search string for PubMed was: (H1N1(Title/Abstract) OR pandemic(Title/Abstract)) AND 
“syndromic surveillance”(Title/Abstract). The search string for Google Scholar was: H1N1 
OR pandemic AND “syndromic surveillance”. The review of Google Scholar hits stopped 
after 10 pages of hits which did not provide any new relevant content. We checked 
references of selected full-text articles for further relevant publications. 
b The additional identified systems were the SurSauUD emergency department and 
general practitioner house calls surveillance systems in France, the national emergency 
department surveillance system and the Lazio emergency department surveillance 
system in Italy, the South Holland South general practitioner pandemic surveillance 
system in the Netherlands, the PIPeR general practitioner pandemic surveillance system 
in Scotland, the general practitioner out-of-hours surveillance system in Ireland, and the 
general practitioner surveillance system in Wales. 
 
 74   Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe 
Acknowledgements 
This paper arises from the project SIDARTHa which has received funding from the 
European Union, in the framework of the Public Health Programme (grant agreement 
number 2007208).  
The authors would like to thank the three reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier 
versions of this article.  
                                                           Chapter 5: Added value of syndromic surveillance for implementing the IHR (2005)     75
References 
1.  World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005). Geneva: 
World Health Organization; 2008. 
2.  Paquet C, Coulombier D, Kaiser R, Ciotti M. Epidemic intelligence: a new 
framework for strengthening disease surveillance in Europe. Euro Surveill. 
2006;11(12):212–214. 
3.  World Health Organization. European Strategy Meeting for implementation of the 
International Health Regulations (2005) - Scope and purpose. Copenhagen: 
World Health Organization; 2013. 
4.  Allebeck P. Which health data for Europe? Eur J Public Health. 2012;22(5):611. 
5.  European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Decision on serious 
cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC 
(1082/2013/EU). Off J Eur Union. 2013;L 293:1–15. 
6.  European Commission. Commission Implementing Decision amending Decision 
2002/253/EC laying down case definitions for reporting communicable diseases 
to the Community network under Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (2012/506/EU). Off J Eur Union. 2012;L262:1–57. 
7.  Mostashari F, Hartman J. Syndromic surveillance: a local perspective. J Urban 
Health. 2003;80(2 Suppl 1):i1–i7. 
8.  McManus J, Huebner K, Scheulen J. The science of surge: Detection and 
situational awareness. Acad Emerg Med. 2006;13(11):1179–82. 
9.  Lyytikainen O, Kuusi M, Snellman M, Virtanen M, Eskola J, Ronkko E, et al. 
Surveillance of influenza in Finland during the 2009 pandemic, 10 May 2009 to 8 
March 2010. Euro Surveill. 2011;16(27). pii: 19908. 
10.  Wilson K, McDougall C, Forster A. The responsibility of healthcare institutions to 
protect global health security. Healthc Q. 2009;12(1):56–60. 
11.  Altmann M, Spode A, Altmann D, Wadl M, Benzler J, Eckmanns T, et al. Timeliness 
of surveillance during outbreak of Shiga Toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
infection, Germany, 2011. Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17(10):1906–9.  
12.  Triple S. Assessment of syndromic surveillance in Europe. Lancet. 2011;378 
(9806):1833–1834. 
13.  Conti S, Kanieff M, Rago G, on behalf of the Triple-S project. Inventory of 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems in Europe; 2012. Available from: 
http://www.syndromicsurveillance.eu/images/stories/Final_material/triple-
S_country_visits.pdf. 
14.  Ziemann A, Krafft T. Guidelines for Assessment of Data Sources; 2013. Available 
from: http://www.syndromicsurveillance.eu/triple-s_guidelines_datasources. 
pdf. 
15.  Paterson BJ, Durrheim DN. The remarkable adaptability of syndromic surveillance 
to meet public health needs. J Epidemiol Global Health. 2013;3(1):41–7. 
16. Kaydos-Daniels SC, Rojas Smith L, Farris TR. Biosurveillance in outbreak 
investigations. Biosecur Bioterror. 2013;11(1):20–8. 
 76   Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe 
17.  Koopmans M. Surveillance strategy for early detection of unusual infectious 
disease events. Curr Opin Virol. 2013;3(2):185–91. 
18.  Morse SS. Public health surveillance and infectious disease detection. Biosecur 
Bioterror. 2012;10(1):6–16. 
19.  Revision of the International Health Regulations. Progress report, February 2001. 
Wkly Epidemiol Rec. 2001;8:61–3. 
20.  Ziemann A, Krafft T, Sala Soler M, Sypniewska P. Country visits. Triple S-AGE 
project; 2013. Available from:  http://syndromicsurveillance.eu/images/ 
stories/Final_material/triple-S_country_visits.pdf 
21.  Rosenkötter N, Ziemann A, Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo L, Gillet JB, Vergeiner G, Krafft 
T, et al. Validity and timeliness of syndromic influenza surveillance during the 
autumn/winter wave of A(H1N1) influenza 2009: results of emergency medical 
dispatch, ambulance and emergency department data from three European 
regions. BMC Public Health. 2013;13(1):905. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-13-905. 
22.  Bollaerts K, Antoine J, Robesyn E, Van Proeyen L, Vomberg J, Feys E, et al. 
Timeliness of syndromic influenza surveillance through work and school 
absenteeism. Arch Public Health. 2010;68:115–20. 
23.  Harder KM, Andersen PH, Baehr I, Nielsen LP, Ethelberg S, Glismann S, et al. 
Electronic real-time surveillance for influenza-like illness: experience from the 
2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in Denmark. Euro Surveill. 2011;16(3). pii: 
19767  
24.  Gerbier-Colomban S, Potinet-Pagliaroli V, Metzger MH. Can epidemic detection 
systems at the hospital level complement regional surveillancenetworks: case 
study with the influenza epidemic? BMC Infect Dis. 2014;14:381. 
25.  Brabazon ED, Carton MW, Murray C, Hederman L, Bedford D. General practice 
out-of-hours service in Ireland provides a new source of syndromic surveillance 
data on influenza. Euro Surveill. 2010;15(31). pii: 19632. 
26.  Ansaldi F, Orsi A, Altomonte F, Bertone G, Parodi V, Carloni R, et al. Emergency 
department syndromic surveillance syndromic surveillancetem for early detection 
of 5 syndromes: a pilot project in a reference teaching hospital in Genoa. Italy J 
Prev Med Hyg. 2008;49(4):131–5. 
27.  Amicizia D, Cremonesi I, Carloni R, Schiaffino S. The response of the Liguria 
Region (Italy) to the pandemic influenza virus A/H1N1sv. J Prev Med Hyg. 
2011;52(3):120–3. 
28.  Schrell S, Ziemann A, Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo L, Rosenkötter N, Llorca J, Popa D, 
et al. Local implementation of a syndromic influenza surveillance syndromic 
surveillancetem using emergency department data in Santander, Spain. J Public 
Health (Oxf). 2013;35(3):397–403. 
29.  Hulth A, Rydevik G, Linde A. Web queries as a source for syndromic surveillance. 
PLoS One. 2009;4(2):e4378. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0004378. 
30.  Hulth A, Rydevik G. Web query-based surveillance in Sweden during the influenza 
A(H1N1)2009 pandemic, April 2009 to February 2010. Euro Surveill. 
2011;16(18). pii: 19856. 
                                                           Chapter 5: Added value of syndromic surveillance for implementing the IHR (2005)     77
31. Hulth A, Rydevik G. GET WELL: an automated surveillance syndromic 
surveillancetem for gaining new epidemiological knowledge. BMC Public Health. 
2011;11:252. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-11-252. 
32.  Smith S, Smith GE, Olowokure B, Ibbotson S, Foord D, Maguire H, et al. Early 
spread of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in the United Kingdom–use of 
local syndromic data, May-August 2009. Euro Surveill. 2011;16(3). pii: 19771. 
33.  Cooper DL, Verlander NQ, Elliot AJ, Joseph CA, Smith GE. Can syndromic 
thresholds provide early warning of national influenza outbreaks? J Public Health 
(Oxf). 2009;31(1):17–25. 
34.  Harcourt SE, Smith GE, Elliot AJ, Pebody R, Charlett A, Ibbotson S, et al. Use of 
a large general practice syndromic surveillance syndromic surveillance system to 
monitor the progress of the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 2009 in the UK. 
Epidemiol Infect. 2012;140(1):100–5. 
35.  Kara EO, Elliot AJ, Bagnall H, Foord DG, Pnaiser R, Osman H, et al. Absenteeism 
in schools during the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic: a useful tool for early 
detection of influenza activity in the community? Epidemiol Infect. 
2012;140(7):1328–36. 
36.  Todd S, Diggle PJ, White PJ, Fearne A, Read JM. The spatiotemporal association 
of non-prescription retail sales with cases during the 2009 influenza pandemic in 
Great Britain. BMJ Open. 2014;4(4):e004869. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2014-
004869. 
37.  Kavanagh K, Robertson C, Murdoch H, Crooks G, McMenamin J. Syndromic 
surveillance of influenza-like illness in Scotland during the influenza A H1N1v 
pandemic and beyond. J R Stat Soc (Series A). 2012;175:939–58. 
38.  Valdivia A, Lopez-Alcalde J, Vicente M, Pichiule M, Ruiz M, Ordobas M. Monitoring 
influenza a ctivity in Europe with Google Flu Trends: comparison with the findings 
of sentinel physician networks - results for 2009–10. Euro Surveill. 2010;15(29). 
pii: 19621. 
39.  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Second Interim Threat 
Assessment. Ash cloud following volcanic eruption in Iceland, 20 April 11:00 CET. 
Stockholm: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; 2010. 
40.  World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. WHO/Europe expert group 
concludes Icelandic volcanic ash currently poses no threat to public health 
[Internet]. Available from: http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-
topics/environment-and-health/air-quality/news/news/2010/05/whoeurope-
expert-group-concludesicelandic-volcanic-ash-currently-poses-no-threat-to-
public-health. 
41.  Rosenkötter N, Ziemann A, Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo L, Vergeiner G, Fischer M, 
Krafft T, et al. SIDARTHa Volcanic Ash Cloud Rapid Public Health Impact 
Assessment. Regional public health impact of volcanic ash cloud covering Europe 
after eruption of Eyjafjallajoekull, Iceland starting April 14th, 2010. Results as of 
May 15th, 2010. Bad Honnef: SIDARTHa project; 2010. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/chafea/documents/health/SIDARTHa_rapid_assessment_vo
lcanic_ash_cloud_15MAY2010.pdf. 
 78   Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe 
42.  Elliot AJ, Singh N, Loveridge P, Harcourt S, Smith S, Pnaiser R, et al. Syndromic 
surveillance to assess the potential public health impact of the Icelandic volcanic 
ash plume across the United Kingdom, April 2010. Euro Surveill. 2010;15(23). 
pii: 19583. 
43.  Robert Koch Institut. Final presentation and evaluation of epidemiological 
findings in the EHEC O104:H4 Outbreak, Germany 2011. Berlin: Robert Koch-
Institute; 2011. 
44.  Wadl M, Rieck T, Nachtnebel M, Greutelaers B, an der Heiden M, Altmann D, et 
al. Enhanced surveillance during a large outbreak of bloody diarrhoea and 
haemolytic uraemic syndrome caused by Shiga toxin/verotoxinproducing 
Escherichia coli in Germany, May to June 2011. Euro Surveill. 2011;16(24). pii: 
19893. 
45.  Dailey L, Watkins RE, Plant AJ. Timeliness of data sources used for influenza 
surveillance. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2007;14(5):626–31. 
46.  Rosenkötter N, Ziemann A, Krafft T, Riesgo LG, Vergeiner G, Brand H. Non-
infectious events under the International Health Regulations (2005) in Europe - 
a case for syndromic surveillance. J Public Health Policy. 2014;35(3):311–26. 
47.  Coory MD, Kelly H, Tippett V. Assessment of ambulance dispatch data for 
surveillance of influenza-like illness in Melbourne, Australia. Public Health. 
2009;123(2):163–8. 
48.  Xing J, Burkom H, Tokars J. Method selection and adaptation for distributed 
monitoring of infectious diseases for syndromic surveillance. J Biomed Inform. 
2011;44(6):1093–101. 
49.  van den Wijngaard C, van Asten L, van Pelt W, Nagelkerke NJ, Verheij R, de 
Neeling AJ, et al. Validation of syndromic surveillance for respiratory pathogen 
activity. Emerg Infect Dis. 2008;14(6):917–25. 
50.  Mook P, Joseph C, Gates P, Phin N. Pilot scheme for monitoring sickness absence 
in schools during the 2006/07 winter in England: can these data be used as a 
proxy for influenza activity? Euro Surveill. 2007;12(12):E11–E12. 
51.  Schmidt WP, Pebody R, Mangtani P. School absence data for influenza 
surveillance: a pilot study in the United Kingdom. Euro Surveill. 2010;15(3). pii: 
19467. 
52.  Aguilera JF, Paget WJ, Mosnier A, Heijnen ML, Uphoff H, van der Velden J, et al. 
Heterogeneous case definitions used for the surveillance of influenza in Europe. 
Eur J Epidemiol. 2003;18(8):751–4. 
53.  Paget J, Marquet R, Meijer A, van der Velden K. Influenza activity in Europe 
during eight seasons (1999–2007): an evaluation of the indicators used to 
measure activity and an assessment of the timing, length and course of peak 
activity (spread) across Europe. BMC Infect Dis. 2007;7:141. Doi: 
10.1186/1471-2334-7-141. 
54.  Kissling E, Valenciano M, Falcao J, Larrauri A, Widgren K, Pitigoi D, et al. “I-
MOVE” towards monitoring seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine 
effectiveness: lessons learnt from a pilot multi-centric case–control study in 
Europe, 2008–9. Euro Surveill. 2009;14(44). pii: 19388. 
                                                           Chapter 5: Added value of syndromic surveillance for implementing the IHR (2005)     79
55.  EuroMOMO [Internet]. Available from: http://www.euromomo.eu. 
56.  Medina S, Fouillet A, Ziemann A, Krafft T, Cooper D, Dupuy C, et al. Proposal for 
a European strategy for syndromic surveillance. Toward comparability of 
reporting from syndromic surveillance systems in Europe; 2013. Available from: 
http://syndromicsurveillance.eu/Triple-S_proposal.pdf. 
57.  Cooper DL, Smith G, Baker M, Chinemana F, Verlander N, Gerard E, et al. National 
symptom surveillance using calls to a telephone health advice service–United 
Kingdom, December 2001-February 2003. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2004;53(Suppl):179–83. 
58.  Flamand C, Larrieu S, Couvy F, Jouves B, Josseran L, Filleul L. Validation of a 
syndromic surveillance syndromic surveillancetem using a general practitioner 
house calls network, Bordeaux, France. Euro Surveill. 2008;13(25). pii: 18905. 
59.  Josseran L, Nicolau J, Caillere N, Astagneau P, Brucker G. Syndromic surveillance 
based on emergency department activity and crude mortality: two examples. 
Euro Surveill. 2006;11(12):225–9. 
60.  Guasticchi G, Giorgi Rossi P, Lori G, Genio S, Biagetti F, Gabriele S, et al. 
Syndromic surveillance: sensitivity and positive predictive value of the case 
definitions. Epidemiol Infect. 2009;137(5):662–71. 
61.  Davies GR, Finch RG. Sales of over-the-counter remedies as an early warning 
syndromic surveillancetem for winter bed crises. Clin Microbiol Infect. 
2003;9(8):858–63. 
62.  Buehler JW, Hopkins RS, Overhage JM, Sosin DM, Tong V. Framework for 
evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks: 
recommendations from the CDC Working Group. MMWR Recomm Rep. 
2004;53(RR-5):1–11. 
63. Ziemann A, Krafft T. Scientific visit guidelines for knowledge exchange on 
syndromic surveillance in Europe. Triple S-AGE project; 2011. Available from: 
http://syndromicsurveillance.eu/triple-s_scientific_visit_guidelines.pdf. 
64. Bounoure F, Beaudeau P, Mouly D, Skiba M, Lahiani-Skiba M. Syndromic 
surveillance of acute gastroenteritis based on drug consumption. Epidemiol 
Infect. 2011;139(9):1388–95. 
65.  Buehler JW, Whitney EA, Smith D, Prietula MJ, Stanton SH, Isakov AP. Situational 
uses of syndromic surveillance. Biosecur Bioterror. 2009;7(2):165–77. 
66.  EuroREACH. Good practice on data linkages and performance measurement in 
relation to access to national health care data systems. Available from: 
http://www.euroreach.net/sites/default/files/EuroREACH-
WP3%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
67.  SIDARTHa [Internet]. Available from: http://www.sidartha.eu. 
68.  Ziemann A, Rosenkötter N, Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo L, Schrell S, Kauhl B, 
Vergeiner G, et al. A concept for routine emergency-care data-based syndromic 
surveillance in Europe. Epidemiol Infect. 2014;142(11):2433–46.
  
  
  
CHAPTER 6         
Success Factors of European 
Syndromic Surveillance 
Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
submitted as: 
  
Ziemann A, Fouillet A, Brand H, Krafft T. Success factors of European syndromic 
surveillance systems: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
82    Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe                                                          
Abstract 
Syndromic surveillance aims at augmenting traditional public health surveillance with 
timely information, based on the analysis of mainly existing data sources such as web 
searches or patient records. Despite the setup of many syndromic surveillance systems, 
there is still much doubt about the added value of the approach. The diverse interactions 
between performance indicators such as timeliness, and various system characteristics 
make the assessment of syndromic surveillance systems a complex endeavour. We argue 
that the comparison of different syndromic surveillance systems through Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis helps to assess performance and identify key success factors. 
 
We compiled case-based, mixed data on performance and characteristics of 19 syndromic 
surveillance systems in Europe from scientific and grey literature and from site visits. We 
identified success factors of syndromic surveillance by applying crisp-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis for the two main areas of syndromic surveillance application: 
seasonal infectious disease surveillance focussing on influenza and situational awareness 
during different kinds of potentially health threatening events. 
 
We found that a syndromic surveillance system might provide timelier information on 
seasonal influenza if it analyses non-clinical data sources. Timely situational awareness 
during different kinds of events is fostered by an automated syndromic surveillance 
system capable of analysing multiple syndromes. To our surprise, the analysis of multiple 
data sources was not identified as key success factor for situational awareness. 
 
We recommend to consider the key success factors when taking decisions on designing 
syndromic surveillance systems. Qualitative Comparative Analysis was of added value to 
interpret complex and mixed data on small-N cases in the area of public health 
surveillance and provided practically relevant results.  
 
 
Key words: Europe, public health surveillance, comparative study, Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis 
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Introduction 
Syndromic surveillance aims at augmenting traditional public health surveillance systems 
by providing (near) real-time information on the public health impact of events. To gain 
a head start, syndromic surveillance mainly analyses data from existing sources that were 
originally not collected for surveillance purposes (1). Such data sources can be web query 
logs, telephone helpline registries, or patient or veterinary records (2). Over the past 15 
years, an increasing number of syndromic surveillance systems were set up in Europe. 
They had the main purposes of timely infectious disease outbreak detection and near 
real-time situational awareness during events such as mass gatherings or extreme 
weather events (3). However, there is still a lot of doubt about the added value of the 
approach (4). A lack of clinical specificity which can lead to false alerts and undetected 
events is considered the major weakness of syndromic surveillance (5). The major 
advantages are timeliness, flexibility in using the approach for different kinds of health 
threats, and cost-effectiveness as no additional data have to be collected (6, 7). There 
are many case reports on the application of syndromic surveillance systems including 
performance measures. But, there is no general synthesis as to when or why syndromic 
surveillance systems are performing well or not. 
Frameworks for evaluating syndromic surveillance systems propose quantitative 
performance indicators such as timeliness and validity, and more qualitative indicators 
such as flexibility and acceptability (8, 9). These indicators are affected by different 
characteristics of a syndromic surveillance system. These can be the analysed data 
source, the data collection, analysis and reporting process, and the purpose for and 
context in which the system is set up. The vast number and causal relationships of the 
different aspects make the assessment of syndromic surveillance systems a complex 
endeavour. Evaluations to date often focus on single, usually quantifiable, performance 
indicators (10-13). These evaluations only assess one syndromic surveillance system at 
a time. There are no comparative analyses of several syndromic surveillance systems. 
Such comparisons could unveil differences in performance and the impact of certain 
system characteristics on performance. Decision makers could use this information to 
design syndromic surveillance systems and improve their added value. We aimed at 
assessing the performance and identifying success factors of syndromic surveillance 
systems in Europe by applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Further, we 
aimed at assessing if QCA has an added value as approach and analysis method in the 
area of public health surveillance. 
 
Methods 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
QCA is an approach and analysis method based on Boolean algebra. It allows for a 
systematic comparative analysis of small-N and especially case-based data which are not 
suited for statistical analysis such as regression analysis (14). Ragin gives a good 
introduction to QCA in a short online presentation (15). The method allows to analyse 
quantitative and qualitative or mixed data to identify if certain conditions or combinations 
of conditions (in our case characteristics of syndromic surveillance systems) are part of 
an outcome set (in our case successful syndromic surveillance systems defined by 
performance indicators). The core of QCA is the process of Boolean minimisation which 
aims at reducing the complexity of combinations of conditions to a minimum of necessary 
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or sufficient conditions (16). Until now, QCA was mainly applied in the social sciences, 
especially the political sciences. It is relatively new to the health sciences and was applied 
in a few studies on identifying success factors of health policies or interventions but not 
in the area of public health surveillance (17-19).  
QCA is an iterative process, characterised by a dialogue between the results of the 
different steps of the QCA and the researcher’s case knowledge and expertise. The data 
input for the QCA is not fixed a priori but is likely to be adjusted in the process to increase 
validity of the results. Nevertheless, QCA follows a structured approach of predefined 
steps: (1) building a data table consisting of outcome indicators and conditions, (2) 
constructing a “truth table” consisting of configurations (combinations of the conditions 
and the outcome), (3) Boolean minimisation to reduce the complexity of the 
configurations to necessary or sufficient configurations known as solution terms, and (4) 
interpretation of the solution terms (16). Steps 2 and 3 are supported by different free 
software (20).  
There are two main QCA variants, differentiated by the characteristics of the data input: 
crisp set QCA (cs/QSA) analyses dichotomous data while fuzzy set QCA analyses ordinal 
or interval data or ratios. The selection of the variant depends on the aim of the study 
and the data basis. Another key aspect of QCA is the inclusion of configurations without 
an observed outcome, so called logical remainders (16). Thus, QCA does not only analyse 
the observed cases but includes all logical possible configurations in the minimisation 
process to further reduce the complexity of the solution terms. Based on the purpose of 
this study and the characteristics of the small-N, case-based and mixed data, we found 
cs/QCA to be the suitable analysis method. In the following, we present our configurations 
for the QCA steps 1 to 3.  
 
Data table: conceptual model, data basis, outcome indicators and conditions 
Conceptual model 
There are two main advantages of syndromic surveillance: it provides timelier information 
and information on events for which no other public health information is available. These 
virtues are mainly applied for two public health surveillance purposes: (1) timelier 
information on seasonal infectious disease outbreaks, mainly influenza, and (2) real-time 
situational awareness during events with potential public health impact such as 
environmental threats or mass gatherings. The latter also includes reassurance that an 
event has no public health impact. We performed two cs/QCA to identify success factors 
of syndromic surveillance systems for these two major areas of application. 
 
Data basis 
The data for this study was collected in the framework of the European project Triple S-
AGE which aimed at supporting a harmonised setup of syndromic surveillance systems 
across Europe (21). Based on a literature review and an inventory, 60 European 
syndromic surveillance systems were identified (2, 22). 36 systems in eight countries and 
one European consortium were selected for a site visit based on the extent of syndromic 
surveillance experience. Active, pilot, planned and expired syndromic surveillance 
systems were visited during nine site visits between June 2011 and June 2012. Data on 
the visited syndromic surveillance systems were collected through presentations and 
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transcripts of the discussions (23). The 18 syndromic surveillance systems initially 
selected for this study were chosen based on the status of the system, i.e., if it is or was 
active and is not only a pilot or planned system, AND on sufficient availability of data for 
the study, defined as results published in peer-reviewed journals AND coverage during 
the site visits (table 1). In February 2015, we updated the literature review purposefully 
on the selected systems searching in Google Scholar and PubMed and by hand-searching 
references. Case-based data for the QCA were compiled from scientific and grey literature 
and the site visits. The visits provided additional information for the QCA beyond what 
was reported in scientific publications. A list of the publications included for the QCA is 
available on request. In the course of the QCA, we chose to add another case from 
Germany to increase validity of the QCA. This ad-hoc system was not considered for a 
site visit as the plan for the site visits was already fixed. All necessary data were collected 
from scientific and grey literature (24, 25). 
 
Table 1: Key characteristics of syndromic surveillance systems selected for QCA 
 
Country Name/description of syndromic surveillance systems Data source 
Denmark DMOS surveillance Primary care 
BioAlarm Emergency medical dispatch centre 
England EDSSS Emergency department 
OOH/Unscheduled care surveillance system Primary care  
QSurveillance Primary care 
NHS Direct Telephone helpline 
France SurSaUD – OSCOUR Emergency department 
SurSaUD – SOS Médecins Primary care  
Germany O104:H4 outbreak surveillance Emergency department 
Italy Migrant influx surveillance Health services at migrant centres 
National emergency department surveillance Emergency department 
Genoa SyS system Emergency department 
Lazio Region SyS system Emergency department 
Scotland NHS24 Telephone helpline 
PiPeR / SISRS Primary care 
SIDARTHa* SIDARTHa-Cantabria Emergency department 
SIDARTHa-Tyrol Emergency medical dispatch centre 
Sweden GETWELL Web queries 
1177 telephone helpline surveillance Telephone helpline 
 
* SIDARTHa = European syndromic surveillance initiative currently comprising two active systems in Cantabria/Spain and 
Tyrol/Austria 
 
 
Outcome indicators 
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
It is anticipated that a syndromic surveillance system can provide timely information if it 
is based on data sources that are providing data earlier in the course of illness. For 
example, data from web searches or telephone helplines are considered to provide 
information on people with mild symptoms before they seek health care. In comparison, 
traditional surveillance data sources such as sentinel general practitioners or laboratory 
confirmations are providing information on patients with more severe symptoms. Further, 
it is anticipated that syndromic surveillance provides timelier information if it is based on 
pre-diagnostic clinical data such as chief complaints, in comparison to confirmed 
diagnoses (2, 11, 26). The data basis was largest for seasonal influenza surveillance, 
therefore, we chose this case for the QCA. The cut-off for differentiating a successful from 
an unsuccessful case in the QCA was chosen based on the data reported in the cases and 
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based on the following theoretic consideration. As traditional influenza surveillance data 
are usually available on a weekly basis, a successful syndromic surveillance system 
should provide data at least the week before. Traditional data sources were sentinel 
general practitioner reports or laboratory confirmations. We defined the cut-off as 
syndromic influenza-like-illness signal indicating the onset or peak of the influenza season 
before the week in which a traditional surveillance data source first indicated the same. 
We used the average timeliness per system if data were reported for several influenza 
seasons. The outcome indicator for the QCA (QCA coding: OUTCOME) was coded as 1 for 
successful syndromic surveillance systems with a timeliness of case detection of less than 
0 weeks. The outcome was coded as 0 for unsuccessful systems with a timeliness of case 
detection of 0 or more weeks. Data were available on syndromic influenza surveillance 
for nine syndromic surveillance systems in six countries (table 2). 
 
Situational awareness 
We anticipate that successful situational awareness is given if a syndromic surveillance 
system can be applied to different potential public health threats (applicability) and if it 
provides rapid information (timeliness of reporting) (7, 27, 28). We defined the cut-off 
for a successful outcome for applicability as prospective surveillance during more than 
one different kind of event. The kind of event could refer to four different event types: 
environmental threats such as the volcanic ash plume 2010, heat waves, or floods, the 
A/H1N1 pandemic 2009, mass gatherings such as political summits or sporting events, 
and industrial accidents. The definition of this outcome indicator and its cut-off were 
chosen based on the reported applications in the cases. The applicability outcome 
indicator was combined with an indicator for timeliness. Here, success was defined as 
reporting of syndromic surveillance results referring to the onset of the health impact of 
an event or to the frequency of reporting of under 3 days. We used the average timeliness 
if data were reported for several events. If the two outcome indicators contradicted 
themselves, we decided to weigh applicability higher than timeliness. Most established 
syndromic surveillance systems provide timely reports as can be seen from the cases but 
it is more difficult to apply a system to more than one kind of event. Therefore, the 
outcome indicator for the QCA (OUTCOME) was coded as 1 for successful syndromic 
surveillance systems with a timeliness of reporting under 3 days and/or with applicability 
during two or more different kinds of events. The outcome was coded as 0 for 
unsuccessful systems with a timeliness of 3 or more days and/or applicability during only 
one kind of event. Data were available on syndromic surveillance systems in nine 
countries (table 2). 
 
 
  
         Chapter 6: Success factors of European syndromic surveillance systems     87 
Table 2: Raw data for cs/QCA of seasonal syndromic influenza surveillance (a) and syndromic situational 
awareness (b) (grey shaded areas indicate successful cases)  
 
a) 
Cases / Systems Country NONCLIN ACUTE SUBNAT  AGE Timeliness detection [weeks] OUTCOME 
1177 SE 1 0 0 0 -0.9 1 
GETWELL SE 1 0 0 0 -1.5 1 
Genoa IT 0 1 1 1 -1.9 1 
SIDARTHa Cant. SID 0 1 1 0 -0.5 1 
NHS24 SC 1 0 0 0 -1.0 1 
NHSDirect  EN 1 0 1 1 -0.5 1 
QSurveillance EN 0 0 1 0 2.0 0 
Oscour FR 0 1 0 0 0,0 0 
SOS Medecins FR 0 1 1 0 -2.5 1 
 
b) 
Cases Events (Systems) 
MULT-
DATA  
MULT-
SYND FREETEXT AUTOM EXIST ELEC 
Appli-
cability 
[no. 
events] 
Time-
liness 
reporting 
[days] OUTCOME 
DE O104:H4 (ad-hoc 
system) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 
DK Pandemic (DMOS) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 
EN Various* (EDSSS, 
OOH, Qsurv, 
NHSDirect) 
1 1 0 1 1 1 4 2 1 
FR Various* (Oscour, 
SOS Medecins) 
1 1 0 1 1 1 4 0.63 1 
IT Migrant influx (ad-
hoc system) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4.41 0 
SC Various* (different, 
mainly NHS 24)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.91 1 
SE Pandemic, Volcanic  
ash plume  
(GETWELL) 
0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
SID Volcanic ash plume, 
pandemic (Tyrol, 
Cant.) 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 14 0 
 
0 = absent, 1 = present, ACUTE = acute care data sources, AGE = age-group analysis, AUTOM = automated syndromic 
surveillance system components, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ELEC = electronic data collection, EN = England, EXIST = 
syndromic surveillance system existed before monitored event, FR = France, FREETEXT = free text analysis, IT = Italy, 
MULTDATA = multiple data sources, MULTSYND = multiple syndromes, NONCLIN = non-clinical data sources, SC = Scotland, 
SE = Sweden, SID = SIDARTHa Cantabria and/or Tyrol, SUBNAT = subnational analysis 
 
 
Conditions 
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
Timeliness of seasonal influenza case detection is anticipated to be mainly influenced by 
the analysed data source. Non-clinical data sources (NONCLIN) and information collected 
prior to confirmed diagnoses from acute care data sources (ACUTE) were expected to be 
of positive influence on timelier case detection. Non-clinical data sources comprised web 
searches and telephone helplines while clinical sources referred to primary and acute care 
data sources. Acute care data sources were referring to emergency departments or out-
of-ours general practitioner services. After having run a first cs/QCA analysis on these 
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two factors, a contradictory combination of conditions occurred. That means that the 
same combination resulted in a positive and a negative outcome in the observed cases. 
The most frequently chosen solution to resolve this contradiction is to add conditions 
(16). We chose the analysis of population subgroups as additional factor. The analysis of 
different age groups (AGE) can positively influence the timeliness of detecting cases. A 
similar positive effect is anticipated to come from the analysis of small-scale subnational 
syndromic surveillance data (SUBNAT) compared to traditional surveillance data referring 
to a higher administrative level. This could refer to regional syndromic compared to 
national traditional surveillance results, for example. 
 
Situational awareness 
Factors influencing applicability of systems for various events are flexibility and 
acceptance of the system. A common experience shared during the site visits was that 
flexibility is positively influenced by the analysis of multiple data sources (MULTDATA) 
and free text compared to fixed diagnostic codes (FREETEXT) (23). We added the ability 
to generate multiple syndromes as another possible success factor (MULTSYND) as a 
logical deduction from the analysis of multiple data sources. Acceptability of the system 
is positively affected by the collection of electronic compared to paper-based data (ELEC). 
Furthermore, the automation of data transfer and possibly also of data analysis and 
reporting (AUTOM) is expected to have a positive effect. The same applies to the 
existence of a system before the occurrence of the event compared to systems that are 
set up ad-hoc during an event (EXIST). These three conditions were also anticipated to 
positively influence reporting time.  
 
Quality of the data table 
In order to check for the quality of the data table for the minimisation process, we 
analysed the variety of values across outcome, conditions and cases. Further, we 
analysed the consistency of the conditions for explaining a positive outcome. A limited 
variety and consistency can reduce the quality and informational value of the cs/QCA 
results (16). As a general rule, there should be a mix of cases with a negative and a 
positive outcome, at least one third of the cases should represent a certain condition 
value and two conditions should not have the same values across the cases. There are 
no general rules for defining appropriate levels of consistency, this is depending on the 
study. However, there is a general agreement about the lower level of consistency of 0.75 
(29). To increase quality of the data table, the selection of cases and conditions or the 
ways in defining the conditions can be reconsidered (16). 
 
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
The condition AGE did not show enough variety across all cases and was excluded from 
the minimisation process. The consistency levels of the three conditions left for the 
minimisation process were between 0.43 and 0.57 (table 3). There is a limitation to be 
taken into account when analysing the condition ACUTE. That is that only clinical data 
sources can also be acute data sources. The consistency level for ACUTE is rising to 0.75 
when referring only to clinical instead of all cases. Despite the low consistency levels for 
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the conditions NONCLIN and SUBNAT, we included the conditions in the analysis and took 
account of the consistency in the interpretation of the results. 
 
Situational awareness 
For three conditions MULTSYND, EXIST and ELEC, there was not enough variety over all 
cases and the conditions ELEC and EXIST were showing the same value pattern over all 
cases. To resolve the similarity of the conditions ELEC and EXIST, we have decided to 
exclude the condition ELEC from the QCA. Data are more and more electronically available 
and, thus, this factor will be of lesser relevance in the future compared to the factor of 
existence before an event to explain success of a system. For increasing the variety of 
values across cases, we had no theoretic justification to exclude any of the cases or 
remaining conditions or to rethink the coding of the conditions. We decided to add another 
case instead. We chose the system from Germany which was set up to monitor the 
O104:H4 outbreak in 2011. We have analysed this syndromic surveillance system in the 
framework of another study (28), and knew that it was qualifying for the QCA and that 
we could retrieve all necessary data from the broad publication coverage of this case. The 
consistency levels of the conditions were between 0.75 and 1.00, except for FREETEXT 
for which it was only 0.5. Thus, we decided to exclude FREETEXT from the minimisation 
process (table 3). 
 
Truth table and Boolean minimisation 
The cs/QCA steps of constructing the truth table and Boolean minimisation were 
accomplished using the software TOSMANA Version 1.302 (30). 
 
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
The truth table contained five configurations of the three conditions (table 3). Six cases 
were combined into two groups of configurations while the other three had individual 
configurations. The first round of Boolean minimisation including logical remainders was 
based on contradictory simplifying assumptions (CSA).  That means that a logical 
remainder was used to explain both positive and negative outcome at the same time. 
This was resolved by applying the following procedure suggested by Delreux and Hesters 
(31). The CSA was assigned the likelier outcome of 1 according to case and theoretic 
knowledge and was included as logical remainder in the minimisation process for 
successful cases. The CSA was excluded as logical remainder from the minimisation 
process of the less likely outcome of 0 by including it as additional case. 
 
Situational awareness 
The truth table contained six configurations of the five factors (table 3). Three cases were 
combined in one configuration group while the other cases had individual configurations. 
The inclusion of logical remainders in the minimisation process did not lead to any 
contradictions. 
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Table 3: Truth table for cs/QCA of seasonal syndromic influenza surveillance (a) and syndromic situational 
awareness (b) 
 
a) 
NONCLIN ACUTE SUBNAT Outcome Cases 
1 0 0 1 1177,GETWELL,NHS24 
0 1 1 1 GENOA, SID CANT,SOSMEDECINS 
1 0 1 1 NHSDIRECT 
0 0 1 0 QSURVEILLANCE 
0 1 0 0 OSCOUR 
0.57 0.43 (0.75) 0.57  Consistency (consistency only for cases NONCLIN = 0) 
 
b) 
MULTIDATA MULTISYND AUTOM EXIST OUTCOME Cases 
0 0 1 1 0 Denmark 
1 1 1 1 1 England, France, Scotland 
0 1 0 0 0 Italy Migrants 
1 1 0 1 0 SIDARTHa 
0 1 1 1 1 Sweden 
0 0 0 0 0 Germany 
0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00  Consistency 
 
0 = absent, 1 = present, ACUTE = acute care data sources, AUTOM = automated syndromic surveillance system components, 
EXIST = syndromic surveillance system existed before monitored event, MULTDATA = multiple data sources, MULTSYND = 
multiple syndromes, NONCLIN = non-clinical data sources, SUBNAT = subnational analysis 
 
 
Results  
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
More than 75% (n=7) of systems registered influenza-like-illness cases earlier compared 
to traditional surveillance systems (table 2). Timeliness ranged from -2.5 weeks in the 
SOS Medecins system to 2.0 weeks in the QSurveillance system with an average of -0.75 
weeks and a median of -0.9 weeks. The minimisation process resulted in two different 
solution terms explaining 57% (n=4) and 43% (n=3) of the successful cases, and in two 
solution terms explaining the unsuccessful cases, each explaining 50% (n=1) of the cases 
(table 4). According to these solutions, successful syndromic surveillance systems for 
timely influenza case detection are analysing non-clinical data sources or are analysing 
acute data sources in combination with applying subnational data analysis. Unsuccessful 
syndromic surveillance systems in terms of timely influenza case detection are analysing 
clinical data sources in combination with either the analysis of non-acute care data 
sources or without applying subnational analysis. No solutions leading to success are 
necessary as the outcome also occurs in the absence of the solutions. But, the solutions 
are sufficient as the outcome always occurs when the solutions are present but there are 
also other solutions leading to the outcome.  
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Situational awareness 
The systems covered different kind of events ranging from one event in four cases to four 
events in two cases (table 2). Reporting time for the six successful systems was around 
one day and the cases were all very close to each other. For the two unsuccessful cases, 
reporting time was around 4 and 14 days. The minimisation process resulted in one 
solution term explaining all successful cases and two explaining 50% (n=2) and 75% 
(n=3) of the unsuccessful cases respectively (table 4). According to the solutions, 
successful syndromic situational awareness systems are analysing multiple syndromes 
and are automated. Unsuccessful systems are analysing single syndromes and/or are not 
automated. The combination of analysing multiple syndromes in an automated system is 
a necessary condition as it is always present when the outcome occurs and the outcome 
does not occur when this condition is absent. The analysis of multiple data sources and 
the existence of the system before the event occurred were not identified as key 
influencing factors.  
 
Table 4: Solution terms for explaining successful and unsuccessful seasonal syndromic influenza surveillance 
(a) and syndromic situational awareness (b) 
 
a) 
Solution terms Cases RC UC SC C 
NONCLIN+ 
 
ACUTE*SUBNAT 
 
→ OUTCOME 
(1177,GETWELL,NHS24+NHSDIRECT) 
 
(GENOA+SID CANT, SOSMEDECINS) 
 
0.57 
 
0.43 (1.0)* 
 
0.57 
 
0.43 (1.0)* 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
nonclin*acute 
 
nonclin*subnat 
 
→ outcome 
(QSURVEILLANCE) 
 
(OSCOUR) 
 
0.5 (0.5)* 
 
0.5  
 
0.5 (0.5)* 
 
0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
b) 
Solution terms Cases RC UC SC C 
MULTSYND*AUTOM 
 
← OUTCOME 
(England,France,Scotland+Sweden) 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
1.0 
1.0 
 
1.0 
multsynd+ 
 
autom 
 
→ outcome 
(Denmark+Germany)
  
(Italy Migrants+SIDARTHa+Germany) 
 
0.5 
 
0.75 
 
0.25 
 
0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
*coverage referring only to clinical cases, Capital letter = presence, small letter = absence, + = logical OR, * = logical AND, 
ACUTE = acute care data sources, AUTOM = automated syndromic surveillance system components, C = consistency, NONCLIN 
= non-clinical data sources, MULTSYND = multiple syndromes, RC = raw coverage (number of cases covered by solution of all 
cases with the same outcome), SC = solution coverage (number of cases covered by all solutions of all cases with the same 
outcome), SUBNAT = subnational analysis, UC = unique coverage (number of cases uniquely covered by a solution of all cases 
with the same outcome) 
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Discussion 
Using cs/QCA we compared the performance and identified success factors of different 
European syndromic surveillance systems for two major areas of application. We found 
that syndromic influenza surveillance might be timelier when analysing non-clinical data 
sources. For timely situational awareness during various kinds of events, we identified 
the analysis of multiple syndromes in automated syndromic surveillance systems as a 
necessary condition for success.  
 
Interpretation 
Syndromic influenza surveillance  
The low coverage levels of the solutions reflect the low consistency level of the data and 
indicate a need for a careful interpretation of the solutions and a limitation of their 
practical relevance. The solution for successful systems confirmed the hypothesis that the 
analysis of non-clinical data can support timely seasonal infectious disease surveillance. 
The analysis of acute care data sources seems to be of lesser importance and only in 
combination with another condition for timeliness such as subnational analysis. 
Only clinical data based cases were unsuccessful. One of the two unsuccessful cases, 
QSurveillance, is based on data from general practitioners. In the course of illness or 
patient treatment, this data source is positioned closer to the traditional data sources of 
confirmed diagnoses from sentinel general practitioners or laboratories. Compared to the 
non-clinical data sources timeliness of general practitioner data sources must be lower. 
The timeliness of the second system, Oscour, which is based on emergency department 
data was referring to two influenza seasons in 2005 and 2006. As the system was used 
since then on a regular basis for influenza surveillance in France, it might as well have 
shown better timeliness in other seasons comparable to the other acute care data source 
based systems that we analysed. 
While the analysis of subnational data was expected to be supportive, the analysis of age 
groups does not seem to have an added value. However, that does not say that 
subnational or age-adjusted analysis does not lead to timelier surveillance, it might just 
not be applied in many systems. QCA does say more about necessary or sufficient causes 
and combinations thereof in relation to each other than about the potential of single 
success factors (29). 
When looking at applications of the analysed syndromic surveillance systems for other 
infectious disease outbreaks, the two solutions explaining successful outcome are 
supported. For detection of seasonal gastrointestinal outbreaks, the NHS Direct system 
in England could achieve a timeliness of -5.68 weeks on average by using non-clinical 
data (32). No subnational analysis was applied but analysis by age-group. The syndromic 
surveillance system in Genoa monitored two measles outbreaks with a timeliness of -3.57 
weeks on average based on acute care data (33, 34). In this case, subnational 
surveillance was applied in one study and was connected to a 1.43 week advance warning 
(34). Age-adjusted analysis was not applied. We could only collect data on syndromic 
surveillance of other infectious disease outbreaks for these two systems and therefore 
they can only function as indication for a confirmation of our results. 
Looking into other systems outside Europe for syndromic seasonal influenza surveillance, 
we can best look into a review by Dailey and colleagues comparing different systems and 
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data sources for timeliness of syndromic seasonal influenza surveillance (11). The authors 
also found a general higher timeliness of non-clinical and acute care data sources. When 
looking into the single studies included in the review, there were no comparable non-
clinical data based systems but six systems based on emergency department data. These 
are comparable to the acute care systems included in our study. One of these systems 
was associated with a negative outcome according to our definition but this system also 
applied subnational analysis (35). Another system applied subnational analysis which was 
associated with a positive outcome (36). Three other successful systems did not apply 
subnational analysis (37-39), one applied spatial cluster analysis but did not find any 
clusters associated with influenza (40) and one also applied age-adjusted analysis (39). 
From the six systems, five only reported results for one influenza season which reduces 
the representativeness of the results (35-37, 39, 40). The results of emergency 
department data based systems included in our study were all based on more than one 
season. The sixth study did not compare syndromic with traditional surveillance results 
which is limiting the comparability to our results (38). For these emergency department 
data based systems we could not retrieve any further publications focusing on syndromic 
influenza surveillance reporting exact timeliness measurements.  
The comparison with other systems indicates that the two conditions associated with data 
sources might be success factors for syndromic influenza surveillance with a trend 
towards non-clinical data sources. The necessity of subnational analysis in combination 
with acute care data sources for success might be weaker. Future QCA including other 
systems or further data on the included systems are expected to add to the evidence. 
 
Situational awareness 
The possibility to analyse multiple syndromes and the use of automated systems were 
prominent success factors which is in line with our hypothesis. Even more, the 
combination of these factors was identified as a necessary condition for success explaining 
all observed successful cases. The absence of one or both of these conditions was 
connected with unsuccessful syndromic situational awareness.  
To our surprise, that means against the expectations formulated during the site visits, 
the condition of analysing multiple data sources turned out not to be a success factor for 
flexible situational awareness. Multiple data sources were analysed in successful and 
unsuccessful systems. Further, successful as well as unsuccessful systems existed before 
the event. Therefore, this condition could not be identified as success factor. However, 
all successful systems were established before the event giving some indication that this 
can be a characteristic of successful systems. 
Systems outside Europe which were used only for one event share similar characteristics 
as the unsuccessful systems in our study. For example, systems that were set up 2005 
in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in different cities in the United States of America 
(USA) were analysing multiple databases and multiple syndromes daily. But, they were 
not existing before the event, and were based on manual data collection and analysis 
(41, 42). The system set up for monitoring the Kentucky Derby in Louisville, USA, for at 
least the years 2002-2004 was neither automated nor established prior to the event (and 
terminated between events). But, it was monitoring multiple syndromes on a daily basis 
(43). Also in these examples for unsuccessful systems, the combination of multiple 
syndrome analysis and automation was absent as suggested by the QCA solution.  
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Turning to successful systems outside Europe, one long established system that was used 
during different events is the system in New York City, USA. Next to multiple other data 
sources, especially emergency department data were used for situational awareness (44). 
The emergency department data based analysis started as an ad-hoc and non-automated 
setup in the days after the September 2011 terrorist attacks (45, 46). The system was 
maintained by changing it into an automated system which again shows the importance 
of automation as a key success factor. The automated emergency department data based 
system was used to monitor multiple syndromes during the blackout in 2003 (47), the 
A/H1N1 pandemic 2009 (48, 49) and the effects of hurricane Sandy in 2012 (50). Another 
system part which was analysing multiple other data sources was only used for monitoring 
one syndrome during the blackout in 2003 (47). This system part seemed to be 
automated for certain data sources but the information we could obtain from the literature 
was unambiguous. For at least one part of the New York City system, the combination of 
multiple syndrome analysis in an automated system is connected with successful 
situational awareness. The example also confirms that the use of multiple data sources 
is not a key success factor.  
 
Limitations  
The low quality of the data table and solutions of the QCA regarding seasonal infectious 
disease surveillance shows the importance of the quality of the data input for QCA. We 
tried to include representative data providing results for more than one influenza season. 
We decided to include two systems despite results referred only to one season: NHS24 
in Scotland and QSurveillance in England. NHS24 was applied in more than one influenza 
season and reported timeliness data were positive but not explicitly quantified for the 
other seasons (51). As QSurveillance was the only case representing a primary care data 
based system, we decided to include it to add variety to the QCA. The QSurveillance 
system was changed during the influenza season for which the results were reported, so 
performance could also change in the future (52). The results for QSurveillance are to be 
interpreted carefully and transfer to other syndromic surveillance systems based on 
general practitioner data might not be validated.  
The conditions analysed in the QCA were chosen based on theoretic considerations but 
also based on the available data. There might be other conditions that we did not include 
in our analysis such as validity or representativeness, or other cases based on other data 
sources which might play an important role. But, we could not include them due to limited 
data availability or in the case of validity because of the large diversity in measuring this 
indicator in the different surveillance systems.  
QCA makes it necessary to differentiate successful from unsuccessful cases. We defined 
the cut-off points for both analyses based on the results reported for the cases and 
theoretic considerations. The low number of unsuccessful cases with a limited 
representativeness included in the QCA on infectious disease surveillance might have 
limited our options to define a representative cut-off. Furthermore, the distinction of 
successful or unsuccessful cases should not be generalised to the syndromic surveillance 
systems behind these cases. The syndromic surveillance systems might perform 
differently when they are monitoring other syndromes, for example. 
Finally, the data in our study were not collected with QCA in mind. We chose the method 
afterwards to add value to our complex case-based data. With QCA in mind, we might 
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have collected different or additional data which could have improved quality of the input 
and output of the QCA.  
 
Conclusions 
We identified key success factors for the two main areas of syndromic surveillance system 
application using cs/QCA. For syndromic influenza surveillance, a system might be 
timelier if it is based on non-clinical data sources. Syndromic situational awareness is 
fostered by automated syndromic surveillance systems capable of analysing multiple 
syndromes. Analysing multiple data sources is no pre-requisite for successful situational 
awareness. We recommend that decision makers take the success factors into account 
when designing or further developing a syndromic surveillance system.  
We showed that the relatively new social science analysis method QCA can have a 
relevant added value for public health surveillance practice by comparing case-based, 
small-N and mixed data in a systematic way. QCA can only produce valid results if it is 
guided by good case and subject expertise and if it is based on varied and representative 
data. We propose to apply QCA to other case-based and small-N data next to more 
traditional analysis methods as it might yield meaningful and relevant results for policy 
and practice that would otherwise remain undiscovered.  
 
Acknowledgements  
This paper arises from the project Triple S-AGE which has received funding from the 
European Union, in the framework of the Health Programme (grant agreement number 
20091112). 
 
  
96    Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe                                                          
References 
1. Triple S Project. Assessment of syndromic surveillance in Europe. Lancet. 
2011;378(9806):1833-4. 
2. Ziemann A, Krafft T. Guidelines for Assessment of Data Sources; 2013 [cited 28 May 
2015]. Available from: http://www.syndromicsurveillance.eu/triple-
s_guidelines_datasources.pdf. 
3. Fouillet A, Sala-Soler M, Conti S, Kanieff M, Rago G, Perrin JB, et al. Inventory of 
syndromic surveillance systems in Europe by the Triple-S project. Emerg Health 
Threats J. 2011;4:10946. 
4. Koopmans M. Surveillance strategy for early detection of unusual infectious disease 
events. Curr Opin Virol. 2013;3(2):185-91. 
5. Kaydos-Daniels SC, Rojas Smith L, Farris TR. Biosurveillance in outbreak 
investigations. Biosecur Bioterror. 2013;11(1):20-8. 
6. Buehler JW, Whitney EA, Smith D, Prietula MJ, Stanton SH, Isakov AP. Situational 
uses of syndromic surveillance. Biosecur Bioterror. 2009;7(2):165-77. 
7. Paterson BJ, Durrheim DN. The remarkable adaptability of syndromic surveillance to 
meet public health needs. J Epidemiol Glob Health. 2013;3(1):41-7. 
8. Buehler JW, Hopkins RS, Overhage JM, Sosin DM, Tong V. Framework for evaluating 
public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks: recommendations 
from the CDC Working Group. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2004;53(RR-5):1-11. 
9. Triple S Project. Guidelines for designing and implementing a syndromic surveillance 
system. Triple S Project; 2013 [cited 28 May 2015]. Available from: 
http://www.syndromicsurveillance.eu/Triple-S_guidelines.pdf. 
10. Rosenkötter N, Ziemann A, Riesgo LG, Gillet JB, Vergeiner G, Krafft T, et al. Validity 
and timeliness of syndromic influenza surveillance during the autumn/winter wave of 
A(H1N1) influenza 2009: results of emergency medical dispatch, ambulance and 
emergency department data from three European regions. BMC Public Health. 
2013;13(1):905. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-13-905. 
11. Dailey L, Watkins RE, Plant AJ. Timeliness of data sources used for influenza 
surveillance. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2007;14(5):626-31. 
12. Doroshenko A, Cooper D, Smith G, Gerard E, Chinemana F, Verlander N, et al. 
Evaluation of syndromic surveillance based on National Health Service Direct derived 
data--England and Wales. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2005;54 Suppl:117-22. 
13. Jefferson H, Dupuy B, Chaudet H, Texier G, Green A, Barnish G, et al. Evaluation of 
a syndromic surveillance for the early detection of outbreaks among military 
personnel in a tropical country. J Public Health (Oxf). 2008;30(4):375-83. 
14. Ragin CC. The comparative comparative analysis to study causal complexity. Health 
Serv Res. 1999;34(5 Pt 2):1225-39. 
15. Ragin CC. What is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)? 2008 [cited 28 May 
2015]. Available from: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/250/1/What_is_QCA.pdf. 
         Chapter 6: Success factors of European syndromic surveillance systems     97 
16. Rihoux B, De Meur G. Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). In: Rihoux 
B, Ragin CC, editors. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Thousand Oaks: SAGE; 2009. p. 33-68. 
17. Blackman T, Wistow J, Byrne D. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of factors 
associated with trends in narrowing health inequalities in England. Soc Sci Med. 
2011;72(12):1965-74. 
18. Thomas J, O'Mara-Eves A, Brunton G. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
in systematic reviews of complex interventions: a worked example. Syst rev. 
2014;3:67. doi: 10.1186/2046-4053-3-67. 
19. Warren J, Wistow J, Bambra C. Applying qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in 
public health: a case study of a health improvement service for long-term incapacity 
benefit recipients. J Public Health (Oxf). 2014;36(1):126-33. 
20. Thiem A, Dusa A. Boolean Minimization in Social Science Research: A Review of 
Current Software for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Soc Sci Comput Rev. 
2013;31(4):505-21. 
21. Triple S-AGE [Internet]; 2015 [cited 28 May 2015]. Available from: 
www.syndromicsurveillance.eu. 
22. Conti S, Kanieff M, Rago G, on behalf of the Triple-S project. Inventory of Syndromic 
Surveillance Systems in Europe; 2012 [cited 28 May 2015]. Available from: 
http://www.syndromicsurveillance.eu/images/stories/Final_material/triple-
S_country_visits.pdf 
23. Ziemann A, Krafft T, Sala Soler M, Sypniewska P. Country visits; 2013 [cited 28 May 
2015]. Available from:  http://syndromicsurveillance.eu/images/stories/Final_ 
material/triple-S_country_visits.pdf 
24. Robert Koch Institut. Final presentation and evaluation of epidemiological findings in 
the EHEC O104:H4 Outbreak, Germany 2011. Berlin: Robert Koch-Institute; 2011. 
25. Wadl M, Rieck T, Nachtnebel M, Greutelaers B, an der Heiden M, Altmann D, et al. 
Enhanced surveillance during a large outbreak of bloody diarrhoea and haemolytic 
uraemic syndrome caused by Shiga toxin/verotoxin-producing Escherichia coli in 
Germany, May to June 2011. Euro Surveill. 2011;16(24). pii: 19893. 
26. Mandl KD, Overhage JM, Wagner MM, Lober WB, Sebastiani P, Mostashari F, et al. 
Implementing syndromic surveillance: a practical guide informed by the early 
experience. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2004;11(2):141-50. 
27. Rosenkötter N, Ziemann A, Krafft T, Riesgo LG, Vergeiner G, Brand H. Non-infectious 
events under the International Health Regulations (2005) in Europe - a case for 
syndromic surveillance. J Public Health Policy. 2014;35(3):311-26.  
28. Ziemann A, Rosenkötter N, Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo L, Fischer M, Krämer A, Lippert 
FK, et al. Meeting the International Health Regulations (2005) surveillance core 
capacity requirements at the subnational level in Europe: the added value of 
syndromic surveillance. BMC Public Health. 2015 Feb 7;15:107. doi: 
10.1186/s12889-015-1421-2. 
29. Schneider C, Wagemann C. Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets. Comp Sociol. 2010;9:397-418. 
98    Syndromic Surveillance - Made in Europe                                                          
30. Cronqvist L. Tool for Small-N Analysis (Version 1.302). Trier: Universität Trier; 2011. 
Available from: http://www.compasss.org/software.htm#tosmana. 
31. Delreux T, Hesters D. Solving contradictory simplifying assumptions in QCA: 
presentation of a new best practice. 2010;58:1-27 [cited 28 May 2015]. Available 
from: http://www.compasss.org/wpseries/DelreuxHesters2010.pdf. 
32. Loveridge P, Cooper D, Elliot AJ, Harris J, Gray J, Large S, et al. Vomiting calls to 
NHS Direct provide an early warning of norovirus outbreaks in hospitals. J Hosp 
Infect. 2010;74(4):385-93. 
33. Ansaldi F, Orsi A, Altomonte F, Bertone G, Parodi V, Carloni R, et al. Syndrome 
surveillance and molecular epidemiology for early detection and tracing of an 
outbreak of measles in Liguria, Italy. J Med Virol. 2009;81(10):1807-13. 
34. Orsi A, Alicino C, Patria AG, Parodi V, Carloni R, Turello V, et al. Epidemiological and 
molecular approaches for management of a measles outbreak in Liguria, Italy. J Prev 
Med Hyg. 2010;51(2):67-72. 
35. Ritzwoller DP, Kleinman K, Palen T, Abrams A, Kaferly J, Yih W, et al. Comparison of 
syndromic surveillance and a sentinel provider system in detecting an influenza 
outbreak--Denver, Colorado, 2003. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2005;54 
Suppl:151-6. 
36. Yuan CM, Love S, Wilson M. Syndromic surveillance at hospital emergency 
departments--southeastern Virginia. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2004;53 
Suppl:56-8. 
37. Irvin CB, Nouhan PP, Rice K. Syndromic analysis of computerized emergency 
department patients' chief complaints: an opportunity for bioterrorism and influenza 
surveillance. Ann Emerg Med. 2003;41(4):447-52. 
38. Ivanov O, Gesteland PH, Hogan W, Mundorff MB, Wagner MM. Detection of pediatric 
respiratory and gastrointestinal outbreaks from free-text chief complaints. AMIA  Ann 
Symp Proc. 2003:318-22. 
39. Miller B, Kassenborg H, Dunsmuir W, Griffith J, Hadidi M, Nordin JD, et al. Syndromic 
surveillance for influenzalike illness in ambulatory care network. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2004;10(10):1806-11. 
40. Heffernan R, Mostashari F, Das D, Karpati A, Kulldorff M, Weiss D. Syndromic 
surveillance in public health practice, New York City. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2004;10(5):858-64. 
41. Murray KO, Kilborn C, DesVignes-Kendrick M, Koers E, Page V, Selwyn BJ, et al. 
Emerging disease syndromic surveillance for Hurricane Katrina evacuees seeking 
shelter in Houston's Astrodome and Reliant Park Complex. Public Health Rep. 
2009;124(3):364-71. 
42. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Injury and illness surveillance in hospitals 
and acute-care facilities after Hurricanes Katrina And Rita--New Orleans area, 
Louisiana, September 25-October 15, 2005. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2006;55(2):35-8. 
         Chapter 6: Success factors of European syndromic surveillance systems     99 
43. Carrico R, Goss L. Syndromic surveillance: hospital emergency department 
participation during the Kentucky Derby Festival. Disaster Manag Response. 
2005;3(3):73-9. 
44. Heffernan R, Mostashari F, Das D, Besculides M, Rodriguez C, Greenko J, et al. New 
York City syndromic surveillance systems. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2004;53 
Suppl:23-7. 
45. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Syndromic surveillance for bioterrorism 
following the attacks on the World Trade Center--New York City, 2001. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep. 2002;51 Spec No:13-5. 
46. Das D, Weiss D, Mostashari F, Treadwell T, McQuiston J, Hutwagner L, et al. Enhanced 
drop-in syndromic surveillance in New York City following September 11, 2001. J 
Urban Health. 2003;80(2 Suppl 1):i76-88. 
47. Marx MA, Rodriguez CV, Greenko J, Das D, Heffernan R, Karpati AM, et al. Diarrheal 
illness detected through syndromic surveillance after a massive power outage: New 
York City, August 2003. Am J Public Health. 2006;96(3):547-53. 
48. Plagianos MG, Wu WY, McCullough C, Paladini M, Lurio J, Buck MD, et al. Syndromic 
surveillance during pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, New York, New York, USA. 
Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17(9):1724-6. 
49. Hadler JL, Konty K, McVeigh KH, Fine A, Eisenhower D, Kerker B, et al. Case fatality 
rates based on population estimates of influenza-like illness due to novel H1N1 
influenza: New York City, May-June 2009. PLoS One. 2010;5(7):e11677. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0011677. 
50. Chen BC, Shawn LK, Connors NJ, Wheeler K, Williams N, Hoffman RS, et al. Carbon 
monoxide exposures in New York City following Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Clin Toxicol 
(Phila). 2013;51(9):879-85. 
51. Kavanagh K, Robertson C, Murdoch H, Crooks G, McMenamin J. Syndromic 
surveillance of influenza-like illness in Scotland during the influenza A H1N1v 
pandemic and beyond. J R Stat Soc a Stat. 2012;175:939-58. 
52. Green HK, Zhao H, Boddington NL, Andrews N, Durnall H, Elliot AJ, et al. Detection 
of varying influenza circulation within England in 2012/13: informing antiviral 
prescription and public health response. J Public Health (Oxf). 2015;37(2):295-304.
  
  
  
CHAPTER 7          
General Discussion
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Main findings & discussion 
Added value of syndromic surveillance for Europe 
First of all, this thesis assessed the added value of syndromic surveillance for Europe as 
one way to improve Europe’s surveillance capacity. In a first step, a European syndromic 
surveillance definition and a system concept were presented. The system concept is 
balancing the European principals of harmonisation, mutual recognition and subsidiarity. 
Secondly, the thesis showed that syndromic surveillance is useful for Europe in terms of 
providing timely and additional information on various kinds of health threats. Non-
specificity applies to certain data sources, syndromes or events but is not a general 
weakness of syndromic surveillance. And finally, the thesis showed that syndromic 
surveillance can support the implementation of the core surveillance capacity 
requirements of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR (2005)). Syndromic 
surveillance can provide timely information at the subnational level for various health 
threats as required by the IHR (2005). Figure 1 summarises the results of the thesis that 
are discussed in the following. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Summary of added value of syndromic surveillance for Europe (own concept) 
IHR (2005) = International Health Regulations (2005) s = strength, w = weakness 
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In chapter 2, a new syndromic surveillance definition was presented which is not only 
valid in the European context. The updated definition is more comprehensive and generic 
than the earlier definition by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1). It covers 
human and animal health, various data sources and features the main advantages of 
syndromic surveillance such as augmenting traditional surveillance systems, timeliness 
and flexibility. The focus on automated data collection is in line with the results presented 
in chapter 6 identifying automation as a key characteristic of successful syndromic 
surveillance systems. Until now, the definition was cited in 21 scientific articles according 
to ScienceDirect (2). 
In chapters 3 and 5, a concept for a European syndromic surveillance system was 
presented. Chapter 3 focused on the design of the system while chapter 5 presented the 
concept for its implementation in the European context. The system balances between 
the principles of subsidiarity, mutual recognition, and harmonisation. Instead of 
recommending one harmonised European syndromic surveillance system, the concept 
suggests to implement a network of subnational systems. They would be embedded into 
the existing surveillance structure of a country, thus supporting the principle of 
subsidiarity. The surveillance results were anticipated to still be comparable across 
systems and borders. This would allow for a pragmatic balance between harmonisation 
and mutual recognition across Europe. As shown in chapter 4, the SIDARTHa concept 
performed best if adjusted to local or regional circumstances. This fosters mutual 
recognition of the system designs in the different countries. As chapter 5 showed, the 
concept is implemented in two regions in Europe at the moment, indicating its applicability 
in the European context. However, in order to assess the real European added value, the 
output of many more subnational syndromic surveillance systems in Europe needs to be 
assessed. Otherwise, the public health impact of an event might not be assessable for 
larger populations.  
Chapters 3-6 assessed the usefulness of syndromic surveillance for Europe by focussing 
on its main purposes: surveillance of (seasonal) influenza and gastrointestinal outbreaks, 
and situational awareness during various events. The main strength of syndromic 
surveillance, timeliness, was confirmed when assessing cases for all three purposes. This 
became apparent especially for seasonal influenza surveillance (chapters 4, 6) and for 
situational awareness of diverse health threats (chapters 5, 6). As chapter 6 showed, 
timeliness of syndromic surveillance for seasonal influenza surveillance might be 
increased when non-clinical data sources are analysed. The results are in line with the 
only other study comparing multiple systems from Dailey and colleagues (3). They found 
that syndromic surveillance systems provided timelier information on seasonal influenza 
surveillance. To my knowledge, the results presented in chapters 5 and 6 are the only 
other studies comparing timeliness of multiple syndromic surveillance systems.  
The other main advantage of syndromic surveillance is flexibility in terms of applicability 
to various, including unexpected events. This strength was confirmed for situational 
awareness during events as diverse as the 2009 influenza pandemic, the 2010 volcanic 
ash plume or the influx of migrants from North Africa to Italy in 2011 (chapters 5, 6). 
This flexibility can also provide a useful and cost-effective support to fulfil the surveillance 
requirements of the IHR (2005) (chapter 5). Flexibility of syndromic surveillance can be 
enhanced if multiple syndromes are analysed in automated systems as shown in 
chapter 6. The reviews presented in chapters 5 and 6 are to my knowledge the only 
studies comparing performance of multiple syndromic surveillance systems for situational 
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awareness. The only other review looking into flexibility of syndromic surveillance 
published by Paterson et al. did not compare systems by performance but showed general 
changes in syndromic surveillance application over time (4). 
Syndromic surveillance is especially useful at times when it can provide additional 
information on the public health impact of an event. This was confirmed in the case study 
presented in chapter 4. Here, syndromic surveillance was the only source of information 
during the Christmas holidays when the traditional surveillance system based on sentinel 
general practitioners was not active. Also the examples presented in chapter 5 confirmed 
this for the 2011 O104:H4 gastrointestinal outbreak in Germany. During this outbreak, 
traditional surveillance was delayed and scattered (5). The other example from chapter 5 
is the 2010 volcanic ash plume event. During this event, syndromic surveillance systems 
were the only source of information on the potential health impact of the plume.  
As the case study in chapter 3 showed, syndromic surveillance can also provide additional 
information on population groups that are not monitored by traditional surveillance. In 
this case, syndromic surveillance covered a group of foreign tourists. This is also the idea 
behind syndromic surveillance systems covering non-clinical data sources, such as web 
searches, over-the-counter sales or telephone helplines. The aim is to detect outbreaks 
in a population which does not (yet) seek health care. People might have milder 
symptoms and chose self-treatment instead. Especially for gastrointestinal outbreaks 
which are often characterised by mild symptoms, syndromic surveillance of non-clinical 
data sources showed promising results to augment traditional surveillance (6, 7). Also 
the opposite, severe gastrointestinal cases treated in the acute care setting, can be 
covered by syndromic surveillance. As shown in chapter 5, a syndromic surveillance 
system was set up during the O104:H4 outbreak in Germany to monitor severe cases in 
emergency departments. 
Non-specificity remains a major weakness of syndromic surveillance. But, its negative 
impact differs depending on the analysed syndrome, data source or event. As 
demonstrated during the case study presented in chapter 3, point-source gastrointestinal 
outbreaks were not identified by syndromic surveillance. This was basically because 
signals could not be differentiated from the background noise. There are various reasons 
related to non-specificity which can explain this effect. The size of the outbreak in terms 
of the number of cases must be large enough to be differentiated from the usual number 
of cases expected at a certain time. Other studies confirmed these findings. Outbreaks 
with a small number of cases were not detected as often as outbreaks with large case 
numbers (6, 8). Further, outbreaks consisting of spatially dispersed cases were difficult 
to be detected by syndromic surveillance as chapter 3 showed. Also the choice of the data 
source for syndromic surveillance can influence the impact of non-specificity. As discussed 
above, gastrointestinal illness is often characterised by mild syndromes. Patients might 
not seek emergency but primary care or self-treatment. Thus, gastrointestinal outbreaks 
might be easier distinguished from noise in non-emergency care data sources. As 
Rosenkötter et al. showed with data from the SIDARTHa action, the choice of data source 
made a difference also for the validity of seasonal influenza surveillance. In their study, 
seasonal influenza cases could not be distinguished from noise using emergency medical 
dispatch data but very well using emergency department data (9).  
Finally, chapter 5 assessed the potential of syndromic surveillance to improve Europe’s 
surveillance capacity according to the IHR (2005) requirements. Syndromic surveillance 
is considered to help detect and assess the local and regional effect of different types of 
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public health emergencies in a timely manner as required by the IHR (2005). This might 
especially hold true for rare and non-infectious health threats for which no (timely) 
information on the public health impact is available from other systems. One example 
was the volcanic ash plume event in 2010 (chapter 5). Also Rosenkötter et al. argued for 
the potential of syndromic surveillance to support countries to fulfil the IHR (2005) 
requirements regarding monitoring of non-infectious events (10).  
 
Added value of Europe for syndromic surveillance 
The thesis also analysed the added value of Europe for gaining new knowledge about 
syndromic surveillance. Chapters 2-6 presented new knowledge on the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance. The results were based on the work accomplished in the two 
European Health Programme actions SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE. Especially, chapter 6 
showed that new knowledge could be derived from a comparative analysis of syndromic 
surveillance systems from different European countries. The chapter identified key 
success factors for syndromic surveillance systems. These can inform decision makers in 
Europe and beyond when setting up or further developing syndromic surveillance 
systems.  
The relatively new social science approach Qualitative Comparative Analysis was useful 
for generating new knowledge as shown in chapter 6. The particularity of the approach 
was the structured analysis of small-N, case-based and mixed data from different 
countries. Cross-country comparisons usually analyse quantitative data such as in the 
work of the WHO European Observatory on Health Systems and Policy (11). Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis might be a promising approach to enhance cross-country 
comparisons with a structured analysis approach for other kinds of data. Until now, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis was mainly applied in the political sciences. The few 
health-related studies applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis were often analysing the 
situation in single countries (12, 13). There are only few other examples of studies using 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis for cross-country comparisons in the area of health (14-
17). To my knowledge, there are only two other studies comparing European countries 
(18, 19). 
The learning process on syndromic surveillance in Europe can be described using the 
conceptual framework for cross-country learning in Europe presented in chapter 1 
(figure 2). The first dimension of ‘Learning in Europe’ comprises the country visits for 
knowledge exchange and the inventory of syndromic surveillance systems of the Triple 
S-AGE action (20-22). Further it entails the inventory accomplished in the framework of 
the SIDARTHa action (chapter 3). The activities in this category are more descriptive. In 
the case of the country visits the impact in terms of knowledge gain in the participating 
countries is difficult to measure. Part of the second dimension ‘Learning for Europe’ is the 
syndromic surveillance definition presented in chapter 2. Also the European syndromic 
surveillance system concept presented in chapters 3 and 5 can be sorted into this 
category. Further, the Triple S-AGE action developed guidelines and a European strategy 
for syndromic surveillance which fit in this dimension (23, 24). The Triple S-AGE 
guidelines and the strategy provide a balance between European harmonisation and 
diversity by suggesting different modes of syndromic surveillance implementation. As 
described above, the SIDARTHa concept fits to the European principles of harmonisation, 
mutual recognition and subsidiarity. These concrete concepts and tools can now be 
applied in different contexts in Europe. The SIDARTHa concept was implemented in two 
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regions and tested in different case studies described in chapters 3 and 4 and by 
Rosenkötter et al (25, 26). The dimension ‘Learning from Europe’ refers to the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis of syndromic surveillance systems presented in chapter 6. New 
knowledge on syndromic surveillance was gained from a structured cross-country 
comparison in Europe. This knowledge can now be implemented in different contexts in 
Europe and beyond.  
 
 
Figure 2: Cross-country learning about syndromic surveillance in the European context (own concept) 
 
Limitations  
Added value of syndromic surveillance for Europe  
The syndromic surveillance concept was assessed for its European fit according to the 
European principles harmonisation, mutual recognition and subsidiarity. These principles 
were a selection of a couple of mainly legal principles that are underlying the functioning 
of the European Union (EU) (27). The other principles such as country of origin for 
products or precedence and direct effect of EU law were not applicable to the interventions 
analysed here. The use of the principles to describe the European fit was meant as a 
conceptual framework for the work in this thesis. It is not a proposal for the assessment 
or evaluation of EU actions. Future work might show if the principles are suitable for 
describing the European fit of other actions. 
The assessment of the usefulness of syndromic surveillance in Europe was based on a 
selection of health threats and performance indicators. The health threats are the major 
purposes of syndromic surveillance. But, there are other syndromes and health threats 
which are monitored by syndromic surveillance. Examples comprise other infectious 
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diseases such as measles (28), or non-infectious health problems such as poisonings 
(29). For many years, the approach has also used as a substitute for traditional 
surveillance in developing countries (30). And, there are many syndromic surveillance 
applications based on animal health data that were not included in the present research 
(22). Especially for the use in the comparative studies presented in chapters 5 and 6, the 
selection of health threats was also based on data availability. 
The performance indicators are considered to be the key strengths and weakness of 
syndromic surveillance. However, there are many more indicators for evaluating 
syndromic surveillance systems (1). For example, cost-effectiveness is considered 
another advantage of syndromic surveillance but there is hardly any data available on 
this indicator (31, 32). Also other indicators related to experience of syndromic 
surveillance systems such as acceptability or stability are not often described in syndromic 
surveillance evaluations (32-34). Validity on the other hand is reported in many cases, 
also in those presented in chapters 3 and 4. However, the indicator was excluded from 
the comparative studies in chapters 5 and 6. Validity was measured in so many different 
ways that it made a comparison a too complex endeavour. In the future, there might be 
more evaluations reporting on other indicators to include them in comparative studies. 
Syndromic surveillance might support the implementation of the IHR (2005) core 
surveillance capacity requirements. This suggestion was only focusing on the requirement 
of providing immediate information on various health threats. The implementation of the 
IHR (2005) or its surveillance requirements in Europe can depend on many other factors, 
the availability of resources for example (35). There might also be other measures that 
help countries improve their capacity to monitor diverse health threats. One example is 
enhancing traditional surveillance as it was done during the FIFA Worldcup in Germany 
2006, for example (36). Another strategy is to set up ad-hoc surveillance systems during 
unfolding events. Such systems can be of added value as seen during the O104:H4 
gastrointestinal outbreak in Germany, for example (39). However, as chapters 5 and 6 
showed, such ad-hoc systems might also be prone to delayed reporting, lower validity 
and higher costs compared to already established syndromic surveillance systems.  
 
Added value of Europe for syndromic surveillance 
The proposed conceptual framework for cross-country learning in Europe is a first attempt 
to capture cross-country learning in the unique European context, the proclaimed 
‘laboratory’ (38). The concept was tested only for the knowledge gained in EU Health 
Programme actions. There might be other kinds of European cross-country learning 
beyond EU Health Programme actions that could be included in the concept. For example, 
there might be unique European situations or events with a health impact such as the 
recent financial crisis (39). These events might yield lessons that can only be learnt in 
the European context. This example might fit into the third dimension of ‘learning from 
Europe’ in the proposed conceptual framework.  
Another question that arises is if the generation of new knowledge as described in the 
conceptual framework is only possible in the European context. The conceptual 
framework might be applicable also to learning processes involving countries and regions 
outside Europe. What this thesis showed is that the European context definitely provided 
a unique opportunity to gain new knowledge on syndromic surveillance. There is a legal 
framework to collaborate in the fight against health threats with the Decision on health 
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threats (40). There is the political will and financial support of the EU to support cross-
country learning in the framework of the Health Programme. And finally, collaboration of 
European countries in such actions might be easier through joint aims, values and already 
existing linkages in many areas.  
 
Implications for policy and practice & future research 
Despite the implementation of many syndromic surveillance systems, there is still doubt 
about the usefulness of the approach among many public health professionals and 
decision makers (41, 42). As shown in this thesis, syndromic surveillance can augment 
traditional surveillance with timely information on various kinds of health threats. It 
especially provides also information on the health impact of unexpected and non-
infectious threats for which no other surveillance system can provide information. This 
way, syndromic surveillance can support countries to meet the core surveillance capacity 
requirements of the IHR (2005).  
In the framework of this thesis and the two European Health Programme actions 
SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE, a range of concepts and tools have been developed. These 
can support syndromic surveillance operators in Europe (and beyond) to set up or further 
develop state-of-the-art syndromic surveillance systems. The syndromic surveillance 
definition presented in chapter 2 and the generic syndromic surveillance system concept 
presented in chapters 3 and 5 provide the basis. The guidelines developed as part of the 
Triple S-AGE project provide developers with a detailed step-by-step handbook on setting 
up or improving a syndromic surveillance system (23). And, the success factors identified 
in chapter 6 of this thesis provide operators and decision makers with a priority list of 
factors to focus on when designing a syndromic surveillance system. 
For the European policy level, the Triple S-AGE action has proposed a syndromic 
surveillance strategy proposing tree implementation models (24). The first model 
describes a fully decentralised landscape of syndromic surveillance without any 
connection across borders. This represents the current status of morbidity syndromic 
surveillance systems. The second model foresees a decentralised data collection but 
harmonised reporting of findings. This is also what the SIDARTHa concept aims at 
(chapters 3, 5). And the third model describes a single European syndromic surveillance 
system. This can only be established for either easily standardised data sources or 
syndromes such as for mortality, for example (43). The strategy suggests that the three 
models can be implemented in parallel (24). The Triple S-AGE definition, guidelines and 
strategy as well as the SIDARTHa system concept provide the framework to set up a 
locally adjusted but Europe-wide comparable network of syndromic surveillance systems. 
The concepts are respecting the EU principles of subsidiarity and mutual recognition. At 
the same time, they foster a certain degree of harmonisation to allow for cross-country 
comparison of syndromic surveillance output. 
The question remains if new knowledge such as generated now for syndromic surveillance 
actually finds its way into policy and practice. In 2009, the first phase of the Health 
Programme was evaluated by the European Court of Auditors. They found ‘no 
demonstrable take-up of project results’ to a next stage of the research-development-
implementation cycle and national policy makers not being aware of projects or produced 
results (44, p.41). Two following evaluations of the last two Public Health Programmes 
2003-13 supported these findings. They stated that little dissemination and translation of 
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results into policies ‘seriously limit the impact of the Health Programme’ (45, 46, p.10). 
To date, the European syndromic surveillance system concept is implemented and active 
in two regions. Only the future can show if the guidelines produced by the Triple S-AGE 
action or the key success factors derived from the Qualitative Comparative Analysis are 
actually picked-up by syndromic surveillance operators. The Triple S-AGE consortium 
mainly consisted of national institutions responsible for public health surveillance and 
operators of syndromic surveillance systems. Maybe the chances are good that the 
concepts are used and spread via these actors. 
There is also a lot we do not yet understand about the pick-up of new knowledge in policy 
and practice. In recent years, the field of knowledge translation research evolved with 
the aim to enhance the use of evidence in policy and practice (47-49). Tools were 
developed to enhance knowledge translation targeting policy makers (50) and 
researchers (51). However, the usefulness and impact of such tools still needs to be 
evaluated. Furthermore, there is still a lack of understanding about the actual process of 
the use of new knowledge by policy makers and professionals (52). Future research has 
also to establish under which circumstances knowledge transfer from one country to 
another is accomplished and which factors influence transfer and implementation (53).  
In order for new knowledge or approaches to be picked-up by policy and practice, it might 
also be relevant to have high-level policy endorsement. For syndromic surveillance, the 
WHO assessed the approach in 2001 as not applicable for a global regulation to support 
countries to meet the IHR (2005) (54). Based on the evidence on the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance as presented in this thesis, it might be time for a reassessment. 
An expansion of syndromic surveillance can position European countries to timely assess 
the public health impact of potential public health emergencies of international concern, 
especially rare and non-communicable events. However, in order to achieve a wider roll-
out of syndromic surveillance in Europe, political endorsement by the national and 
European levels might be necessary (55). 
 
Conclusions 
Syndromic surveillance can support Europe to timely assess various infectious and non-
infectious health threats. In this way, the approach can help European countries to meet 
the new IHR (2005) surveillance requirements. The thesis presented a syndromic 
surveillance system concept that fits into the European context by balancing 
harmonisation efforts and diversity. The thesis also identified key success factors to 
inform the design of syndromic surveillance systems. 
The relatively new approach of syndromic surveillance is still contested. Before a broader 
implementation could be achieved, more evidence about the usefulness of the approach 
is necessary - beyond single cases reports. Such evidence was provided in this thesis 
based on comparisons of multiple syndromic surveillance systems and across countries. 
The unique European ‘laboratory’ provided the opportunity to accomplish such 
comparative research and to generate new knowledge for action.  
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Valorisation  
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Relevance of research results  
The innovative aspect of the research results is the provision of new knowledge on the 
application of syndromic surveillance in Europe. There is doubt about the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance among public health professionals and decision makers (1, 2). The 
research results add clarity on the strengths and weaknesses of the approach and its 
applicability and usefulness in the European context. The research was accomplished 
based on the work of the two Health Programme actions SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE and 
as such was from the beginning oriented towards relevance for practice and decision 
making in public health surveillance. The analysis of actually applied syndromic 
surveillance systems or as part of case studies support the practical relevance of the 
results. Especially, the new definition, the generic syndromic surveillance system concept, 
and the success factors provide concrete input for public health surveillance. The 
SIDARTHa system concept was implemented at the regional level in Austria and Spain. 
During the Triple S-AGE action, some of the research results regarding the SIDARTHa 
project were included in the European guidelines for syndromic surveillance systems (3). 
These form a handbook for public health authorities who intend to implement or improve 
syndromic surveillance systems and are available from the Triple S-AGE website (4). 
There are three valorisation areas for which the research results are relevant beyond 
science:  
1. the improvement of the surveillance and early warning capacity of public health 
authorities,  
2. the potential to enhance general public health monitoring based on syndromic 
data sources, and 
3. the support of timely management of resources in health services.  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the different aspects of the valorisation process for each 
area that is explained in more detail in the following. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Main aspects of the valorisation process  
CHAFEA = Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (European Commission); ECDC = European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control; WHO = World Health Organization (Regional Office for Europe)  
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Improves surveillance and early warning capacity 
The research provides additional knowledge relevant for improving the surveillance 
capacity of public health authorities. The new syndromic surveillance definition, system 
concept and success factors can support syndromic surveillance operators to set up or 
improve syndromic surveillance systems. An increased and improved use of syndromic 
surveillance can enhance the ability of public health authorities at local, regional, and 
national level to timelier assess expected or emerging health threats. The exploitation of 
existing data sources for public health surveillance through syndromic surveillance adds 
an additional piece to the health information puzzle that can help identify and track health 
threats.  
First concrete valorisation activities in this area would focus on the dissemination of the 
research results. The main target group would be public health authorities and European 
organisations that can influence the transfer of knowledge and innovations in this area. 
As the research was based on the work of the Triple S-AGE action, the partner 
organisations involved in the action, mainly national public authorities, would be the 
primary target group for disseminating the research results. The partners could use the 
research results to improve their own syndromic surveillance systems. Further, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the European Commission’s Health 
Threat Unit and the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe were part of 
the project. Awareness about the research results among these institutions could help to 
further disseminate the research results. We will send a copy of this thesis in 2015 to all 
project partners and the European Commission’s Consumers, Health, Agriculture and 
Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA) that handled the Triple S-AGE action. We think it very 
likely that those Triple S-AGE partners who are operating syndromic surveillance systems 
will use the research results in short to mid-term. 
Furthermore, there is a new European research project called COMPARE, co-funded by 
the European Commission as part of the Horizon 2020 programme (5). The COMPARE 
project intends to integrate different information sources for a timelier detection of and 
response to disease outbreaks among humans and animals. The author of this thesis and 
the supervisor Thomas Krafft are involved as advisors on syndromic surveillance in the 
project. To raise awareness on the research results, we will send the thesis also to the 
co-coordinator of the project, Marion Koopmans. The project just started and there is a 
chance that the research results inform the project activities in the next couple of years. 
Finally, the e-book version of this thesis could be included on the web-platform set up by 
the Triple S-AGE action, which can be seen as the primary information source on 
syndromic surveillance in Europe (4). Furthermore, it could be included also on the 
primary web-platform worldwide, hosted by the International Society for Disease 
Surveillance, that was involved as advisor in the Triple S-AGE action (6). Also the CHAFEA 
could be asked to include the thesis or a link to the thesis on their website. We will 
approach the three organisations in 2015. It is likely that public health authorities who 
intend to setup a syndromic surveillance system in the next couple of years are visiting 
these web-platforms and might include the research results in their work. 
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Enhances public health monitoring 
The research has shown the use of syndromic information to monitor various health 
threats, especially also non-communicable threats. This yields the potential of syndromic 
data sources and indicators to be used also for general public health monitoring. Some 
of the partner organisations of the SIDARTHa action, including the author and the 
supervisor Thomas Krafft, were involved in another Health Programme Action, the 
“European Emergency Data Project” (EED Project). The EED Project partners defined and 
tested key health monitoring indicators based on routine emergency care data – the same 
data source used in the SIDARTHa action for syndromic surveillance. They have defined 
five key indicators, which were included in the European Community Health Indicators 
long list (7, 8). The author and the supervisor Thomas Krafft were also involved in a case 
study in Germany on the added value and feasibility of pre-hospital emergency care data 
for the European Injury Data Base (9). The study showed that many indicators, which 
are required for the Injury Data Base were retrievable from pre-hospital emergency care 
data and even provided additional data compared to the usually registered data from 
hospitals. Recently, the World Health Organization has acknowledged the potential of 
non-traditional data sources such as electronic patient records for public health 
monitoring in their 2015 European Health Report (10).  
The focus of the valorisation activities in this area is also on disseminating the research 
results. As part of the dissemination activities described above, we will inform the same 
target groups about the potential of the syndromic data sources for other areas of public 
health surveillance and public health monitoring. We will ask our contacts at the 
organisations to send the link to the e-book version of the thesis to the colleagues in their 
organisations who are responsible for public health monitoring. We will also disseminate 
the e-book version to the Division of Information, Evidence, Research and Innovation of 
the WHO Regional Office for Europe, who are the editors of the European Health Report, 
and to which the supervisor Helmut Brand serves as advisor. The research results can 
provide awareness about the approach and its potential use for health monitoring but 
further research is warranted to build a sound evidence base. Therefore, the valorisation 
of the research results in this area is rather indirect and mid to long-term. 
 
Enables timely health services resource management 
Syndromic surveillance information might also be useful for resource management in 
health services. As indicated in chapter 4, the SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance system 
that is implemented based on emergency department data in Spain was the only source 
of timely information on the peak of the influenza season during the Christmas holidays 
in one season. The head of the emergency department used the information provided by 
the syndromic surveillance system in that season to call further staff members into the 
emergency department to cope with the increasing number of patients. The SIDARTHa 
syndromic surveillance systems are intended to be implemented in the institutions that 
are providing data such as emergency service providers, not in the public health 
authorities. This allows for better awareness of and direct access of managers in these 
institutions to the syndromic surveillance information. 
Also for this area, the focus of the valorisation activities is on dissemination. The major 
target group are the partners of the SIDARTHa action, which were mainly representing 
regional-level emergency care institutions from different countries. We will send the 
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thesis to all SIDARTHa partners and the CHAFEA, with an enclosed letter asking for further 
spread of the link to the e-book-version to other emergency care institutions in their 
networks. In 2015, the e-book-version will also be included for download on the websites 
of the SIDARTHa action (11) and the European Emergency Data Research Network (8), 
combined with a news item posted on the home pages. In the following years, the two 
active SIDARTHa system implementations in Austria and Spain could be evaluated for 
this purpose. This could be done as part of placements of Bachelor or Master students of 
Maastricht University’s European Public Health programme, in which both supervisors are 
involved. We think that the use of the research results in this area will depend on the 
demonstration of the usefulness in the two implementation sites or other institutions 
involved in the SIDARTHa action. Therefore, the valorisation of the research results in 
this area will rather be mid- to long-term. 
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Summary 
Background 
Our globalised world faces new, unprecedented and diverse challenges for public health 
from new emerging diseases, natural disasters, or man-made threats. They call for quick 
decisions and actions, which can only be taken based on rapid information about the 
public health impact of events. Until now, traditional public health surveillance was 
focusing on specific pre-defined diseases or agents causing certain diseases. It cannot 
provide information rapidly or on various kinds of health threats. Syndromic surveillance 
can fill this gap. It aims at augmenting traditional public health surveillance systems with 
(near) real-time information on the public health impact of events. Syndromic 
surveillance analyses existing, possibly electronic data that usually were not collected for 
surveillance purposes such as from web searches or patient records. The approach is 
relatively new and there is still much doubt about its added value.  
Europe or the European Union is a unique structure, which supports member states who 
are actually responsible for health issues, to join forces for fighting health threats and to 
learn from each other to generate new knowledge. Three dimensions of learning can be 
differentiated, with the European context playing an increasing role from the first to the 
third dimension. In the first dimension, Europe provides a context in which countries can 
learn from each other to gain new knowledge for their own situation (‘Learning in 
Europe’). In the second dimension, knowledge for Europe is compiled by harmonisation, 
standardisation, generalisation or identification of a common denominator (‘Learning for 
Europe’). Here, the European Union principles such as harmonisation, subsidiarity and 
mutual recognition should be taken into account in order for the knowledge to fit into the 
European context. The third dimension is focusing on generating new knowledge, based 
on a structured analysis of the differences between countries (‘learning from Europe’).  
This thesis aimed at analysing (1) the added value of syndromic surveillance for improving 
Europe’s surveillance capacity, and (2) the added value of the European context to gain 
new knowledge about syndromic surveillance. 
 
Methods 
For the first aim, the thesis first explored how a specific European definition for syndromic 
surveillance and a syndromic surveillance system should look like by respecting the 
European principles of harmonisation, mutual recognition and subsidiarity. This was 
achieved by applying a consensus method approach, which was informed by the results 
of a semi-structured survey and a literature review. Secondly, the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance for Europe was analysed by assessing the major strengths and 
weakness of syndromic surveillance: timeliness, flexibility, additional information 
provision, and non-specificity. The analysis focused on three main purposes of syndromic 
surveillance: surveillance of (seasonal) influenza and gastrointestinal outbreaks, and 
situational awareness during various events. Finally, the thesis assessed how the 
application of syndromic surveillance can foster Europe’s capacity to meet the new 
International Health Regulation’s (2005) surveillance core capacity requirements. These 
two analysis steps were based on quantitative data analyses in a case study design, using 
secondary data from emergency care and a narrative review based on mixed data 
collected from the literature. For the second aim, the thesis analysed how the European 
context provides an added value for learning about syndromic surveillance. The focus of 
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this analysis was on a cross-country comparison for identifying success factors of 
syndromic surveillance systems. For this step, the mixed methods approach Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis was applied, analysing mixed data collected from the literature and 
from country visits. 
 
Results 
The new syndromic surveillance definition is more comprehensive and generic than the 
earlier definition by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The syndromic 
surveillance system concept is balancing the European principals of harmonisation, 
mutual recognition and subsidiarity. Instead of recommending one harmonised European 
syndromic surveillance system, the concept suggests to implement a network of 
subnational systems. The concept performed best if adjusted to local or regional 
circumstances. The surveillance results were anticipated to still be comparable across 
systems and borders. The system is implemented in two regions in Europe at the moment, 
indicating its applicability in the European context.  
Syndromic surveillance is useful for Europe in terms of providing timely and additional 
information on various kinds of health threats. The main strength of syndromic 
surveillance, timeliness, was confirmed when assessing cases for all three purposes. The 
strength of flexibility was confirmed for situational awareness during diverse events such 
as the 2009 influenza pandemic or the influx of migrants from North Africa to Italy in 
2011. Syndromic surveillance is especially useful at times when it can provide additional 
information on the public health impact of an event or on population groups that are not 
monitored by traditional surveillance. Non-specificity applies to certain data sources, 
syndromes or events but is not a general weakness of syndromic surveillance. Further, 
syndromic surveillance can support the implementation of the core surveillance capacity 
requirements of the International Health Regulations (2005). It can help detect and 
assess the local and regional impact of different types of public health emergencies in a 
timely manner. This might especially hold true for rare and non-infectious health threats 
for which no (timely) information on the public health impact is available from other 
systems. 
Regarding the added value of the European context for gaining new knowledge about 
syndromic surveillance, the thesis showed that the new definition and the system concept 
were generated as a result of ‘learning for Europe’. The thesis especially showed that new 
syndromic surveillance knowledge could be derived by ‘learning from Europe’, based on 
the comparative analysis of syndromic surveillance systems from different European 
countries. Here, key success factors for syndromic surveillance systems were identified 
which can inform decision makers in Europe and beyond when setting up or further 
developing syndromic surveillance systems. The analysis showed that timeliness of 
syndromic influenza surveillance might be increased when non-clinical data sources are 
analysed. Furthermore, syndromic situational awareness can be enhanced if multiple 
syndromes are analysed in automated systems.  
 
Conclusions 
Syndromic surveillance can support Europe to timely assess various infectious and non-
infectious health threats. In this way, the approach can help European countries to meet 
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the new International Health Regulation’s (2005) surveillance requirements. The thesis 
presented a syndromic surveillance system concept that fits into the European context 
by balancing harmonisation efforts and diversity. The thesis also identified key success 
factors to inform the design of syndromic surveillance systems.  
Before a broader implementation of syndromic surveillance could be achieved, more 
evidence about the usefulness of the approach was necessary - beyond single cases 
reports. The thesis provided such evidence based on comparisons of multiple syndromic 
surveillance systems and across countries. The unique European ‘laboratory’ provided the 
opportunity to accomplish such comparative research and to generate new knowledge for 
action. 
 
Samenvatting 
Achtergrond  
Onze geglobaliseerde wereld wordt geconfronteerd met nieuwe, onbekende en 
verschillende uitdagingen voor de volksgezondheid door nieuw ontstane ziekten, 
natuurrampen of door de mens gemaakte gevaren. Deze vragen om snelle beslissingen 
en acties, die alleen gebaseerd op snelle informatie over de effecten van incidenten op 
de volksgezondheid kunnen worden genomen. Tot nu toe was traditionele 
volksgezondheidssurveillance gericht op specifieke, vooraf gedefinieerde ziekten of 
verwekkers van specifieke ziekten. Informatie is niet snel en ook niet voor verschillende 
soorten van bedreigingen van de gezondheid beschikbaar. Syndroomsurveillance kan 
deze lacune opvullen. Het is gericht op het aanvullen van traditionele surveillance met 
(bijna) realtime informatie over de impact van een incident op de volksgezondheid. 
Syndroomsurveillance analyseert bestaande, zo mogelijk elektronische data, die 
gewoonlijk niet voor surveillance reden zijn verzameld, bijvoorbeeld van zoekacties op 
internet of patientendossiers. Deze aanpak is relatief nieuw en er bestaat nog steeds 
twijfel over de meerwaarde ervan. 
Europa of de Europese Unie is een unieke constructie die hun lidstaten, die eigenlijk 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor gezondheidszaken, steunen om gezamenlijk 
gezondheidsgevaren te bestrijden of van elkaar te leren om nieuwe kennis te genereren. 
Drie dimensies van leren kunnen worden onderscheiden met een toenemende rol van de 
Europese context van de eerste tot de derde dimensie. In de eerste dimensie voorziet 
Europa een omgeving waarin staten van elkaar kunnen leren om nieuwe kennis voor hun 
eigen situatie te verzamelen (‘leren in Europa’). In de tweede dimensie wordt kennis voor 
Europa verzameld door harmonisatie, standaardisatie, generalisatie of identificatie van 
een gemeenschappelijke basis (‘leren voor Europa’). Hier zouden de principes van de 
Europese Unie zoals harmonisatie, subsidiariteit en wederzijdse erkenning worden 
gehanteerd zodat daarmee de kennis in de Europese context past. De derde dimensie is 
gericht op het genereren van nieuwe kennis gebaseerd op een gestructureerde analyse 
van verschillen tussen landen (‘leren van Europa’).  
Dit proefschrift was gericht op het analyseren van (1) de meerwaarde van 
syndroomsurveillance voor het verbeteren van de Europese surveillance capaciteit, en (2) 
de meerwaarde van de Europese context voor het genereren van nieuwe kennis over 
syndroomsurveillance. 
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Methode 
Voor het eerste doel is in het proefschrift ten eerste verkent hoe een specifieke Europese 
definitie voor syndroomsurveillance en een syndroomsurveillancesysteem eruit kan zien 
die de Europese principes harmonisatie, wederzijdse erkenning en subsidiariteit 
respecteren. Dit is bereikt door toepassing van consensusmethoden gebaseerd op de 
resultaten van een semi-gestructureerde survey en literatuuronderzoek. Ten tweede 
werd de bruikbaarheid van syndroomsurveillance voor Europa geanalyseerd door 
beoordeling van de sterkten en zwakte van syndroomsurveillance: actualiteit, flexibiliteit, 
extra informatie voorziening en niet-specificiteit. De analyse was gefocust op de drie 
belangrijkste doelen: surveillance van (seizoens) influenza en gastro-enteritis uitbraken, 
en situationele bewustzijn of situational awareness tijdens diverse incidenten. Ten slotte 
heeft dit proefschrift beoordeeld hoe het gebruik van syndroomsurveillance de Europese 
capaciteit kan verbeteren om aan de kernvoorwaarden voor surveillancecapaciteiten van 
de nieuwe Internationale Gezondheidsregelingen (2005) te voldoen. Deze twee 
analysestappen waren gebaseerd op kwantitatieve data analyses van routinematig 
verzamelde data uit de acute zorg in een casestudie opzet en een narratieve analyse van 
mixed data uit de literatuur. Voor het tweede doel is geanalyseerd hoe de Europese 
context een meerwaarde toevoegt aan het leren over syndroomsurveillance. De focus van 
deze analyse lag op een vergelijking van meerdere landen voor het identificeren van 
succesfactoren van syndroomsurveillancesysteemen. Voor deze stap werd de mixed-
method aanpak Qualitative Comparative Analysis toegepast, waarbij mixed data 
verzameld uit de literatuur en gegevens door het bezoeken van verschillende landen 
geanalyseerd werden. 
 
Resultaten 
De nieuwe syndroomsurveillance definitie is uitgebreider en generieker dan de vroegere 
definitie van de Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Het 
syndroomsurveillancesysteem concept balanceert tussen de Europese principes 
harmonisatie, wederzijdse erkenning en subsidiariteit. In plaats van het aanbevelen van 
één gestandaardiseerd Europees syndroomsurveillancesysteem stelt het concept de 
implementatie van een netwerk van regionale systemen voor. Dit concept werkt het best 
indien het toegepast wordt op lokale of regionale omstandigheden. De verwachting is dat 
de surveillanceresultaten nog steeds over landsgrenzen en systemen heen vergelijkbaar 
zijn. Het systeem is op dit moment geïmplementeerd in twee regio’s in Europa waardoor 
de toepasbaarheid van het concept voor de Europese context wordt aangetoond. 
Syndroomsurveillance is bruikbaar voor Europa met betrekking tot het aanleveren van 
actuele en aanvullende informatie voor diverse soorten van gezondheidsgevaren. Het 
belangrijkste sterke punt van syndroomsurveillance, actualiteit, werd bevestigd bij het 
onderzoeken van situaties voor alle drie doeleinden. Het sterke punt flexibiliteit werd 
bevestigd voor situational awareness tijdens diverse incidenten zoals bijvoorbeeld de 
influenza pandemie in 2009 of de instroming van immigranten uit Noordafrika naar Italie 
in 2011. Syndroomsurveillance is van bijzondere meerwaarde indien het extra informatie 
kan leveren over de impact van een incident of over specifieke populaties die niet worden 
gemonitord door traditionele surveillance. Niet-specificiteit geldt voor specifieke bronnen 
van data, syndromen of incidenten maar is geen algemeen zwak punt van 
syndroomsurveillance. Verder kan syndroomsurveillance de implementatie van de 
kernvoorwaarden voor surveillancecapaciteit van de Internationale 
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Gezondheidsregelingen (2005) steunen. Het kan het detecteren en beoordelen van lokale 
en regionale effecten van verschillende soorten van volksgezondheidsgevaren op een 
actuele manier ondersteunen. Dit geldt vooral voor ongewone en niet-besmettelijke 
gevaren waarvoor (actuele) informatie over de impact op de volksgezondheid op basis 
van andere systemen niet beschikbaar is. 
Met betrekking tot de meerwaarde van de Europese context voor het genereren van 
nieuwe kennis over syndroomsurveillance heeft dit proefschrift laten zien dat de nieuwe 
definitie en het systeemconcept als resultaat van ‘leren voor Europa’ zijn ontstaan. Dit 
proefschrift heeft vooral aangetoond dat nieuwe kennis over syndroomsurveillance werd 
genereerd door ‘leren van Europa’, gebaseerd op de vergelijkende analyse van 
syndroomsurveillancesystemen in verschillende landen. Hier werden 
sleutelsuccesfactoren voor syndroomsurveillancesystemen geïdentificeerd die 
besluitnemers in Europa en daaroverheen kunnen gebruiken indien deze een 
syndroomsurveillancesysteem willen inrichten of doorontwikkelen. De analyse heeft laten 
zien dat de actualiteit van syndroomsurveillance voor influenza geoptimaliseerd kan 
worden door het analyseren van niet-klinische data bronnen. Verder kan de situational 
awareness verbeterd worden door het analyseren van meerdere syndromen in 
geautomatiseerde systemen.  
 
Conclusie 
Syndroomsurveillance kan Europa steunen door een actuele beoordeling van 
verschillende besmettelijke en niet-besmettelijke gezondheidsgevaren. Daardoor kan 
deze aanpak Europese landen helpen aan de surveillance voorwaarden van de nieuwe 
Internationale Gezondheidsregelingen (2005) te voldoen. Dit proefschrift heeft een 
concept voor een syndroomsurveillancesysteem gepresenteerd dat in de Europese 
context past door het balanceren tussen het streven naar harmonisatie en diversiteit. Het 
proefschrift heeft ook sleutelsuccesfactoren geïdentificeerd die gebruikt kunnen worden 
in het design van syndroomsurveillancesystemen. 
Voordat een bredere implementatie van syndroomsurveillance kan worden bereikt was 
meer bewijs nodig over de meerwaarde van de aanpak – over enige casestudies heen. 
Dit proefschrift heeft dit bewijs geleverd gebaseerd op het vergelijken van meerdere 
syndroomsurveillancesystemen en meerdere landen. Het unieke Europese ‘laboratorium’ 
heeft de mogelijkheid voor dit soort vergelijkend onderzoek geboden en heeft nieuwe 
kennis voor vervolgactiviteiten opgeleverd. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Hintergrund 
Unsere globalisierte Welt steht vor neuen, unbekannten und vielschichtigen 
Herausforderungen für die öffentliche Gesundheit, durch neu auftretende Krankheiten, 
Naturkatastrophen oder von Menschenhand geschaffene Gefahren. Diese fordern schnelle 
Entscheidungen und Maßnahmen, die nur basierend auf schnell verfügbaren 
Informationen zu den Auswirkungen der Ereignisse auf die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung 
getroffen werden können. Bisher war die traditionelle Gesundheitsüberwachung oder 
Surveillance auf spezielle vordefinierte Krankheiten oder Krankheitserreger gerichtet. 
Diese kann Informationen weder schnell noch zu verschiedenen Arten von 
                                                                                                                              Summary – Samenvatting – Zusammenfassung   127 
Gesundheitsgefahren bereitstellen. Syndromsurveillance kann diese Lücke füllen. Sie hat 
das Ziel, die traditionelle Surveillance mit Informationen zur Auswirkung von diversen 
Gesundheitsgefahren auf die öffentliche Gesundheit (beinahe) in Echtzeit anzureichern. 
Syndromsurveillance analysiert bestehende, möglichst elektronische Daten, die 
gewöhnlich nicht für Surveillancezwecke gesammelt wurden, wie beispielsweise von 
Internetsuchanfragen oder aus Patientenakten. Der Ansatz ist relativ neu und es besteht 
noch Zweifel über seinen Mehrwert.   
Europa bzw. die Europäische Union ist ein einzigartiges Konstrukt, das die 
Mitgliedstaaten, die eigentlich für Gesundheitsfragen verantwortlich sind, dabei 
unterstützt, ihre Kräfte für die Bekämpfung von Gesundheitsgefahren zu bündeln oder 
voneinander zu lernen, um neues Wissen zu generieren. Es lassen sich drei Dimensionen 
des Lernens unterscheiden, wobei der europäische Kontext von der ersten bis zur dritten 
Dimension eine zunehmende Rolle spielt. In der ersten Dimension bietet Europa eine 
Umgebung, in der Länder voneinander lernen, um neues Wissen für ihre eigene Situation 
zu kreieren (‚Lernen in Europa‘). In der zweiten Dimension wird Wissen für Europa 
zusammengetragen durch Harmonisierung, Standardisierung, Generalisierung oder 
Identifikation eines gemeinsamen Nenners (‚Lernen für Europa‘). Hier sollten die 
europäischen Prinzipien wie Harmonisierung, Subsidiarität und gegenseitige Anerkennung 
mitbetrachtet werden, damit das Wissen in den europäischen Kontext passt. Die dritte 
Dimension konzentriert sich auf das Generieren neuen Wissens basierend auf 
strukturierten Analysen der Unterschiede zwischen Ländern (‚Lernen von Europa‘). 
Diese Dissertation hatte zum Ziel (1.) den Mehrwert von Syndromsurveillance für die 
Verbesserung von Europas Surveillancekapazität und (2.) den Mehrwert des europäischen 
Kontextes zur Generierung neuen Wissens über Syndromsurveillance zu untersuchen. 
 
Methoden 
Für das erste Ziel wurde in der Dissertation zunächst untersucht wie eine spezifisch 
europäische Definition für Syndromsurveillance und ein spezifisch europäisches 
Syndromsurveillancesystem aussehen könnten, indem die europäischen Prinzipien 
Harmonisierung, gegenseitige Anerkennung und Subsidiarität berücksichtigt werden. 
Dies wurde erreicht durch das Anwenden eines Konsensusmethodenansatzes und diesem 
zugrunde liegenden Ergebnissen einer halbstandardisierten Befragung und einer 
Literaturanalyse. Zweitens wurde der Nutzen von Syndromsurveillance für Europa durch 
die Bewertung ihrer hauptsächlichen Stärken und Schwäche analysiert: Aktualität, 
Flexibilität, Bereitstellung zusätzlicher Informationen und nicht-Spezifität. Die Analyse 
konzentrierte sich auf die drei Hauptanwendungsgebiete von Syndromsurveillance: 
Surveillance von (saisonalen) Influenza- und Gastroenteritisausbrüchen, und 
Lagebewußtsein oder Situational Awareness während unterschiedlicher Ereignisse. 
Zuletzt wurde in der Dissertation untersucht wie die Anwendung von Syndromsurveillance 
Europa darin unterstützen kann, die neuen Anforderungen für 
Surveillancekernkapazitäten der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften (2005) 
einzuhalten. Diese zwei Analyseschritte basierten auf der quantitativen Analyse von 
routinemäßig erhobenen Daten der Notfallversorgung und einem narrativen Review von 
gemischten Daten aus der Literatur. Für das zweite Ziel wurde in der Dissertation 
untersucht wie der europäische Kontext einen Mehrwert für das Lernen über 
Syndromsurveillance liefert. Der Fokus dieser Analyse lag auf einem Ländervergleich zur 
Identifikation von Schlüsselerfolgsfaktoren für Syndromsurveillancesysteme. Für diesen 
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Schritt ist die gemischte Methode Qualitative Comparative Analysis zur Anwendung 
gekommen, mit der gemischte Daten aus der Literatur und von Standortbesichtigungen 
in verschiedenen Ländern untersucht wurden. 
 
Ergebnisse 
Die neue Syndromsurveillancedefinition ist umfassender und allgemeiner anwendbar als 
die frühere Definition der Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Das 
Syndromsurveillancesystemkonzept findet einen Ausgleich zwischen den europäischen 
Prinzipien Harmonisierung, gegenseitige Anerkennung und Subsidiarität. Statt ein 
harmonisiertes europäisches Syndromsurveillancesystem zu empfehlen, sieht das 
Konzept die Implementierung eines Netzwerks regionaler Systeme vor. Das Konzept 
funktionierte am besten, wenn es an die lokalen oder regionalen Umstände angepasst 
wurde. Die Surveillanceergebnisse sind voraussichtlich dennoch über Systeme und 
Landesgrenzen hin vergleichbar. Das System ist momentan in zwei Regionen in Europa 
implementiert, wodurch die Anwendbarkeit im europäischen Kontext demonstriert wird. 
Syndromsurveillance ist für Europa im Hinblick auf die Bereitstellung von kurzfristigen 
und zusätzlichen Informationen zu verschiedenen Gesundheitsgefahren von Nutzen. Die 
hauptsächliche Stärke von Syndromsurveillancesystemen, Aktualität, wurde in der 
Untersuchung von Fällen aus allen drei Hauptanwendungsgebieten bestätigt. Die Stärke 
Flexibilität wurde für Situational Awareness während verschiedener Ereignisse, wie 
beispielsweise die Influenzapandemie 2009 oder die Einreisewelle von Flüchtlingen aus 
Nordafrika 2011 bestätigt. Syndromsurveillance ist besonders nützlich, wenn es 
zusätzliche Informationen zu den Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit oder auf 
bestimmte Bevölkerungsgruppen liefern kann, die nicht durch traditionelle 
Surveillancesysteme überwacht werden. Nicht-Spezifität kommt nur für bestimmte 
Datenquellen, Syndrome oder Ereignisse zum Tragen, ist aber keine generelle Schwäche 
von Syndromsurveillance. Des Weiteren kann Syndromsurveillance die Umsetzung der 
Kernanforderungen zur Surveillancekapazität der Internationalen 
Gesundheitsvorschriften (2005) erleichtern. Sie kann bei der schnelleren Entdeckung und 
Bewertung von lokalen und regionalen Auswirkungen verschiedener Arten von Gefahren 
für die öffentliche Gesundheit Unterstützung leisten. Dies gilt vor allem für seltene und 
nicht-infektiöse Gesundheitsgefahren, für die keine aktuellen Informationen zu den 
Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit durch andere Systeme vorliegen. 
Bezüglich des Mehrwerts des europäischen Kontextes für die Erwerbung neuen Wissens 
über Syndromsurveillance hat die Dissertation gezeigt, dass die neue Definition und das 
Systemkonzept aus einem ‚Lernen für Europa‘ heraus generiert wurden. Die Dissertation 
hat insbesondere zeigen können, dass basierend auf der vergleichenden Analyse von 
Syndromsurveillancesystemen verschiedener Länder neues Wissen durch ‚Lernen von 
Europa‘ abgeleitet werden konnte. Dabei sind Schlüsselerfolgsfaktoren für 
Syndromsurveillancesysteme identifiziert worden, die Entscheidungsträger in Europa und 
darüber hinaus bei der Implementierung oder Weiterentwicklung von 
Syndromsurveillancesystemen berücksichtigen können. Die Analyse hat ergeben, dass 
die Aktualität von syndromischer Influenzasurveillance durch die Analyse nicht-klinischer 
Daten gesteigert werden könnte. Des Weiteren kann Situational Awareness durch die 
Analyse mehrerer Syndrome in automatisierten Systemen verbessert werden. 
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Schlussfolgerungen 
Syndromsurveillance kann Europa dabei unterstützen, in kurzer Zeit verschiedenste 
infektiöse und nicht-infektiöse Gesundheitsgefahren zu beurteilen. Dadurch unterstützt 
der Ansatz europäische Länder dabei, die neuen Kernanforderungen zur 
Surveillancekapazität der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften (2005) einzuhalten. In 
der Dissertation wurde ein Syndromsurveillancesystemkonzept vorgestellt, das durch das 
Ausbalancieren von Harmonisierungsbemühungen und Diversität in den europäischen 
Kontext passt. Zudem wurden in der Dissertation Schlüsselerfolgsfaktoren identifiziert, 
die in die Gestaltung von Syndromsurveillancesystemen einfließen können. 
Vor einer breiteren Implementierung von Syndromsurveillancesystemen war mehr 
Evidenz zum Nutzen des Ansatzes notwendig – über einzelne Fallstudien hinaus. Die 
Dissertation hat, basierend auf dem Vergleich verschiedener 
Syndromsurveillancesysteme und verschiedener Länder, solche Evidenz geliefert. Das 
einzigartige europäische ‚Labor‘ hat diese Art vergleichende Forschung und das 
Generieren neuen Wissens für Folgeaktivitäten ermöglicht.  
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